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ABSTRACT

My dissertation addresses two fundamental problems confronting most Islamist
organizations: (a) their monolithic treatment by Western advocates of secular and democratic
change, who by default associate Islamism with extremism; and (b) their struggle to function
as unencumbered civil society actors and legitimate political entities in authoritarian political
societies. In that endeavor, I carry out an ideological analysis of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood’s (MB) English-language rhetoric in its website, Ikhwanweb: (a) to interpret the
worldview manifest in its cyber rhetoric, and identify the rhetorical strategies that support
this worldview; and b) to examine Ikhwanweb’s potential as a tool for counterpublic
expression in a repressive political environment, counterpublics being alternative, nondominant publics, who voice their oppositional needs and values through diverse discursive
practices. The timeframe for choice of rhetorical texts for this analysis was from 2005 to
2010, which corresponds with Hosni Mubarak’s finals years as Egypt’s President. My
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analysis unearths a Counterpublic Cyber Islamic worldview held by the Egyptian MB; a
worldview characterized by endemic dialectical tensions. The core tensions identified are: (a)
openness and closedness, or the desire to be open and share information versus the desire to
be private; (b) autonomy and connectedness, or the need to separate to maintain uniqueness
versus the desire to have ties and connections with others; (c) equality and inequality, or the
desire to be considered as equals versus the desire to develop levels of superiority; and (d)
possession and deficiency, or the need to portray what we have versus the desire to manifest
deficiency, or what we do not have. These dialectics point to four core elements that
constitute this worldview: (a) distrust towards the Hosni Mubarak regime, and Western
agents who aid and support authoritarian governments; (b) the need to be valued—to be
respected, considered equals, understood without prejudices, and acknowledged despite
differences—by Western agents; (c) the significance of caution in its online communications;
and (d) the flux resulting from its efforts at transitioning into an organization that has an
Islamic essence but nurtures democratic aspirations. This worldview is constructed through
three rhetorical paradigms—the show of support, the portrayal of opposition, and the display
of contradiction. These paradigms are demonstrated through specific rhetorical tactics—
consubstantiation, resource sharing, testimony, epithet, negative other-presentation, action
over substance, generalization, implication, and antithesis. Based on these findings I assert
that the Egyptian MB has genuine democratic intentions. Inherent in its Counterpublic Cyber
Islamic worldview is a need for an Islamic reformulation and an effort at becoming an entity
within the Egyptian society that can counter authoritarianism, promote human rights and a
robust civil society, and establish a system of governance based on democratic ideals yet
preserve its Islamic ethos. In addition, a major success of using Ikhwanweb as a

xiii
counterpublic sphere is in the Egyptian MB’s ability to reach out to the Western world. The
intent is to apprise prejudiced agents in the West that Islamic organizations are not inherently
extremist entities, and to disapprove Western agents’ support for authoritarian regimes,
which despite being secular neither support democracy nor foster robust civil societies. In
fact, it becomes imperative that in today’s post-Mubarak era the West pay attention to the
moderate rhetoric of the Egyptian MB and support its attempts at helping Egyptians reach
their manifest destiny—live as free citizens in a democratic Egypt.
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Chapter I: Setting the Stage
In a stimulating account of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Robert S. Leiken, Director
of the Immigration and National Security Program at the Nixon Center, and Steven Brooke, a
research associate of this public policy think tank, addressed it as one of the “world’s oldest,
largest, and most influential Islamist” organizations as well as the “most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East”
(2007, p. 107). According to Leiken and Brooke, scholars and commentators from the West
have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s
assault force . . . deeply hostile to the United States” (p. 107). On the other hand, and rather
ironically, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of the militant Islamist group Al-Qaeda,
accused the Muslim Brothers of “luring thousands of young Muslim men into lines for
elections . . . instead of into the lines of jihad” (a holy war) (Leiken & Brooke, 2007, p. 107).
This account aptly portrays the predicament of the Muslim Brotherhood; it is often under
attack by agents of secular and democratic change as well as agents of militant jihad.
The controversial and complex nature of the Muslim Brotherhood—and consequently
the ambiguity surrounding its ideology and objectives—have led scholars to explore the
Brotherhood’s stance on Islam and jihad, elections and democracy, civil society, Israel and
the West, and most importantly, the type of society the group seeks to create (Burke &
Lapidus, 1988; Kepel, 2002; Moaddel, 2005; Zollner, 2008). However, academics as well as
policy makers often are handicapped by their tendency to see the Muslim Brotherhood, and
Islamism as a whole, as a monolith (Leiken & Brooke, 2007).
In an effort to define Islamism, Rangus (2004) states that Islamists are those Muslims
who seek to use the basic principles of Islam to seek reform. In other words, Islamists
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consider Islam not only to be a religion, but also a political program. This description is at
best simplistic. To get a comprehensive and contextual understanding of what Islamism is,
what Islamists seek, and how they achieve it, one has to consider the diverse interactional
dynamics that characterize religion—in this case Islam—and politics, in varied contexts.
Leiken and Brooke (2007) describe the MB as “a collection of national Islamist groups with
differing outlooks, and the various national factions often disagree about how best to advance
its mission” (p. 108), reiterating the fact that Islamism is not a monolith. Thus, it becomes
pertinent to analyze each national Muslim Brotherhood faction independently to: (a)
understand and explore its specific ideology, actions, and motives; and (b) avoid a reductive
treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood, and more broadly, Islamism.
In this dissertation, I focus primarily on the Egyptian faction of the Muslim
Brotherhood since the MB was founded in Egypt. Today, Egypt is the main hub of the
organization, with Cairo as its headquarters. Wickham (2002) states:
The rise of a popular Islamic reform movement in Egypt not only has transformed the
character of opposition politics in the world’s largest Arab state, but also has affected
political trends beyond Egypt’s borders; looking ahead, Egypt’s stature as a leader in
the Arab world is such that an Islamic victory—at the polls or in the streets—could
significantly alter regional alliances, as well as offer a model and source of inspiration
for Islamist parties in neighboring states. Finally, the Mubarak regime’s status in
Egypt as an American ally and strategic partner in the Arab-Israeli peace process has
given to a broader set of international actors a stake in Egypt’s political stability. (p.
4)
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Although the implications of the January 2011 Egyptian Revolution, which led to the
overthrow of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, are numerous, the significant role Egypt played in
affecting the regional balance of power in the Arab world and its political centrality in the
region during Mubarak’s rule, raised the importance and impact of the Islamic trend in Egypt
(Wickham, 2002). All these factors make the Egyptian faction of the MB appropriate for
exploration.
The evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, since its founding in that country
in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a schoolteacher, has been associated with climactic resurgences
interspersed by successive government crackdowns. The periods of resurgence usually have
been marked by the coming into prominence of individuals, such as Sayyid Qutb or Hassan
al-Hudaybi, who significantly influenced the Brotherhood’s ideology and activities during
their period of eminence. These episodes of resurgence, however, have been accompanied by
major government intrusion and interference. Both dynastic and nationalist Egyptian
governments have accused, suppressed, and tortured Brotherhood members after plots, or
alleged plots, of assassination and overthrow were uncovered to the point that the group was
officially banned from 1954, and remained as such till the ousting of erstwhile President
Hosni Mubarak in 2011. For several decades the MB neither enjoyed legal status nor was
recognized as a political party, and despite official renunciation of violence in the 1970s, the
Brotherhood continued to face periodic suppressions (McDonough, 2005).
Nevertheless, the Brotherhood’s position in Egypt as an influential and powerful nongovernmental organization and its significant role in Egyptian civil society is irrefutable
(McDonough, 2005). In addition, regardless of the ban it faced, the MB remained a
prominent political force in Egyptian political life. Although it was banned, the group was
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able to gain some representation in Parliament through members who ran as independents in
previous elections.
The changing and complex roles the MB has been playing in Egyptian society has led
diverse audiences—the secular Egyptian regime led by Hosni Mubarak till 2011, varied
Western agents, especially the US, or militant fundamentalists—to form multiple and often
contradictory perceptions of what the Brotherhood stands for and just what its ideology and
motives are; Moaddel (2005) claims that these changes and complexities have led to the
creation of multiple and changing discourses within the Brotherhood, and consequently,
about the Brotherhood. This scenario reinforces the importance of exploring the Egyptian
MB in this dissertation.
Specifically, I explore the rhetorical dynamics of the Egyptian Brotherhood, as
present in the MB official English website, Ikhwanweb, during the final years of Hosni
Mubarak’s rule in Egypt. Counterpublic theory and rhetorical criticism form the conceptual
and methodological foundations of this study. Through this dissertation, I seek an
understanding of: (a) the Egyptian MB’s ideology and motives as manifest in its Englishlanguage rhetoric in Ikhwanweb; (b) the rhetorical strategies the Egyptian MB uses to
construct a worldview; and (c) the dynamics of counterpublicity exhibited rhetorically by the
Egyptian MB and its possible implications on Western agents and the global civil sphere
during Hosni Mubarak’s final years as Egypt’s President. In addition, I also address the use
of the Internet by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood for counterpublic expression, and
consequently, the Internet’s potential for revitalizing the role of the public sphere and civil
society. The following sections include brief overviews (to be elaborated in Chapter 2) of the
relation between the Habermasian public sphere, civil society, and counterpublic theory; the
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role of rhetoric in counterpublic studies; the Internet as a communicative forum for
counterpublics; the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s identity dilemma; and finally, the
rationale and purpose of this study.
From Public Sphere to Counterpublics
The publication of Jurgen Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois Society in 1962 is widely considered to be
the origin of post-war research on the public sphere, specifically in Western societies (Asen
& Brouwer, 2001). It is also considered the basis of most contemporary public sphere
theories. Through this work, Habermas gave a “historical-sociological account of the
creation, brief flourishing, and demise of a bourgeois public sphere based on rational-critical
debate and discussion” (Berdal, 2004, p. 21).
Habermas (1989) specifies that, due to certain unique historical circumstances, a new
civic society emerged in Europe in the 18th century. Berdal (2004) states:
Driven by a need for open commercial arenas where news and matters of common
concern could be freely exchanged and discussed, accompanied by growing rates of
literacy, accessibility to literature, and a new kind of critical journalism, a separate
domain from ruling authorities started to evolve across Europe. (p. 21)
The emergent bourgeoisie created a public sphere in which state authority was publicly
monitored, and the means to do that was informed and critical discourse, in other words,
rational argument by the people (Habermas, 1989).
Habermas’s views on the public sphere had considerable immediate influence, and his
views enjoyed renewed prominence after The Structural Transformation was translated in
1989. Although it has led to important scholarship, especially on the late 18th and early 19th
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century cases Habermas used for his analysis, two criticisms of his public sphere theory have
been central: (a) the notion that Habermas neglected the proletariat; and (b) the privileging of
reason too much over experience as a source of political judgment (Calhoun & McQuarrie,
2004). The first criticism is central to this study.
Before elaborating on this critique it becomes important to delve briefly into the
concept of civil society for two key reasons. First, civil society finds itself at the crosssection of important intellectual debates and developments on topics such as democracy and
the public sphere and Islam and the West. Second, civil society is a vital component of this
study by virtue of its association with the concept of public sphere. According to Tlanhlua
(2008), the Center for Civil Society at the London School of Economics defines civil society
as follows:
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared
interests, purposes, and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct
from those of the state, family, and market, though in practice, the boundaries
between state, civil society, family, and market are often complex, blurred, and
negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors, and
institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil
societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities,
development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women’s
organizations, faith-based and religious organizations, professional associations, trade
unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions,
and advocacy groups. (para. 1)
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According to Edwards (2005, para. 10), the concept of a public—“a whole polity that
cares about the common good and has the capacity to deliberate about it democratically”—is
central to a civil society as it leads to “effective governance, practical problem-solving, and
the peaceful resolution of differences.” Furthermore, as a public sphere, civil society also
becomes the platform for debates and deliberation, association and institutional collaboration.
Therefore, the flourishing of the civil sphere is crucial to the strengthening of democratic
ideas and institutions. But, “if alternative viewpoints are silenced by exclusion or suppression
or if one set of voices are heard more loudly than those of others, the public interest
inevitably suffers” (Edwards, 2005, para. 10); in this respect civil society becomes a vital
element of this study. The concern over silencing alternative viewpoints brings this
discussion back to the critique of Habermas’s public sphere theory—the idealization of the
bourgeois public sphere as a forum for rational-critical debate—which leads to the neglect of the
potential and dynamics of the proletarian public sphere.
Negt and Kluge (1993) suggest that the proletarian public sphere, in fact, worked in
parallel to the bourgeois public sphere as a counterpublic. The term counterpublic took its
place in academic discourse in 1972 as Gegenöffentlichkeit in the German-language work of
Negt and Kluge, Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung (Public Sphere and Experience), and as
aforementioned, their work challenged Habermas’s (1962/1989) account of the bourgeois
public sphere. However, the term counterpublic entered English-language scholarship in
1989 through Rita Felski’s work Beyond Feminist Aesthetics. Notably, in this work Felski
describes the counterpublic constituted by feminist literature as “oppositional discursive
space” (p. 155) that alters, even as it is shaped by, the ideological structures within which it
emerged. But Nancy Fraser’s conceptualization of counterpublic is most widely applied in
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academic circles (Brouwer, 2006). Fraser (1992) suggests that subordinated social groups, or
“subaltern counterpublics,” often find it “advantageous to constitute alternative public . . . in
order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social
groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of
their identities, interests, and needs” (p.123).
According to Brouwer (2006), most definitions of counterpublic share three key
features: oppositionality, constitution of a discursive arena, and a dialectic of retreat from and
engagement with other publics. To elaborate on each, oppositionality is characterized by a
stance of “resistance, rejection, or dissent” (Brouwer, 2006, p. 197). The notion of
oppositionality is essentially perceptual, that is counterpublics are created when social actors
perceive themselves to be marginalized within dominant publics, and they communicate
about that exclusion. Second, according to Brouwer (2006), communication about
marginality helps to comprise a discursive arena. Discursive “refers not just to speech—
written or spoken language—but also to visual communication and bodily display” (p. 197).
Further, this discursive arena is in fact a conceptual metaphor rather than just a specific
place; here people who communicate oppositional stances have the ability to create imagined
communities (Anderson, 1991) through asynchronous communication, over and above
simply meeting together in physical spaces (Brouwer, 2006).
Finally, counterpublics entail a dialectic of inward and outward address (Brouwer,
2006). In other words, oppositional communication exhibited by counterpublics necessitates
not only interaction among themselves in moments of regrouping or reflection, but also, this
inward communication anticipates and is in preparation of outward engagements with other
publics. In that sense, “radical exclusions such as forced exile or chosen separatism, in which
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social actors cannot or do not address other publics, do not constitute counterpublicity”
(Brouwer, 2005, p. 197).
Several concerns arise in relation to the praxis and potential of counterpublic theory
to study a particular phenomenon. For instance, Doxtader (2001) states that since few groups
self-identify as counterpublic, it becomes difficult to assess whether counterpublics are an
integral feature of democracy, a normative benchmark, or a figurative entity symbolizing
certain kinds of activity. Also, with the promise to expand the form of public life,
counterpublics may challenge the conventions of deliberation, creating alternative conduits
of discussion, or they may use opposition to create the basis for consensus (Doxtader, 2001).
Thus, a crucial question arises: how do counterpublics operate, and what might allow one to
examine dynamics of counterpublics’ communication and its political value? This question
resonates with my interest in exploring the counterpublic dynamics of the Egyptian MB and
assessing its political value and subsequent impact on civil society. Therein rests the
justification of using counterpublic theory for this dissertation.
Rhetoric in Counterpublic Studies
Rhetoric, in one of its widely used descriptions, is defined as “the human use of
symbols to communicate. This definition includes three primary dimensions: (a) humans as
the creators of rhetoric; (b) symbols as the medium for rhetoric; and (c) communication as
the purpose for rhetoric” (Foss, 2004, p. 4). The qualitative research method, according to
Foss (2004), which is designed for the purpose of studying rhetoric, often begins with an
interest in understanding particular symbols and how they operate to deepen appreciation and
understanding of a rhetorical text.
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Gronbeck (1975) defines rhetorical criticism as including “any examination of
discourse and rhetors which essentially or primarily is intrinsic [emphasis in original], any
analysis which finds most of its confirming materials inside a rhetorical artifact [emphasis in
original]” (p. 314); the purpose of these studies is to extract the fundamental essence of a
rhetorical artifact; principally to render aesthetic, ethical, or metacultural judgments; and
consequently generate norms. The nature of these judgments is “not descriptive-causal but
rather valuative-advisory-philosophical, not subject to tests of truthfulness or falsehood but to
tests of consistency and insightfulness” (p. 315). Thus, based on Foss (2004) and Gronbeck
(1975), rhetorical criticism generally is carried out for three primary reasons: (a) to
appreciate rhetorical structures and processes; (b) to generate norms or productive guidelines;
and (c) for advocacy.
To elaborate, “humanity . . . preconsciously seeks structure and organization”
(Gronbeck, 1975, p. 315). From that standpoint, when rhetorical criticism is applied to a text,
it is regarded not so much as an object of contemplation but as a structured instrument of
communication; “rhetoricians are more interested in a work for what it does [emphasis in
original] than for what it is [emphasis in original]” (Corbett, 1969, p. xxii). By unearthing
what a text teaches about the nature of rhetoric, rhetorical critics make a contribution to
rhetorical theory, thus improving the practice of communication. In terms of the second goal
for rhetorical criticism, that of generating norms or productive guidelines for others, “either a
single figure or a set of discourses can be examined to reveal some standard-for-judgment
which the reader can apply to other discourses or to his own practice” (Gronbeck, 1975, p.
315). These norms, thus, help classify or typify problematic, or simply, varied discourses. An
important step beyond norm-generation for rhetorical critics is advocacy. In this sense, critics
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see themselves as advocates and address society rather than a rhetorical event; these critics
believe they are using the study of a certain discourse “to affect our feelings and cognitions
about the current world-at-large.” Thus, the ultimate goal of the critic as advocate is to either
gain adherents or to stir counter-argument (Gronbeck, 1975, p. 317).
Brouwer (2006) claims that in the field of communication, rhetorical critics have been
the scholars who have most vigorously taken up counterpublic theory; such scholars are
prone to thinking in terms of conflict, dissent, and argument, and counterpublic’s origins in
oppositionality thereby makes it an apt match for rhetorical scholars. According to Hauser
(2001):
Insofar as a public sphere excludes ideas and speakers through impermeable
boundaries, privileges public relations over deliberation, enforces the technical jargon
of elites over contextualized language specific to issues and their consequences,
presupposes conformity of values and ends, and imposes a preordained orientation, its
discursive features undermine its status as a public sphere. Most importantly, when
official public spheres repress the emergence of rhetorically salient meanings, those
meanings are likely to emerge elsewhere in oppositional sites, or counterpublic
spheres. (p. 36)
Therefore, the process for engaging in the study of counterpublic communication—of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in this dissertation—is rhetorical criticism.
A counterpublic sphere is “a site of resistance” (Hauser, 2001, p. 36). Sometimes this
resistance is militant as in an underground movement, and sometimes it is apparently benign
as in the counterpublic sphere of a minority community, enacting its own internal business. It
must be kept in mind, however, that the rhetorical study of counterpublic spheres does not

12
always ascribe an interest in consensus to counterpublics; rather, it tries to unearth and
explore whether local speech acts create an opportunity for dialogue and agreement
(Doxtader, 2001). This distinction, Doxtader (2001) explains, means that the goal is to
understand “how counterpublics identify themselves, challenge the conventions of dominant
discourse, and recover the productive contingency of speech and action” (p. 66); these
nuances are at the core of this study. Furthermore, the rhetorical study of counterpublic
spheres harkens back to the goals of rhetorical criticism—that of analyzing the structure of a
symbolic discourse to unearth what it does, to generate guidelines to classify or type complex
discourses, and to affect feelings and cognitions about the world-at-large to gain adherents or
to stir counter-argument. These conditions justify the importance of studying the rhetoric of
counterpublics.
Internet as a Site of Counterpublic Communication
In work that is becoming increasingly key to studies in the public sphere, practitioners
and scholars continue to explore the ways in which counterpublics and dominant publics
employ the Internet in their engagements with each other, and the types of discursive fora to
which the Internet gives rise. According to McDorman (2001), researchers also need to
explore significant questions, such as how virtual space impacts the operation of the public
sphere and whether it truly offers new opportunities for the advancement of resistance or
merely presents the same obstacles in new forms. In this dissertation, I analyze the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood’s online rhetoric in Ikhwanweb, and by extension, the implications of
its use of the Internet as a counterpublic sphere.
Globally, the growth of the Internet has been faster than any past communication
technology: “In 1994, only four years after it became widely accessible, the Internet
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supported a usership of 50 million people; by mid-1998, the Internet had over 140 million
users with a predicted usership of 700 million by 2001” (United Nations Development
Programme [UNDP] 1999, p. 58). As of March 2009, approximately 1,596,270,108 people
worldwide use the Internet, according to Internet World Stats. Given such an astounding rate
of growth, it is not unnatural to be optimistic about the ability of the Internet to enhance
communication, to invigorate already existing groups and collectives, and to create new
kinds of associations.
However, those who believe the potential impact of the Internet is either negligible or
almost entirely negative offer a variety of arguments. For instance, Asen and Brouwer (2001)
claim, “tempering such optimism, however, is the fact that structural exclusions often
alienate marginal peoples from the very technologies that could enable their amelioration” (p.
21). Four primary objections to the Internet are that commercialization will ruin its potential,
access is limited to the elite, reflective interaction among participants is rare, and it fails to
produce truly deliberative democracy (McDorman, 2001).
Nevertheless, even if one concurs with the negative aspects, it cannot be denied that
under certain circumstances the Internet presents opportunities favorable to a broad range of
counterpublics and social movements. In an analysis of how Indian immigrants use the
Internet, Mitra (1997) claims that the Internet plays a significant role in creating a virtually
connected community for the Indian diaspora. Resnick (1998) notes that the Internet has the
potential to facilitate democratic politics, while Kellner (1998) claims that “cyberactivists
have been attempting to carry out globalization from below, developing networks of
solidarity and circulating struggle throughout the globe” (p. 185).
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In an effort to confront cynical evaluations of the potential of the Internet, Sampaio
and Aragon (1998) argue that the Internet challenges traditional notions of language and
social construction, disrupting “the production of more traditional subjectivities” and
allowing for “the production of alternate subject positions, and by extension alternate
political practices” (p. 145). Gurak (1997) adds that by extending the physical boundaries of
local communities, new communication technologies create alternate fora for citizen
participation. For counterpublics, such as the Egyptian MB, extended and diverse fora might
mean valuable discursive spaces from which to engage and interact with dominant powers
and wider publics, such as militant fundamentalists, Western agents, or state power. 1
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Identity Dilemma
The Muslim Brotherhood is considered to be Egypt’s oldest and most influential
Islamist Sunni Muslim group (Biot Report, 2005). The Muslim Brotherhood was founded
when Egypt was in the midst of a national turmoil; in 1928, its founder Hasan al-Banna
created the MB “as an outlet to express political dissent to the short-lived half-hearted liberal
experiment with parliamentary democracy” (Hassan, 2005, p. 3). During this experiment the
unquestioned embrace of European values by the parliamentary regime, on top of concerns
associated with foreign colonization, “ostensibly alienated the population from the
parliamentary regime and from the politicians and intellectuals who claimed to speak for the
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Estes (2011) states, “the United Nations counts Internet access as a basic human right in a report that
bears implications both to ongoing events in the Arab Spring [a revolutionary wave of demonstrations
and protests against dictatorial regimes that has been taking place in the Arab world since December
2010] and to the Obama administration’s war on whistle-blowers. Acting as special rapporteur [sic], a
human rights watchdog role appointed by the U.N. [sic] Secretary General, Frank La Rue takes a hard
line on the importance of the Internet as ‘an indispensable tool for realizing a range of human rights,
combating inequality, and accelerating development and human progress’” (para. 1).
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people but ignored their economic grievances and insulted their Islamic sensibilities”
(Cleveland, 2004, p. 198), thus contributing to large scale national unrest.
The Muslim Brotherhood has rooted itself in Egypt through its successful social
programs and also seeks to assert its presence through a popular appeal, which on the other
hand the secular authoritarian Egyptian regime of Hosni Mubarak failed to capture (Hassan,
2005). Moreover, in recent years the organization’s campaign for democratic reforms and
equal representation in elections and its fight for social justice and civil liberties placed it in
direct opposition to Hosni Mubarak’s tyrannical tendencies.
The assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt on October 6, 1981, by a
military cell within the scattered ranks of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, an offshoot of the
Muslim Brothers, led by Sunni Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, resulted in Zawahiri’s
imprisonment by Hosni Mubarak for three years. According to Wright (2002), while in
prison, Zawahiri transformed from a relatively moderate Islamist into a violent extremist;
there he encountered Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (now imprisoned for life for crimes
relating to the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993), with whom he had numerous
debates about the best way to achieve a true Islamic revolution. According to the Biot Report
(2005) of the Suburban Energy Management Project, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad fused with
Al-Qaeda, led by Sunni Saudi Osama bin Laden, to form Qaeda al-Jihad in June 2001. The
Muslim Brotherhood’s connection with extremist ideologies, such as its apparent association
with movements like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, problematizes comprehension of the
ideology and objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood, both within Egypt and for the world.
Scholars and policymakers, nations and governments, have viewed the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood from various perspectives—an extremist and radical Islamist
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organization, an illegal non-governmental organization, a civil association, and the Egyptian
government’s most popular opposition, to name a few. The Brotherhood has been portrayed
as anti-secular, anti-Western, opposed to liberal nationalism, out to reclaim Islam’s manifest
destiny (Davidson, 1998), and as a proponent of democratic reform. This element of intrigue
characterizing the Egyptian MB’s identity dynamics predisposed this study to an exploration
and understanding of how the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood rhetorically positions itself in
its official English-language website, how it defines and delineates its ideology, acts, and
goals, and the implications of these rhetorical positionings.
Rationale and Purpose
US President Barack Obama addressed the Muslim world from Cairo University on
June 4, 2009. In opening a bold proposition to the Islamic world, President Obama
confronted frictions between Muslims and the West, pledging “to seek a new beginning
between the United States and Muslims.” Following are excerpts from his speech:
The relationship between Islam and the west includes centuries of co-existence and
co-operation, but also conflict and religious wars . . . . Violent extremists have
exploited these tensions in a small but potent minority of Muslims. The attacks of
September 11, 2001 and the continued efforts of these extremists to engage in
violence against civilians has led some in my country to view Islam as inevitably
hostile not only to America and western countries, but also to human rights. This has
bred more fear and mistrust . . . . So long as our relationship is defined by our
differences, we will empower those who sow hatred rather than peace, and who
promote conflict rather than the co-operation that can help all of our people achieve
justice and prosperity. This cycle of suspicion and discord must end . . . . I have come
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here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the
world…. (The Huffingtonpost, 2009)
In this speech President Obama stated that stereotypes must be fought, and the cycle of
suspicion and discord must end. This dissertation is an endeavor towards this new beginning,
and therein rests this study’s overall significance. A contextual understanding of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology manifest in its English-language rhetoric in Ikhwanweb will
provide a unique perspective on the intent and actions of, and the challenges faced by
Islamist organizations. Consequently, this understanding will address the problem of a
monolithic and reductive treatment of Islamist organizations. This in turn could be
instrumental in slowing the cycle of discord between Muslims and Western agents.
The means used to address the concerns raised in this study are counterpublic theory
and rhetorical communication. In light of Egypt’s history, the relationship between the
Muslim Brotherhood and the government has been one of conflict and tension, and some of
the reasons contributing to that are a history of exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood from
the mainstream political process, an unfamiliarity with the objectives of the Muslim
Brotherhood that breeds potential unease and mistrust, and systematic suppression of the
organization’s members by state officials. In addition, since September 11, 2001, in the
minds of millions around the world and especially in the West, Islam has been
uncompromisingly associated with extremism, violence, and conflict; thus, any organization
or movement with an Islamist ethos has had a complex and often uphill relationship with the
West defending their stance, be it moderate or extremist. Whether episodically or enduringly,
openly or secretly, Islamist organizations such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have
encountered (a) militant fundamentalist organizations; (b) Western agents; and (c) the state in
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complex, multiform relations. Using counterpublic theory as the theoretical framework for
this study and situating the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a counterpublic to all three
groups aforementioned, an exploration of counterpublic dynamics is undertaken in this
dissertation.
According to Doxtader (2001), a rhetorical view endeavors to uncover the occasion,
the figurative elements of communication, and representational functions of a counterpublic.
It also provides an understating of the rhetorical processes by which the grounds of
agreement are cultivated from within expressions of opposition, or whether, in the face of
limitations dissidents engage in rhetorical resistance without reaching consensus (Hauser,
2001). To explore the dynamics of counterpublicity, thus, analysis of the rhetoric used by the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood becomes important to this study.
Finally, “when engagement with counterpublic agents provokes too many risks such
as the threat of damaging critique, loss of credibility, exposure of villainy or corruption, or
instigation of anti-government uprising, states may act by removing agitator(s) from public
view” (Asen & Brouwer, 2001, p. 19). Typically achieved through torture, exile,
imprisonment, and so on, such removal places severe limitations on the political activities of
counterpublics. According to Cleveland (2004), Al-Banna explored ways in which Muslims
could take advantage of the technological capabilities provided by the 20th century.
Following that legacy, one way the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood endeavors to take
advantage of technology, especially in the face of severe limitations and constraints, is by
maintaining their official English website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/.
As aforementioned, use of the Internet by counterpublics highlights the “vitality of
the Internet in promoting increased political activism of groups that have had a prolonged
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physical existence,” or the possibilities of the Internet to increase counterpublic expression,
facilitate different styles and forms of discursive exchange, etc., in situations of opposition,
repression, suspicion, and conflict (McDorman, 2001, p. 192). Furthermore, the About Us
section of http://www.ikhwanweb.com/ states, “Our main mission is to present the Muslim
Brotherhood vision right from the source and rebut misconceptions about the movement in
western [sic] societies.” A study focusing on the English language rhetoric of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood in its website, therefore, can address the concerns raised in this
dissertation.
To reiterate, broadly, this study: (a) addresses the problem of the monolithic treatment
of the Muslim Brotherhood by Western agents; (b) explores the potential of the Internet as a
tool for counterpublic expression; and (c) evaluates the role Islamist organizations might (or
might not) play in strengthening civil society. Specifically, the purpose is to explore the
English-language rhetoric of the Egyptian MB in its official English website to understand:
(a) the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as manifest in its English-language
cyber rhetoric; (b) the dynamics of its relationship as a counterpublic to militant
fundamentalist organizations, Western agents, and the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt; and
(c) the implications of the Egyptian Brotherhood’s online rhetorical manifestations of its
worldview and counterpublic dynamics on Western agents and global civil society. The
findings of this study will make a significant contribution to the literature on rhetoric and
counterpublicity, and Internet and civil society, in the context of Islam and the Middle East
as well as foster a unique perspective through which Western agents, and the rest of the
world, can view the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
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Preview of Chapters
The main focus of this dissertation, as detailed in this chapter, is to gain a contextual
perspective of the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, its role as a counterpublic,
and its use of the Internet, through analysis of its English-language rhetoric in
www.ikhwanweb.com. In Chapter Two, with an aim to define counterpublic and
counterpublic sphere for this study, I review Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, discuss
critiques of the same, and elaborate on the reconfigurations of the public sphere. Thereafter, I
discuss and define the concepts of rhetoric and rhetorical criticism and review some key
studies on rhetoric, communication, and counterpublics. Finally, I describe certain
fundamental characteristics of the Internet as technology and evaluate significant debates on
the promises and problems associated with Internet use in general and in the context of the
Middle East.
In Chapter Three, I contextualize the Muslim Brotherhood for this study, and in that
endeavor present an in-depth discussion of the Egyptian Brotherhood’s origin and evolution.
I also discuss the Islamist ideology and how it applies to this dissertation and review debates
and perceptions surrounding the Muslim Brotherhood in both scholarly and policy circles,
especially in the West. I conclude this chapter with the research questions, namely:
RQ1: What is the ideology manifest in the English-language rhetoric of the Egyptian
Muslim Brothers in www.ikhwanweb.com?
RQ2: What rhetorical strategies provide support for this ideology?
In Chapter Four, I provide a comprehensive discussion and justification of the
methodological framework utilized in this dissertation, including an overview of ideological
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rhetorical analysis. A detailed description of the artifact for analysis, data-analysis
techniques, the standards of evaluation, and role of researcher are included.
In Chapter Five, I present a detailed account of the analysis of the artifact, and in
Chapter Six I answer the research questions. Chapter Seven includes commentaries based on
the ideology and rhetorical strategies unearthed, specifically around the issues of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s counterpublic dynamics, and its use of
www.ikhwanweb.com as a counterpublic sphere. I conclude by presenting a discussion of the
implications and contributions of this study, and the challenges faced in its undertaking.
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Chapter II: What the Literature Says
A study that explores the English-language rhetorical dynamics of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood as manifest in its official English website, Ikhwanweb, can foster a
contextual understanding of the Egyptian Brotherhood’s ideology, role, and objectives by
Western audiences. At the same time, this study sheds light on the Egyptian MB’s role as a
counterpublic and its use of the Internet for counterpublic expression. In this chapter, I
review the origin and nature of the Habermasian public sphere and critiques surrounding it,
eventually leading to a discussion of the concept of counterpublic. I include an overview of
the role and contribution of rhetoric, communication, and rhetorical criticism to this study.
Finally, I present a discussion of the strengths and shortcomings of the Internet, and review
some key issues surrounding its discursive and emancipatory potential as applicable to this
study.
The Habermasian Public Sphere
The concept of the public sphere has a long and complex genealogy. Jurgen
Habermas’s (1962/1989) early study, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere:
An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, traces much of that genealogy, revealing
the shifting meanings that are attached to this concept and the various struggles and sociohistorical changes, which have occasioned them. In this historical analysis the public sphere
takes a variety of forms. After the demise of representative publicity the literary public
sphere emerges, then transforms into the political sphere in the public realm.
Representative publicity operated in the feudal states of medieval and early modern
Europe. Essentially, it consisted of the King or the nobility representing their political power
before the people. According to Habermas (1989):
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Publicness (or publicity) of representation was not constituted as a social realm, that
is, as a public sphere; rather, it was something like a status attribute. . . .The manorial
lord . . . displayed himself, presented himself as an embodiment of some “higher”
power. . . . Representation in the sense in which the members of a national assembly
represent a nation or a lawyer represents his clients had nothing to do with this
publicity of representation inseparable from the lord’s concrete existence, that, as an
“aura,” surrounded and endowed his authority. (p. 7)
The literary public sphere developed in the 18th century. Its key institutions were
literary journals, periodicals, and the coffee houses and salons where these publications were
discussed. For the first time, the public could critically discuss art and literature, drawing on
the emotional resources they developed within the family, and in the process began emerging
a novel, individualized sense of selfhood. In this manner, the literary public sphere spread
beyond the pages of the printed press and beyond the restricted strata of the pedagogues and
philosophers. According to Goode (2005), the 18th century literary public sphere was a prepolitical realm of self-clarification, a zone of freedom in which authentic subjectivity could
flourish, and whose protection was supposed to be the purpose of a just polity. The literary
public sphere developed into the political public sphere.
Habermas (1989) states that the political public sphere developed out of the literary
public sphere and represented private people who have come together as a public to use their
reason critically. Furthermore, a political public sphere was one where discussion concerned
the practice of the state; the coercive power of the state was considered the counterpart of the
political public sphere. According to Habermas (2000), one of the important elements of the
political public sphere was public opinion, which specifically refers “to the functions of
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criticism and control of organized state authority that the public exercises informally as well
as formally during periodic elections” (p. 92). Public opinion could be formed only when a
public that engages in rational discussion exists.
Habermas (1989) considers three institutional criteria as preconditions for the
emergence of the public sphere. The first institutional criterion was disregard of status, or in
other words, the type of social interaction where a person’s status is not a consideration.
However, Habermas also qualified that this was not always realized in earnest, “but as an
idea it had become institutionalized and thereby stated as an objective claim” (p. 36). The
second institutional criterion was domain of common concern. “Discussion in the public
sphere featured the problematization of areas that until then had not been questioned,”
because till then the domain of common concern was the monopoly of church and state
authorities, who consequently had the monopoly of interpretation (p. 36). The final criterion
was inclusivity. Habermas claims:
However exclusive the public might be in any given instance, it could never close
itself off entirely and become consolidated as a clique; for it always understood and
found itself immersed within a more inclusive public of all private people—persons
who, insofar as they were propertied and educated as readers, listeners, and spectators
could avail themselves via the market of the objects that were subject to discussion.
(p. 37)
The issues discussed became general not merely in their significance, but also in their
accessibility; everyone had to be able to participate.
A central concept in The Structural Transformation was the dynamic and complex
relationship between public and private. Habermas (1989) traces the two concepts back to
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ancient Greece and then through the hierarchical world of the Middle Ages where public and
private had no separate existence. Public and private assumed their presently recognized
forms with the development of the modern state and economy. In their current forms, public
usually relates to the public authority of the state, whereas private relates to the family,
society, and economy. The public sphere existed as part of the private world that moved into
the public domain (Habermas, 1989).
Thus, essentially as Kellner (2000) states, Habermas’s concept of the public sphere
described a space of institutions and practices between the private interests of everyday life in
civil society and the realm of state that often exerts arbitrary forms of power and domination. It
consisted of social spaces where individuals gathered to openly, through discursive
argumentation, discuss their common public affairs and to organize against arbitrary and
oppressive forms of social and public power.
However, Habermas (1989) also argues that a refeudalization of the public sphere began
occurring in the late 19th century. Kellner (2000) notes:
The transformation involved private interests assuming direct political functions, as
powerful corporations came to control and manipulate the media and state. On the other
hand, the state began to play a more fundamental role in the private realm and everyday
life, thus eroding the difference between state and civil society, between the public and
private sphere. As the public sphere declined, citizens became consumers, dedicating
themselves more to passive consumption and private concerns than to issues of the
common good and democratic participation. (p. 4)
The conception of public opinion as independent discussion and rational critique of public
affairs that developed in the 18th century in Europe and North America, transformed in the
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20th century into something to be measured and manipulated. As Habermas (1989) argues,
this happened as a result of the expansion of capitalism and the bureaucratized state, as well
as the seeming power of the state to construct and control social life.
Habermas’s (1989) analysis sparked several debates and discussions in academic
circles. These, in turn, have enabled the Habermasian public sphere to be extended, modified,
and applied to different times, situations, and locations. One of the prominent discussions of
Habermas’s public sphere focuses on the issue of exclusions. In the following section I
elaborate on these exclusions and specify how they apply to this study.
Reconfigurations of the Habermasian public sphere. According to Kellner (2000),
Habermas’s Structural Transformation has received extensive critique and promoted productive
discussions on liberal democracy, civil society, public life, and social changes in the 20th
century, among other issues. Furthermore, “intense critical arguments have clarified his earlier
positions, led to revisions in later writings, and fostered intense historical and conceptual
research on public sphere” (p. 5). Recognition of the historical and conceptual exclusions of
the bourgeois public sphere, a fundamental component of this project, has led to efforts in
rethinking the public sphere more inclusively. According to Asen and Brouwer (2001), these
efforts have proceeded through three major moves: (a) to discern multiplicity of the public
sphere; (b) to loosen boundaries and appreciate the permeability of borders; and (c) to
reconsider the separation of the public sphere and the state.
The first key move in rethinking the public sphere more inclusively entails
“discerning the public sphere as a multiplicity of dialectically related public spheres rather
than a single, encompassing arena of discourse” (Asen & Brouwer, 2001, p. 6).
Reformulations along these lines point at the ideology of Habermas’s bourgeois public
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sphere, which considers the presence of a single overarching arena of public deliberation as
desirable to the bolstering of democracy, and conversely, regards the expansion of
deliberation through a multiplicity of publics as a negative departure from democracy
(Fraser, 1992a). Undoing this conceptual hierarchy, scholars (Felski, 1989; Fraser; 1992)
have theorized alternative, non-dominant publics amid wider publics to explain the complex
discursive practices among these realms.
A significant line of inquiry concerning alternatives to dominant public spheres has
cumulated under the term counterpublics. As briefly stated in the introductory chapter of this
study, Rita Felski and Nancy Fraser have been prominent articulators of this concept.
Appearing around the time of the English translation of Structural Transformation, their
early work in this area advocates recognition of the “current plurality of public spheres”
(Felski, 1989, p. 155) and the “plurality of competing publics” (Fraser, 1992a, p. 122). Felski
(1989) describes counterpublic as critical oppositional forces that seek to disrupt the
homogenizing processes of a global mass-communication culture and voice oppositional
needs and values by affirming specificity of race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, or some other
axis of difference. In an often cited definition, Fraser (1992a) identifies counterpublics as
“parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate
counterdiscourses” (p. 123).
Common to Fraser and Felski’s conceptions is the vital characteristic exhibited by
most counterpublics—that of the practice of both inward and outward address as a response
to the experience and discernment of exclusion. Discussing the feminist counterpublic
sphere, Felski (1989) explains:
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The experience of discrimination, oppression, and cultural dislocation provides the
impetus for the development of a self-consciously oppositional identity. Yet insofar
as it is a public sphere, its arguments are also directed outward, toward a
dissemination of feminist ideas and values throughout society as a whole (p. 167).
Similarly, Fraser (1992a) asserts that counterpublics often assume a publicist orientation and
this reveals a dual character. She observes that they function both as spaces of withdrawal for
regroupment, as well as training grounds for agitational activities that are directed towards
wider publics. For both theorists, the emancipatory potential of counterpublics emerges in
this dialectical movement of withdrawal and reengagement with wider publics.
The second reconfiguration of the public sphere is that boundaries and borders
between public and private need to be loosened, because this leads to a silencing of the
concerns of certain excluded groups. In various case studies (Fraser, 1992b; McClure, 1996),
scholars have demonstrated how the separation of public and private function as discursive
strategies that offer advantage to one participant or another. Benhabib (1992) proclaims “all
struggles against oppression in the modern world begin by redefining what had previously
been considered private, non-public, and non-political issues as matters of public concern, as
issues of justice, as sites of power which need discursive legitimation” (p. 100). Furthermore,
these struggles manifest in various directions as antagonists encounter one another in the
multiple sites of the public sphere.
As scholars have loosened the restriction of discourse in the public sphere to the
common good, as aforementioned, so too they have sought to undo the status-bracketing
requirements of the bourgeois public sphere. Fraser (1992a) explains that the bourgeois
conception of the public sphere envisioned an arena in which participants set aside status
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inequalities and spoke to one another as if they were equal in social and economic standing.
Yet, “even in the absence of formal exclusions, social inequality can infect deliberation as
modes of discussion and engagement mark inequalities” (Asen & Brouwer, 2001, p. 12).
Thus, Fraser (1992a) calls instead for discourse in the public sphere to address and thematize
inequalities as explicit topics of debate, in a larger effort to articulate difference as a resource
for public deliberation and discourse in the public sphere; here difference, following Young
(1997), is viewed as a resource necessary for discussion-based politics, the aim and objective
of which is co-operation, reaching understanding, and doing justice.
Scholars have also sought to loosen boundaries and borders by arguing that consensus
need not be viewed as the end of discourse in the public sphere. “Besides deliberation
oriented toward agreement, discourse in the public sphere may serve a number of purposes,
including expressing identity, raising awareness, celebrating difference, and enabling play”
(Asen & Brouwer, 2001, p. 12). In fact, McCarthy (1992) explains that a background
consensus may motivate members of diverse political communities to condone collective
decisions with which they disagree. Various efforts of McCarthy and others (e.g., Estlund,
1997) lead toward what Bohman (1996) has called a “plural public reason” (p. 83), which
does not presuppose a single norm of reasonableness and recognizes instead that participants
may agree with one another for different publicly accessible reasons. Along these lines, some
proponents of consensus (e.g., Cohen, 1989; 1997) do not necessarily regard its absence as an
indicator of failed deliberation. As Asen and Brouwer (2001) argue, “elucidation of the
nonconsensual ends of the public sphere has focused attention on the varied functions of
public discourse, layered conceptions of reason and alternative agreements, and situations
where action must be taken in the absence of agreement” (p. 13).
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The final major move in reconfiguring Habermas’s public sphere theory involves
reconsideration of the separation of the public sphere and the state. This revision gains
momentum from debates over the degree to which state institutions inform public discourse
and publics influence state institutions (Asen & Brouwer, 2001). According to Asen and
Brouwer (2001):
The liberal political tradition from which Habermas derives his original theory of the
bourgeois public sphere insisted on a conceptual distinction between the public
sphere and the state on one side and the official economy on the other . . . . In
significant respects, Habermas attributes the decline of the bourgeois public sphere to
the interpenetration of public and private realms since the era of liberal capitalism, as
the state has intervened in the affairs of civil society and society has increasingly
assumed tasks previously accomplished under state authority. (pp. 13-14)
However, Fraser (1992a) argues that the strict separation of the bourgeois public sphere from
the state, contrary to Habermas’s claim, promotes weak publics—publics whose deliberations
consist of opinion formation but not decision-making authority—thus undermining the role
and functioning of a sovereign parliament. She also regards this attribution of functions as
inadequate for understanding contemporary political arrangements, which, since the
achievement of parliamentary sovereignty, have actually blurred lines separating civil society
and the state.
Nevertheless, the dynamics between the public sphere and the state are complex.
According to Asen and Brouwer (2001), in some scenarios autonomous publics are formed
when members cannot access or are denied certain rights and resources offered or secured by
state power; on the other hand, it is common knowledge that participation in state-sponsored
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fora runs the risk of co-optation. Furthermore, the state itself is undergoing transformations.
From within and from without national borders, states are under duress—“the significance of
globalization, robust civil societies, and separatism and their influence on states, social and
political practices, and public discourse cannot be underestimated” (Asen & Brouwer, 2001,
p. 17). Therefore, as Schudson (1994) asserts, based on the complex and diverse relationships
that manifest the public and the state, particular public spaces are created based on particular
forms of political representation. In other words, the separation and relational dynamics
characterizing the public sphere and the state is context specific.
Based on this review, I define counterpublic for this study as: (a) those alternative,
non-dominant publics, amid wider publics; (b) who voice oppositional needs and values; (c)
through discursive practices that affirm their specificity on some axis of difference from
wider publics; (d) and are not restricted by the rigid separation of public and private in their
discourse, or a separatist stance with the state. The emancipatory potential of counterpublics
emerges in the dialectical movement of withdrawal and reengagement with wider publics,
and the discursive aim of counterpublics is not necessarily reaching consensus—besides
addressing and thematizing inequalities, counterpublic discourse may serve a number of
purposes, including expressing identity, raising awareness, celebrating difference, and
enabling play. In this study I position the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a counterpublic to
three wider publics—militant fundamentalist organizations, Western agents, and the Hosni
Mubarak regime.
A counterpublic sphere is a parallel discursive arena from which counterpublics carry
out their discursive pursuits; the MB official English website, www.ikhwanweb.com, is the
counterpublic sphere in this study. Considering discourse is an important component of
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counterpublic theory, and rhetoric is fundamental to this study, a discussion on discourse and
rhetoric becomes essential at this juncture.
Rhetoric
There is little consensus as to the meaning of the word rhetoric. It has been defined
and redefined by scholars throughout history: “the ability to see, in any given case, the
available means of persuasion” (Aristotle, 1991, p. 1355b26); “the art of speaking well—that
is to say, with knowledge, skill and elegance” (Cicero, 1942, II 5); “that art or talent by
which discourse is adapted to its end” (Campbell, 1988, p. 1); “the finding of suitable
arguments to prove a given point, and the skilful arrangement of them” (Whately, 1963, p.
39); the process of “adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas” (Bryant, 1972, p. 26).
While some of these definitions equate rhetoric with persuasion, others define rhetoric more
broadly as any type of instrumental expression; one definition identifies rhetoric with
argumentation, another with eloquent language.
For Foss (2004), rhetoric involves symbols created and used by humans, where “a
symbol is something that stands for or represents something else by virtue of relationship,
association, or convention” (p. 4). Each symbolic choice humans make results in seeing the
world in one way instead of another, and thus, rhetoric is limited to humans as the originators
or creators of messages. Foss (2004) also states that though rhetoric often involves the
deliberate choice of symbols for communication, actions not consciously constructed by
rhetors can be interpreted symbolically too. “Humans often choose to interpret something
rhetorically that the sender of the message did not intend to be symbolic. In this case,
someone chooses to give an action or an object symbolic value even though the sender does
not see it in symbolic terms” (p. 5).
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Furthermore, rhetoric’s purpose is the use of symbols for communication (Foss,
2004). Rhetoric functions in a variety of ways to allow humans to communicate with one
another. In some cases, it is an effort to persuade others, “to encourage others to change in
some way” (p. 6). In other instances, rhetoric is an invitation to understanding, wherein “we
offer our perspectives and invite others to enter our worlds so they can understand us and our
perspectives better” (p. 6). Sometimes, rhetoric is used simply as a means of “self-discovery
or to come to self-knowledge” (p. 6). Another communicative function of rhetoric is to tell
what reality is. Reality is not fixed but changes according to the symbols humans use to
construct it. “This does not mean that things do not really exist . . . . Rather, the symbols
through which our realities are filtered affect our view . . . and how we are motivated to act
toward it” (Foss, 2004, p. 6). The labels we choose to apply, define, and describe what we
encounter influence our perceptions of what we experience, and in the process construct the
kinds of worlds in which we live.
According to Gill and Whedbee (1997), rhetoric includes two major characteristics.
First, like all the major writers on rhetoric from antiquity, such as Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle,
Cicero, Quintilian claimed, the principal locus of rhetoric is the political stage. Thus, they
designed their theories of rhetoric for use by political agents. More recent writers have
suggested that rhetoric functions also in religion, science, philosophy, literature, and
elsewhere; however, even these writers usually acknowledge political speaking and writing
as the centerpiece of rhetorical practice. Second, rhetoric has an instrumental function, in
other words, rhetoric is discourse calculated to influence an audience toward some end. It is,
in one way or another, a vehicle for responding to, reinforcing, or altering the understandings
of an audience or the social fabric of the community (Gill & Whedbee, 1997).
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For the purpose of this study I ascribe the symbolic, the instrumental, and the political
dimensions to rhetoric. In other words, rhetoric is the use of symbols by the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood to create discourse/s, with the purpose to respond to, reinforce, or alter the
understandings of its audience/s or the social fabric of the community, with its essential
activities located on a political stage. What these symbols are and the purpose and
implications of the same are significant concerns of this study.
Counterpublic advancing communication. Brouwer (2006) asserts that the concept
of counterpublic advances rhetorical, and consequently, communication theory in specific
and productive ways. “The key communication dimensions of a counterpublic, including the
expression of opposition, the constitution of discursive spaces, and the participation in
multiple publics, mark it as potentially exciting and beneficial to . . . rhetorical scholarship in
the field of communication studies” (p. 195).
To begin with, the concept of counterpublic advances communication theory by
bringing within its purview objects of inquiry that are not restricted to rational-critical norms
of public deliberation (Brouwer, 2006). Without denying the value of rational-critical
standards, Brouwer states that these norms of deliberation elide full consideration of the
affective, or emotional, aspects of human communication—the emotional aspects that
motivate human communication, persuade, and more generally constitute a social realm. For
instance, studies of unruly, passionate, ironic, or other modes of counterpublicity emphasize
their significance to human communication. Additionally, “the specification of counterpublic
is an explicit recognition and warning that not all publicly significant speech occurs in
officially sanctioned public forums, by official representative of the public or the public
good, or in dominant public idioms” (p. 198).
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This concept also advances communication theory by recognizing the fact that
humans are part of multiple publics and thus participate in multiple public fora (Brouwer,
2006). Brouwer states:
Counterpublic was introduced as part of a larger theoretical argument about the
multiplicity of spheres; as such, it should remind us of multiplicity each time it is
deployed . . . . Responding more rigorously to concern about the “frustrating
vagueness” of counterpublic or the potentially anemic utility of a counterpublic
concept spread too thin (Asen & Brouwer, 2001; Squires, 2002), some have offered
more elaborate typologies of publics: for example, circumscribed, co-opted, critical,
circumventing publics (Chay-Nemeth, 2001, p. 129); and enclaved, satellite, and
counter publics (Squires, 2002). (pp. 198-199)
In spite of the “frustrating vagueness,” the recognition of multiplicity promotes
contextualization, aids in identifying uniqueness, and enables greater precision of
description, understanding, and analysis of publics.
Third, and related, counterpublic theory brings into attention the dialectic of inward
and outward address, “which foregrounds the status of relations between dominant and
subordinate as one of mutual influence and the status of rhetorical structures and practices as
contingent” (Brouwer, 2006, pp. 199-200). This dialectic reveals that while counterpublics
communicate with the like-minded, either overtly or obscurely, these interactions occur with
an understanding that communication will be directed toward or constitute other wider
publics.
A study of the rhetoric of counterpublics, thus, allows exploration of the rationalcritical as well as the emotional components of public discourse, the multiplicity of publics
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and the discursive dynamics at play in this multiplicity, and the dialectic of inward and
outward address practiced by counterpublics that establishes the relational dynamics between
counterpublics and wider publics. The concerns raised in this study reflect these issues, and
analysis of English-language rhetoric of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—the
counterpublic in this study—is accomplished through the method of rhetorical criticism.
Rhetorical analysis. In terms of the work of rhetoricians, much of the activity earlier
was concentrated on pedagogy—teaching students how to create effective rhetorical
discourse (Gill & Whedbee, 1997). In contemporary times, according to Gill and Whedbee
(1997):
The emphasis has shifted to include the criticism of rhetorical texts. The activities of
rhetorical critics in the last 30 years have been quite varied. What they have in
common is explication of the dynamic interaction of a rhetorical text with its context;
that is, how a text responds to, reinforces, or alters the understandings of an audience
or the social fabric of the community. (p. 159)
Foss (2004) defines rhetorical criticism as “a qualitative research method that is
designed for the systematic investigation and explanation of symbolic acts and artifacts for
the purpose of understanding rhetorical processes” (p. 6). The difference between act and
artifact is a key aspect in rhetorical analysis. An act is executed in the presence of a rhetor’s
intended audience; however, because an act tends to be ephemeral, making its analysis
difficult, many rhetorical critics prefer to study the artifact of an act—“the text, trace or
tangible evidence of the act. When a rhetorical act is transcribed and printed, posted on a
website, recorded on film, or preserved on canvas, it becomes a rhetorical artifact that then is
accessible to a wider audience than the one that witnessed the rhetorical act” (p. 7). Both acts
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and artifacts are objects of rhetorical criticism. Henceforth I will use the term artifact in this
study, because the object of analysis is text posted on the Muslim Brotherhood website.
The specific objectives of contemporary rhetorical criticism have been named and
discussed variously. For instance, according to Zarefsky (2008), knowledge of how rhetorical
texts or actions work and why they matter is valuable because it promotes appreciation of the
artful use of rhetoric, as also, enhances perception of the possibility of its abuse. In addition,
criticism enables one to assess whether and how particular works (in other words, acts or
artifacts) build community and inspire people to achieve collective goals:
The first function is performed as the rhetor identifies with the audience, establishing
and strengthening common bonds among people and thereby constituting otherwise
isolated individuals as a public with shared interests and values. The second is
performed as the rhetor articulates a vision or goal and motivates an audience to seek
and pursue it. (Zarefsky, 2008, p. 638)
In addition, rhetoric can also become a means of domination, for instance, in an act or
artifact, rhetoric can be used to suppress female voices and emphasize and celebrate male
ways of understanding and interpretation (Gill & Whedbee, 1997). In other words, every act
or artifact, in making some things present to an audience, at one and the same time obscures
something else (Burke, 1966; Derrida, 1982). Rhetorical critics, thus, need to keep in mind
that not all individuals or groups have equal access to channels of communication and that
discourse is not always benign but hegemonic. In this regard, rhetorical criticism helps
identify the dominant and the subservient voices in an act or artifact as well as the strategies
used to create discourses of domination and subservience.
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Gill and Whedbee (1997) claim that at least two major schools of thought regarding
the purpose of rhetorical criticism operate simultaneously. According to one school,
rhetorical criticism aims to increase appreciation of the historical importance of rhetorical
texts—to clarify the political effects of speeches and writings, to examine the inner workings
and structure of canonical texts, or to recover unappreciated rhetorical texts and rhetors of the
past. The second school aims to uncover how rhetoric constructs or reconstructs events and
phenomena. In other words, “textual structures are identified, discussed, and in some cases
dismantled to determine how they operate to create understandings, to sanction particular
ways of viewing the world, or to silence particular people or points of view” (p. 160).
Anchoring on this overview, the overarching goal of rhetorical criticism is: (a)
increasing, through analysis of an artifact, one’s knowledge of how rhetoric operates in that
artifact; and (b) understanding the implications of this knowledge on the relational and
discursive dynamics between the creator and audience of this rhetoric. By explaining how
this work is done in particular acts and artifacts, rhetorical criticism offers models for
appreciation, insights for possible emulation, instances of abuse for condemnation, and
opportunities for advocacy (Gronbeck, 1975).
Rhetoric and rhetorical criticism have been discussed and defined for the purpose of
this study in this review. Emphasis now must be placed on the fact that the communication
revolution has led to changing conceptions about numerous issues related to counterpublics
and rhetoric. The standpoint of the communication revolution leads this review to the
direction of the Internet, another vital element that sets the context of this study.
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Internet: Fundamentals
New technologies often are welcomed with political optimism, and the Internet too is
thought to bring with it new potential and possibilities for political participation (Bohman,
2004). As the Human Rights Watch (1999) notes: “the Internet can enable anyone with
access to receive and to disseminate alternatives to state-controlled information at low cost”
(p. 12). For instance, any person with access to a personal computer, a modem, and the basic
skills, bears the potential to communicate with a huge local and international audience.
According to Hansen (1998), a connection to the Internet can increase access to information
by putting within easy reach one of the world’s great repositories of information (much of
which is free and continuously updated); the Internet also has features that enable easy
managing and transferring of information. Cynics often argue that such benefits only come
with the power to purchase a computer and learn the skills. However, computers available to
the public at libraries, schools or community centers, or the presence of privately run Internet
cafés or cybercafés have shown to promote use of the Internet even in relatively poor
countries (Kavanaugh, 1998).
To focus on the Internet’s vast potential for empowering people by providing them
the means to exercise the right to free expression, some have argued that “governments have
an affirmative obligation to facilitate Internet access for all segments of the population on
terms of nondiscrimination” (Human Rights Watch Report, 1999, p. 13). Some also contend
that the Internet can significantly assist governments to aid citizens to exercise their right,
under article 25(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “to take part in
the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives” (1966). Thus,
it suffices to say that the Internet’s potential contribution to democratic and participatory
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politics is indisputable. As the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Mr.
Abid Hussain, outlined in his 1998, 1999, and 2000 annual reports:
The new technologies and, in particular, the Internet, are inherently democratic,
provide the public and individuals with access to information and sources, and enable
all to participate actively in the communication process. The Special Rapporteur also
believes that action by States to impose excessive regulations on the use of these
technologies and, again, particularly the Internet, on the grounds that control,
regulation, and denial of access are necessary to preserve the moral fabric and cultural
identity of societies, is paternalistic. These regulations presume to protect people
from themselves and, as such are inherently incompatible with the principles of the
worth and dignity of each individual. (E/CN.4/1998/40; E/CN.4/2000/63)
Some of the characteristics that make the Internet unique are interactivity, user
control, and open access. Castells (1996) states that in “a society organized around mass
media, the existence of messages that are outside the media is restricted to interpersonal
networks, thus disappearing from the collective mind” (p. 336). According to Underwood
(2010), in order to understand the concept of interactivity offered by the Internet, one has to
be able to picture the Internet’s potential role as the electronic analogue of Castell’s
interpersonal networks, which comes with the possibility to bring otherwise marginalized
topics before the collective mind.
The feature of user control is understood better in connection with the term hypertext.
According to Underwood (2010), hypertexts provide links that one can choose to follow or
not, thus making it different from printed text; by clicking on the links in an online text it
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becomes possible to reach new webpages, and in the process search for specified text/s. A
second significant difference between hypertext and printed text is that the former has the
ability to be live, that is, hypertext allows an individual to store, add comments, rapidly
retrieve documents, and to follow random associations between pairs of documents and store
the trails of those associations (Underwood, 2010).
As for the Internet’s being accessible to anyone, there are millions who cannot even
afford a daily newspaper, let alone the costs to access the Internet. But it is naïve to overlook
the fact that the Internet certainly provides open access to those who have the skill, the
money, and the resources needed. Taking these qualities of the Internet together, Spender
(1995) foresees Internet’s effect on society as radical as the changes that resulted from the
invention of the printing press.
Nonetheless, Internet critics nurture significant concerns. The claim that commercial
forces will overwhelm the idealized free space of the Internet is among the most common
issues debated (Barber, 1984; Buchstein, 1997; McChesney, 1999). Second, detractors argue
that cyberspace is not representative of the world at large. While some individuals choose to
remain low-tech, the cause for concern lies in that the poor and less educated have less access
to the Internet and thus may be disproportionately excluded from participation (Barber, 1984;
Streck, 1998). Most importantly, many Internet dystopians contend that the instantaneous
nature of the Internet actually upsets the spirit of democracy, because it discourages critical
democratic reflection and encourages reactionary decision-making (Barber, 1984; Buchstein,
1997).
McDorman (2001), advocating the strengths of the Internet states that all these factors
cannot be denied, but the case for the Internet is not completely bleak; these concerns cannot
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overshadow the positive characteristics of the Internet, or its rapid growth. The decentralized
nature of the Internet makes commercialization a less powerful threat than in the centralized
media. Unlike traditional electronic media, such as the radio and television, there is no limit
to the number of frequencies or channels available. Despite the existence of commercial
forces in other segments of the Web, the Internet can provide space for dissent through
independent websites and chat rooms, thus minimizing the threat of corporate monopoly.
Also, the digital divide based on income, education, and race continues to be problematic, but
on the whole access is quickly rising; regardless of inequalities, more individuals have access
to email and the Internet than have the opportunity to voice their opinion in other media fora
(McDorman, 2001). Furthermore, to address the concern that the instantaneous nature of the
Internet encourages reactionary decision making, McDorman (2001) argues:
Internet dystopians fail to take into account the ongoing nature of many political
discussions on the Internet. If a message or brief exchange is viewed in isolation, such
a conclusion is understandable. However, observing an organization devoted to
activism, as opposed to chat room where visitors air individual grievances, might
produce much different conclusions. (p. 191)
It is understandable why many detractors would claim that unrealistic expectations
are placed on the Internet. For instance, the Internet is expected to radically democratize
authoritarian societies, and revolutionize the networking potential of civil society
organizations in repressive environments; and if these are the expectations, the Internet
undoubtedly will be a disappointment and a failure. But it is a matter of shifting focus and the
discourse on the blessings that the Internet brings; in other words, it would be “better to view
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the Internet as an advocacy tool, as a means of supplementing current efforts” (McDorman,
2001, p. 192).
Every technology has its strengths and limitations, and the Internet is no exception to
that rule. It is naïve to claim that the Internet, with its emancipatory qualities, is the panacea
to many a problem today’s societies face. In the same vein, a complete disregard of this
technology as a medium to solve some of the challenges of our times is a misjudgment. One
of the goals of this study is to address this predicament; essentially, to explore how the
Egyptian Brotherhood uses its English-language website as a rhetorical counterpublic sphere,
and to gain insights into the implications of this use. To further contextualize the Internet’s
association to this study, in the following section I have detailed some perspectives on the
scope of the Internet as it applies to the Middle East.
Scope of the Internet: perceptions and perspectives. Recent research on the
emergence of World Wide Web communities acknowledges a growing role for cyberspace in
a variety of communication contexts. From social networking, newsgroups, to e-commerce,
the Internet is becoming a more mature and diverse fora for communication. “While the
manner in which the Internet currently is being utilized is deserving of extended study,
evaluations must also recognize that the Internet has not reached adulthood, making steadfast
conclusions difficult” (Mitra, 1997, p. 162). The rapidity with which the Internet is changing
communication makes any prediction of its ultimate effect “nearly impossible” (McChesney,
1999, p. 121). This is an equally important observation for both those who casually dismiss
the potential of the Internet and those who, without qualification, celebrate the possibilities of
the Internet. Specifically, in the context of politics and counterpublicity in repressive
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societies, such as the Middle East, the question of the effect of the Internet is a complex one,
and worth exploring.
According to the Human Rights Watch Report (1999), it is arguably in less developed
and in more repressive countries that the Internet can have the greatest impact, although it
may seem that the issue of Internet speech is an issue of least concern in societies where
torture is commonplace and free elections a rarity. Moreover, it might appear to be an elitist
concern in countries plagued with illiteracy and poverty. But wherever it is accessible, the
Internet has provided dramatic new possibilities; for instance, it has been hailed by many as a
force for eroding authoritarian political control 2 and aiding participatory democracy (Human
Rights Watch Report, 1999). However, the dynamics of Internet use are not simplistic;
debates abound around the discursive, technological, and emancipatory potential of the
Internet. Furthermore, in the context of Muslim societies, such as Egypt, Islam further
complicates our understanding of the contribution of the Internet. A review of some of these
concerns and debates becomes necessary.
Political discourse on the Internet, a key component of this dissertation by virtue of
its association with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s rhetoric, is an important area of
discussion. Gurak (1999) argues that politics on the Internet is unique, and a break of an
essential nature from things as usual. She suggests:
Two rhetorical features, community ethos and the novel mode of delivery on
computer networks, are critical to rhetorical online communities because these
features sustain the community and its motive for action in the absence of physical

2

The 2010-2011 Arab Spring is a case in point.
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commonality or traditional face-to-face methods of establishing presence and
delivering a message. (p. 5)
Similarly, according to Poster (2001), political discourse has been mediated by electronic
machines earlier, but with the advent of the Internet new forms of decentralized dialogue and
new combinations of human-machine dynamics are being created, and these are becoming
the new building blocks of political formations and groupings. For instance, Poster argues
that “Internet discourse constitutes the subject as the subject fashions himself or herself . . . .
On the Internet individuals construct their identities, doing so in relation to ongoing
dialogues, not as acts of pure consciousness” (p. 211). Additionally, individuals
communicating online may bring their preexisting identities in the course of their
communication or invent themselves repeatedly and differentially in the course of conversing
or messaging electronically; thus, in the case of the Internet, an individual’s performance of
communication requires “linguistic acts of self-positioning” (Poster, 1995, para. 11).
Summing up, the communication dynamics of politics on the Internet is distinctive and hence
should be understood and analyzed as such.
Because the Internet is a communication technology, a medium through which the
poetics and politics of discourse, rhetoric, and identity are played out, it becomes imperative
to discuss the concern with technological determinism many scholars voice in connection
with the Internet. According to Chandler (1995), technological determinism presumes that a
society’s technology drives the development of its social structure and cultural values.
Bohman (2004) rejects any form of technological determinism associated with the Internet,
as he argues that the hardware of the Internet is largely indeterminate; rather, he suggests that
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the hardware must be given shape by software, a term that broadly refers to human uses of
the technology and its organization.
Poster (2001) poses the question, “if the technological structure of the Internet
institutes costless reproduction, instantaneous dissemination, and radical decentralization,
what might be its effects upon the society, the culture, and the political institutions” (pp. 99100)? According to Poster, there can be only one answer to this question—that this is the
wrong question. Poster believes that the question of the deterministic nature of the Internet is
a flawed premise. Rather, in line with both Bohman and Poster, it can be stated that:
The Internet installs a new regime of relations between human and matter, and
between matter and non-matter, reconfiguring the relation of technology to culture
and thereby undermining the standpoint from within which, in the past, a discourse
developed about the effects of technology; rather, the Internet is an efficient tool of
communication, advancing the goals of its users, who are understood as reconstituted
instrumental identities. (Poster, 2001, p. 100)
Yet another issue of significance to this project is the scope of the Internet to evade
controls on the flow of information, usually by repressive governments. Some of the ways in
which people work around the controls imposed on use of Internet are (Ristuccia, 1999): (a)
in the absence of local Internet Service Providers (ISP), persons can pay a premium and dial
service providers in other countries; (b) if a website is blocked, it is possible to change its
address or mirror the same content on other websites; and (c) local users can view blocked
websites by accessing them through free Anti-censorship Proxy (ACP) servers, or they can
also have those, who because of their geographic location enjoy access to content that is
blocked locally, e-mail content as attached files. “Wary e-mail correspondents can foil
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surveillance by using pseudonymous e-mail accounts or encryption, or by routing messages
through a Web-based re-mailing service that provides anonymity by stripping information
that identifies the sender” (Human Rights Watch Report, 1999, p. 34).
But if the tricks available to users to evade controls are many, so is the technology on
the other side; governments may not be able to stop, but they too have the means to slow the
flow of content they consider objectionable or threatening, and to regulate access to the
Internet. The Global Internet Liberty Campaign (1998) divides these methods into four
categories: (a) Internet-specific laws; (b) application of existing laws; (c) content-based
license (or contract) terms applied to users and service providers; and (d) compulsory use of
filtering, rating or content labeling tools. Moreover, other government practices such as
threats and intimidation, fear of government surveillance or reprisals, can foster selfcensorship, and affect online speech of individuals and groups.
A report by Human Rights Watch on the repression of Internet users in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA), False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and
North Africa, 2005, documents online censorship and cases in which Internet users have been
detained for their online activities in countries across the region, including Tunisia, Iran,
Syria, and Egypt. This report is based on an examination of several websites from MENA
countries, and interviews with dozens of writers, bloggers, computer experts, and human
rights activists. According to the World Summit on the Information Society, 2005, held in
Tunis, these repressive attempts contradict governments’ national and international legal
commitments to freedom of opinion and expression.
For instance, False Freedom (2005) states that although in Egypt the Internet has
proven to be a boon to the development of civil society, and freedom of expression and
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information, it has frequently provoked government backlash. Egyptian activists use the
Internet for social networking, e-mailing, blogging, chatting, and text messaging to publicize
their cause as well as to bring forth human rights abuses, to organize protests, and to network
with other activists. The Egyptian Blog Ring, a website set up to highlight and catalogue local
blogs, listed around 390 Egyptian blogs as of September 2005, according to False Freedom
(2005). However, an example of government backlash was the detainment of Egyptian
blogger Abd al-Karim Nabil Suleiman, a student of Islamic jurisprudence at Al-Azhar
University in Muharram Bek, a district of Alexandria in Egypt. On October 22, 2005
Suleiman had posted comments online criticizing Muslim rioters and Islam in response to
deadly sectarian riots that took place days earlier in Muharram Bek. At 3 a.m. on October 26,
2005 security agents in plain clothes entered his home, took him in custody, and confiscated
prints of his online writings.
Nevertheless, despite frequent repression experienced by users, Internet enthusiasts
continue to view the potential of the Internet in the Middle East optimistically. According to
Sajoo (2004):
Through the use of the Internet, citizen demands for individual space, gender and
minority inclusiveness, political participation and the rule of law, ethical
accountability in public life, and the freedom to redefine the secular limits of the
public sphere, have prompted fundamental political change in Indonesia and Iran,
along with less radical but important transformations in Turkey, Morocco and Jordan.
And they have triggered civil conflict in Tajikistan, Nigeria, Algeria and Afghanistan,
with new expectations of accountability to society by future governments. (p. 17)
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According to Sarah Leah Whitson (2005), Middle East and North Africa Director at Human
Rights Watch, in spite of rigid controls, censorship, and government backlash, the speed with
which the Internet has spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa testifies to the
region’s appetite for an alternative to the traditional and more constraining media of press,
radio, and television as a means of receiving and transmitting information.
Therefore, the Internet can be considered a medium of emancipation. According to
Naughton (2001), the rise of the Internet is an important development in human affairs, and
there are plausible grounds for claiming that it is potentially a subversive technology, which
can challenge and counter established political or economic structures. Albeit, in the context
of repressive societies like many in the Middle East, the Internet’s full emancipatory
potential is often not realized.
A review of the Internet’s scope in the Middle East requires a discussion on Islam and
the Internet. Bunt (2000) states that the impact of the Internet on both Muslims and nonMuslims is hugely significant; it affects how Muslims approach and interpret Islam, and at
the same time, it influences how non-Muslims perceive Islam and matters relating to
Muslims. Some of the issues Bunt raises are: (a) the impact of the integration of multimedia
applications into websites that enable Muslim surfers to listen to and see sermons delivered
thousands of miles away on their religious experience; (b) the effect of global online
networking by Muslim organizations on the understanding and negotiation of Islam and
Muslim identities; (c) the implications of the availability of the Qur’an in its digital form; and
(d) the dynamics of the use of the Internet to present diverse dialogues relating to Islam,
often reaching wide audiences where other forms of communication are heavily censored.
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Bunt (2003) adds that many Muslims and non-Muslims rely on the Internet as a
primary source of information and communication about Islam, which has had a significant
impact on areas of global Muslim consciousness; post-September 11, 2001 this phenomenon
has grown more rapidly than ever. Bunt also identifies the emergence of two radical new
concepts. First is the emergence of e-jihad (Electronic Jihad), which basically includes online
activism such as promotion of militaristic activities to hacking, to coordinating peaceful
protests, and Muslim expression post 9/11. Second is the issue of religious authority on the
Internet, which includes the complexities of conflicting notions of religious authority, the
concept of online fatwas (decrees), and their influence in diverse settings.
Bunt (2009) claims that a practice of Islam, distinct from Islam lived in real life, has
emerged online. Bunt terms those who practice this form of Islam iMuslims—they often
identify more with a website than a particular mosque or formal sect, they espouse their
Muslim values online, and they need not always be jihadis, but also hajjis (pilgrims) and
other bloggers. Sardar (2009) in his review of Bunt’s concept of iMuslims reiterates that the I
in iMuslims does not simply represent the Internet; it also stands for an innovative online
universe characterized by new pathways and new dynamics of interactivity and
interconnection among Muslims.
This cyber-Islamic environment has a strong historic resonance. Cooke and Lawrence
(2005) state that crucial to understanding Islamic identity and social cohesion is recognition
of the role networks have been playing for Muslims. The Mediterranean trade routes were the
earliest networks the Muslims used as transregional paths for pilgrimage, scholarship, and
conversion. Also, the scholarship that developed around the hadith, the collection of sayings
and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, was a result of collaborative networking. “Scholars
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traveled far and wide, making connections with networks around centers of knowledge, both
to collect and transmit versions of hadith. The criteria for evaluating hadith were also a
product of collaborative efforts” (Sardar, 2009, para. 4). Bunt (2009) compares the new cyber
networks to the traditional networks; for instance, he states that during the time of the
Prophet Muhammad religious knowledge evolved as an open-source system, and just like
Wikipedia, experts as well as ordinary people collaborated to develop a consensus on Islamic
knowledge. Thus, networking, as a phenomenon is not a new concept for Muslims, and
according to Bunt (2009), it has been rediscovered by today’s Internet-savvy generation.
To enlist some specific uses of the Internet by today’s Muslims, as enumerated by
Bunt (2009), one has to begin with the unrestricted access the Internet provides to the Qur’an
by way of online translations and commentaries. Several religious institutions, such as
Egypt’s Al-Azhar and Iran’s Qom, have a web presence with designated sheikhs (Islamic
scholars) and ayatollahs (clerics) corresponding with petitioners. One can find online
versions of madrasas, where young Muslims normally go for religious education, as well as
websites representing specific mosques or religious sects. Furthermore, a significant online
presence belongs to Islamists, both extremists and moderates, as well as reformists. Extremist
organizations such as Al-Qaeda, groups like Indonesia’s Liberal Islam Network, or reformist
blogs in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, Malay, and Bengali, all use the Internet—either for logistic or
publicity purposes, or for promoting their worldviews, to alter traditional ways of thinking,
for shaping opinion and challenging state media, and sometimes as an instrument of
resistance.
According to Eickelman and Anderson (1999), the Internet has created a public
sphere where an increasing number of participants can take part in the discourse on Islam.
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This online plurality leads to fragmentation and recombination of a myriad of ideas,
understandings, and experiences about Islamic thought and practice. Muslims as well as nonMuslims, in today’s global environment frequently marred with reductive views,
stereotyping, cynicism, and suspicion, can use these sources to gain a contextualized
understanding of Islam and its proponents. This dissertation is an endeavor towards that
understanding.
Discussions on public sphere, counterpublic theory, rhetoric and rhetorical criticism,
and finally, the dynamics of Internet use, then, create the foundation and framework on
which this dissertation rests. In this overview, I explicated three fundamental components of
this study: (a) I discussed the debates surrounding Habermas’s notion of the public sphere,
emphasized counterpublics as an extension of the public sphere concept, and defined
counterpublics and the counterpublic sphere for this study; (b) I elaborated on the concept of
rhetoric, rhetorical analysis, and the usefulness of these to study counterpublics; and (c) I
offered an assessment of both the strengths and the limitations of the Internet, and its
contextual importance to this study. A closer look at the origin and evolution of the Muslim
Brotherhood, its historical and socio-political dynamics in Egypt, and debates surrounding
Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood in both academic and policy circles in the West,
become vital to craft the research questions of this dissertation. In the following chapter I
present some facts and discussions related to these issues, and thereafter, posit the research
questions of this study.
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Chapter III: Contextualizing the Muslim Brotherhood
The case of the Muslim Brotherhood is intriguing. The MB has been described, and
its actions interpreted in numerous and sometimes conflicting ways (Dekmejian, 1995; Lia,
2006; Mitchell, 1993; Moaddel, 2005; Poole, 2007; Wickham, 2002; Zollner, 2008). In this
dissertation, I seek to understand how the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, through the
use of their official English website, www.ikhwanweb.com, rhetorically construct who they
are, what they stand for, and how they describe and define their ideologies, objectives, and
actions, especially for the Western audience. Also, I explore and interpret the counterpublic
dynamics manifest in the English-language cyber rhetoric of the Egyptian MB, and their use
of Ikhwanweb as a counterpublic sphere.
Assessing the Muslim Brotherhood as a single entity is difficult owing to the fact that
its attributes vary from country to country. Nevertheless, since the Muslim Brotherhood was
created in Egypt, and because the complex historical, religious, and socio-political
environment Egypt presents to the Brotherhood further problematizes comprehension of its
ideology and actions, in this dissertation I focus on the rhetoric of the Egyptian Brotherhood.
In this chapter, I embark on a review of the social transformation of the Islamic world in the
modern era that has led to the concerns and socio-political conditions of the day in Egypt, the
origin of the Muslim Brotherhood and its dynamics in the context of Egypt today, and current
debates associated with the organization in scholarly and political circles. I conclude this
chapter with the research questions that guide this study.
A Century of Ideological Strife
In the modern era, the Islamic world went through major social transformations.
According to Moaddel (2005), there was a decline of the traditional order, emergence of new
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social classes and groups, development of the modern nation state, and the inclusion of local
economies into the world capitalist structure. However, no lasting agreement on the “form
government should take, the appropriate economic model, the relationship of Muslim nations
with the outside world, the status of women, their national identities, and the relation of Islam
to rational analysis and rule making” could be reached (Moaddel, 2005, p. 1). In other words,
there was hardly any consensus regarding the most fundamental principles and features of
social organization. Instead, Islamic societies experienced a sequence of diverse cultural
episodes, such as Islamic modernism, liberal nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism; these
were characterized by serious ideological disputes that were followed by socio-political
crises, leading to revolutions or military coups.
A significant problem in building consensus was “the conflict between Islamic
orthodoxy and the secular discourse that spread into the Islamic world, which either failed to
produce a new synthesis, or where it did was not widely institutionalized” (Moaddel, 2005, p.
1). In the 19th century, efforts were made to bring Islam and values of the European
Enlightenment together; these efforts gave rise to Islamic modernism. Closely associated
with this movement was liberal nationalism with the kernel of its ideology in the modern
nation state. Thereafter, with the decline of these ideologies, Islamic fundamentalism grew to
become a major oppositional ideology to both Islamic modernism and liberal nationalism. It
becomes pertinent to elaborate on these ideological contentions—Islamic modernism, liberal
nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism—specifically in the context of Egypt.
Islamic modernism. The turn of the 19th century witnessed a cultural encounter
between the West and the Islamic world. According to Moaddel (2005), Islamic modernism
can be considered as the first Islamic response to the West’s ideological challenge; it
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originated in India and Egypt in the later half of the 19th century. Islamic modernism was
characterized by “a critical reexamination of the classical conceptions and methods of
jurisprudence and a formulation of a new approach to Islamic theology and Quranic
exegesis,” and it was “reflected in the work of a group of like-minded Muslim scholars” (p.
2). The impact of the cultural encounter with Western ideas led native Islamic intellectuals to
evaluate the dynamics behind Muslim backwardness and decline, and to devise ways to
create a new, progressive society. Although their assessments and resolutions were both
numerous and diverse, a central intellectual point of contention was religion—in other words,
Islam.
Specifically, the central theological questions surrounded the “credibility of the
knowledge derived from sources external to Islam” and the “methodological adequacy of the
four traditional sources of jurisprudence: (a) Qur’an; (b) the dicta attributed to the Prophet
(hadith); (c) the consensus of the theologians (ijma); and (d) juristic reasoning by analogy
(qiyas)” (Moaddel & Talattof, 2002, p. 1). Furthermore, influenced by the ideas of the
Enlightenment, and impressed by the scientific and technological achievements of the West,
intellectuals and theologians such as Sayyid Jamal ud-Din al-Afghani, Sir Sayyid Ahmad
Khan, Chiragh Ali, Shibli Nu’mani, and Muhammad Abduh formulated a reformist model
based on scientific rationality and modern social theory (Moaddel & Talattof, 2002). Their
claim was that the essence of a perfect Islamic community is law and reason; hence Islam
was equipped to adapt itself to the modern, rational ideas and changes the encounter with the
West was heralding.
In Egypt of the 19th century, the discursive context in which Islamic modernism was
produced was diverse, and these discourses included that of the European Enlightenment, the
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Christian Evangelicals who were often considered proselytizing, and the orthodox Islamic
establishment. The movement started with Rifa’a al-Tahtawi, an Egyptian renaissance
intellectual, but gained considerable momentum decades later when Al-Afghani, an Islamic
ideologist and one of the founders of Islamic modernism, organized a circle of Muslim
scholars to address the sociopolitical and theological issues facing Islam. Specifically, the
Islamic modernists, in the context of Egypt, debated over complex intellectual questions such
as the implications of the rational sciences on the Islamic belief system, the apparent
contradiction between Islamic tradition and modern European thought and practice, the
maltreatment and status of women, and Islamic conceptions of sovereignty and political
theory (Moaddel, 2005). Thus, according to Atasoy (2005):
Proponents of Islamic modernism assume that Islam is perfectly compatible with the
instrumental reason of modern science and technology. In order to counter Western
dominance in the world economy and the state system, Muslims must first recognize
the scientific and economic dynamism of Western societies. They must then
reinterpret the Koran’s [sic] meaning in such a way that Muslims can catch up with
European levels of development . . . . Islamic modernism was an ideology of Muslim
restructuring according to the Western progress ideal, one which accommodated the
secularization thesis. (para. 6)
Liberal nationalism. This movement developed as an offshoot of the modernist
project in the Islamic world, and one of its core features was the importance placed on the
concept of the nation state. In other words, Islamic ideologues emulated a “Western
conception of nation” to guide them with their understanding of what constitutes a nation,
and “Western principles of democratic institutions” to provide them with new principles of
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governing and new forms of political institutions (Moaddel, 2005, p. 4). Some of the
fundamental ideals of this movement were the integration of the nation through cultural and
educational reforms, the promotion of indigenous national languages, and the separation of
religion and the state. Ironically, the nationalistic fervor of this project gave rise to political
movements, ideologies, and discourses that turned against the West’s imperialistic strategies,
although it was the Islamic world’s encounter with the West that led to the creation of liberal
nationalism. Given that some countries in the Islamic world, such as Egypt, were
monarchies, it becomes important to note that this nationalistic fervor also served to check
the arbitrariness that monarchical rule often entails (Moaddel, 2005).
One of the first nations to experience the wave of liberal nationalism in the Arab
world, Egypt’s liberal nationalist ideology was distinct for its territorial nature, one that
revolved around “Egyptian rather than Arab or Islamic identity” (Moaddel, 2005, p. 4).
Intellectuals involved in this movement held constitutionalism to be the model of politics,
celebrated secularism and scientific rationalism, and advocated gender equality; most
naturally, the culmination of the liberal nationalist project in Egypt was the formation, in
1924, of a constitutional government based on hereditary monarchy (Moaddel, 2005).
However, excessive emphasis on secularist, and often antireligious values and practices by
liberal intellectuals backfired in the Islamic world in some significant ways, contributing to
the decline of the movement and rise of alternative discourses, such as Islamic
fundamentalism.
Islamic fundamentalism. Following the decline of liberal nationalism and the
overthrow of parliamentary politics through coups in many Islamic countries (including
Egypt in the 1930s), another cultural episode set in. Moaddel (2005) asserts:
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The primary elements of this episode were the rise of an [socially] interventionist
ideological state, on the one hand, and the increasing popularity of the Islamic
opposition, on the other. In a marked contrast with the previous ideologies, Islamic
fundamentalism categorically rejected the Western model and outlook. (p. 5)
The most essential tenet of Islamic fundamentalism, as advanced by pioneers of this
movement, such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Mussaui Khomeini and Ayatollah Morteza
Motahhari from Iran, Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb from Egypt, Abul Ala Maududi from
Pakistan, Mustafa as-Siba’i from Syria, and Abbasi Madani, Shaikh Nahnah, and Ali Belhaj
from Algeria, was an unconditional acceptance and acknowledgement of, in other words,
fealty to Islam, to shape and influence all spheres of life. Furthermore, “fundamentalism
aimed at Islamizing society through social and political action, the seizure of the state power
being a necessary step in its overall Islamization project” (Moaddel, 2005, p. 5).
United by a common hostility toward Western values and ideas like parliamentary
politics and constitutionalism, and the consequent decline of the liberal nationalist ideology,
the late 1930s saw the rise of two significant cultural movements in Egypt (Moaddel, 2005).
One was pan-Arab nationalism, and the other was the Muslim Brotherhood movement; the
latter is significant to this study. It becomes imperative to mention that there are considerable
variations in the discourse and orientations of Islamic fundamentalists. There are
considerable variations in terminologies as well, one of which being Islamist. In this
dissertation I address the Muslim Brotherhood as an Islamist organization, instead of a
fundamentalist one, and in the following paragraphs I provide my rationale for this
terminological decision.
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Islamists or fundamentalists? Hardly any analysis or commentary about the events
in the Muslim world can avoid the concern and dilemma over the labeling of those Muslims
who “invoke Islam as the source of authority for all political and social action” (Kramer,
2003, p. 65). Two of the most prominent labels are Islamic fundamentalists and Islamists. For
a few decades now, this issue has been the subject of heated debates and discussions.
According to Kramer (2003), in Western scholarly circles in the 18th century,
specifically by thinkers of the Enlightenment, huge steps were being taken to classify Islam
on its own terms—that is, as a religion and faith practised by Muslims. Finally, it was
Voltaire, the French philosopher, who coined the term Islamisme (Islamism) and defined it as
the religion of Mahomet (Muhammad) (Versaille, 1994). In the course of the 19th century,
this term became popular throughout Europe. However, since many scholars simply
preferred the shorter and purely Arabic term Islam, by the turn of the 20th century Islamism
began to disappear from the lexicon; by the date of the completion of the Encyclopedia of
Islam in 1938, Islamism had been substituted by Islam (Kramer, 2003).
On the other hand, according to Kramer (2003), the term fundamentalism originated
in the US in the 1920s. Kramer (2003) explains:
As the pace of social change accelerated, Protestant Christians felt threatened by the
higher criticism of the Bible and the spread of philosophical skepticism. They sought
to reaffirm their belief in the literal text of the Bible and the “fundamentals” of
Christian belief, including creationism. These Christians called themselves
fundamentalists. (pp. 67-68)
At the time of its origin, fundamentalism received much flak and acquired a strongly
pejorative association in the minds of liberals and modernists. Also, its association with
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Islam, as Islamic fundamentalism, in terms of usage as well as meaning, was rare and
inconsistent. It was only about 50 years later that Islamic fundamentalism came into
widespread usage as the consequence of media coverage of Iran’s revolution in 1979
(Kramer, 2003). Following this, the use of fundamentalism in connection with Islam spread
rapidly, and by 1990 the Concise Oxford English Dictionary defined it not only as “the strict
maintenance of traditional Protestant beliefs,” but also as “the strict maintenance of ancient
or fundamental doctrines of any religion, especially Islam” (1990, pp. 477, 628). Yet, the
more popular Islamic fundamentalism as a label became, the more scholars of Islam debated
about the aptness of its use to contexts beyond its origins.
For instance, Lewis (1988) states that the label fundamentalism cannot capture the
essence of Iran’s revolution and comparable Islamic movements because it actually
represents only those Protestant churches and organizations “that maintain the literal divine
origin and inerrancy of the Bible” (p. 117); in that sense, all Muslims are in principal
fundamentalists in their attitude to the text of the Qur’an. But if that label needs to be
extended, then what could specifically characterize fundamentalists in the Islamic sense and
separate them from other Muslims and Christian fundamentalists is their “scholasticism and
their legalism,” that is “they base themselves not only on the Qur’an, but also on the
Traditions of the Prophet [hadith], and on the corpus of transmitted theological and legal
learning” (p. 117). They treat Islam as an all-embracing religion adept at guiding Muslims
not just in the spiritual or the metaphysical, but also the legal and the scholastic. To sum up,
fundamentalism is primarily a Christian term because its origin, nuances, and what it depicts
are primarily Christian; hence, the use of fundamentalism in association with Islam requires
specification of context.
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Esposito (1992) protests that the label of fundamentalist unfairly stigmatizes forwardthinking Muslims. He states:
For many liberal or mainline Christians, “fundamentalist” is pejorative or derogatory,
being applied rather indiscriminately to all those who advocate a literalist biblical
position . . . . and wish to return to and replicate the past. In fact, few individuals or
organizations in the Middle East fit such a stereotype. Indeed, many fundamentalist
leaders have had the best education, enjoy responsible positions in society, and are
adept at harnessing the latest technology to propagate their views and create viable
modern institutions such as schools, hospitals, and social service agencies. (p. 7)
Esposito claims that this term is a victim of prejudice and prejudgment; it is often
synonymized with extremism and anti-Americanism by default due to the pejorative
connotation liberal and mainline Christians have attached to it. Consequently, fundamentalist
stigmatizes anyone labeled as such.
With new Islamic movements such as the Iranian revolution gaining ground in the
late 1970s, Europeans, specifically the French who gave birth to the term Islamisme,
struggled with a new dilemma—to find an appropriate label to describe these movements.
According to Kramer (2003), Islamisme became their choice for two key reasons. First, it
had a French pedigree because it was Voltaire who created this label. Second, the only
French alternative, intégrisme, was deeply embedded in its original Catholic context. By the
mid-1980s in contemporary French usage Islamism was no longer simply a synonym for
Islam, the religion; it stood for “Islam as a modern ideology and a political program”
(Kramer, 2003, p. 71), thus also capturing the essence of the Islamic movements
contemporaneous to the times.
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By 1985 this term crossed over from French to English, and it greatly appealed to
scholars who not only were averse to the pejorative connotations fundamentalism had, but
also claimed that fundamentalism and Islamism were in fact essentially different phenomena.
For instance, according to Fuller (1991) fundamentalism entails “a strict reversion to the
institutions of a medieval or even early Islamic state,” whereas Islamism suggests “not so
much theology as an ideology whose implications are not at all old-fashioned, but thoroughly
modern” (p. 2). Cantori (1993) likewise argues that fundamentalism “conveys a sense of
extremism and dismissal,” whereas Islamism “is used increasingly to denote the political
manifestation of the religion of Islam” and “permits one to more dispassionately make
distinctions between extremist and mainstream Islam” (p. 57).
It is not only in academic circles, but also within US agencies today that the issue of
the use of fundamentalism in reference to Islam has been associated with numerous debates
and discussions. According to Kramer (2003), in Washington Islamism has prevailed over
fundamentalism as the term of choice in policy circles. At first, the term made a few rare
appearances in policy statements, until it received an official definition from Robert
Pelletreau, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs, in remarks made in 1994.
Pelletreau cautioned that the term Islamic fundamentalism had to be used vigilantly and only
to refer to the “broad revival of Islam” (Kramer, 2003, p. 72). Pelletreau (1994) claims,
within that broad revival there were subdivisions:
In the foreign affairs community, we often use the term “Political Islam” to refer to
the movements and groups within the broader fundamentalist revival with a specific
political agenda. “Islamists” are Muslims with political goals. We view these terms as
analytical, not normative. They do not refer to phenomena that are necessarily
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sinister: there are many legitimate, socially responsible Muslim groups with political
goals. However, there are also Islamists who operate outside the law. Groups or
individuals who operate outside the law—who espouse violence to achieve their
aims—are properly called extremists. (p. 2)
Thus, there are fundamentalists, some of whom are Islamists and some of whom are
extremists; only the latter constitute a threat. By 1996 Pelletreau worked out a comprehensive
definition of Islamism firmly grounding the term’s privileged status, and in an address at the
Council on Foreign Relations in New York he stated:
We normally use the term “Islamist” to refer to Muslims who draw upon the belief,
symbols, and language of Islam to inspire, shape, and animate political activity. We
do not automatically seek to exclude moderate, tolerant, peaceful Islamists who seek
to apply their religious values to domestic political problems and foreign policy. We
do, however, object strongly to Islamists who preach intolerance and espouse
violence in the domestic and international arenas. (para. 11)
This brief overview suggests that both Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism are
complex terms. Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism are sometimes used synonymously, at
times in opposition, and in some instances as sub-categories of one another. Thus, it will not
be faulty to assume, as Kramer (2003) states, that a scholar’s choice is not automatically a
substantive statement about either; the choice of a term has perhaps been reduced to a matter
of perception and style. For the purpose of this dissertation I address the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood as an Islamist movement, for the sole reason of keeping prejudgments and
negative perceptions often associated with fundamentalism away. I conform to Pelletreau’s
(1996) definition of Islamism to describe the Egyptian Brotherhood. Nevertheless, the scope
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for change of terminology and modification of perceptions to describe this organization,
based on the results of my analysis, stays open. 3 At this juncture I undertake a review of the
origin and activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the socio-political dynamics of the
Egyptian Brotherhood within Egypt and in relation to the West.
The Muslim Brotherhood: Origin and Evolution
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna in the city of
Ismailia, Egypt. The primary factors that promoted the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood
included the rise of the new middle class, rapid economic development, and the proliferation
of institutions of higher learning (Moaddel, 2005). According to the FAS Intelligence
Resource Program (2002), it began as a religious, political, and social movement with the
credo, “Allah is our objective; the Qur’an is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; Jihad
[sic] is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations” (para. 1). In
fact, the highly secularist stance of the national intellectual leaders in Egypt—excessively
secularist and thus alienating in the eyes of some Muslims—fuelled the creation of the
oppositional discourse of the Muslim Brothers.
In a pronounced departure from the discourse of liberal nationalism, Moaddel (2005)
states, the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood “rejected the Western model, Egyptian
3

In the past decade, a new line of thinking and literature has emerged around the idea of postIslamism. One of the most eminent proponents of the post-Islamist line of thinking is Asef Bayat,
who, according to El-Affendi (2008), “first coined the term ‘post-Islamism’ in a 1996 essay to
describe the nascent reform movement in Iran [of the late 1990s], and it caught on like wild fire” (p.
297). Bayat (2011) explains that post-Islamism upholds religion, and in that sense is not anti-Islamic;
at the same time it also emphasizes citizens’ rights, thereby supporting secular ideas. Thus, it
envisions a pious social order within a democratic state. He further elaborates that several examples
of post-Islamist movements exist, for instance, the reform movement in Iran in the late 1990s and the
Green Movement in the country today, and Turkey’s currently ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP). Each of these parties, Bayat claims, was associated with Islamist politics, but with time began
critiquing Islamist excesses, its violation of democratic rights, and its use of Islam as an instrument to
sanctify political power. They all eventually opted to work within a democratic framework.
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territorial nationalism, the idea of the separation of religion and the state, parliamentary
politics, and the Islamic modernist conception of gender relations” (p. 197). As an
alternative, Al-Banna proposed a vision of Islam as an all-encompassing religion:
We believe the provision of Islam and its teachings are all inclusive, encompassing
the affairs of the people in this world and the hereafter. And those who think that
these teachings are concerned only with the spiritual or ritualistic aspects are
mistaken in this belief because Islam is a faith, a ritual, a nation [watan] and a
nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed, holy text and sword . . . The
Glorious Qur’an . . . considers [these things] [bracket in original] to be the core of
Islam and its essence. (Moaddel, 2005, p. 197)
Kuntzel (2002) states that an all-encompassing vision of Islam essentially would mean the
acceptance of Shari’a law, which is based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah (the sayings and
living habits of Muhammad) as law passed down by Allah, and its application to all aspects
of life, from handling of daily issues to the organization and working of the government.
Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood was a multifaceted organization that focused on
social, educational, and service fields. It established domestic mosques, educational
institutions, hospitals, and some commercial and industrial projects. Furthermore, as
Chamieh (1994) claims, the mosque doubled up as a place for worship and a place for
tarbiah (training), in other words, a place for gathering as well as mobilizing people. After
the Second World War, the Muslim Brothers took up a major role in distributing and printing
books and issuing magazines, and when the group moved its headquarters to Cairo, they
devoted much of their time and resources to the establishment of universities and schools.
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In terms of its growth, according to Hallett (1974) by 1936 the Brotherhood had 800
members, and this number increased greatly to 200,000 by 1938; by the late 1940s the
Brotherhood’s membership rose to around two million, and its Pan-Islamic ideology gained
ground in other Arab societies. Specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood spread extensively
among the middle classes. According to Ehrenfeld and Lappen (2006), this was due to the
characteristics of the middle class in the Arab world—the middle class was oriented to
change through reforms, they had a high political spirit that made them enthusiastic to
participate in policy making, and finally, there was also a considerable effect of modern
tarbiah, or training, on this class.
On its stance on violence, an issue that has been a point of contention in both
academic and policy circles, since its inception in 1928 the Muslim Brotherhood has
officially opposed violent means to fulfill its objectives. Nevertheless, there have been some
exceptions, such as the overthrow of the secular Ba’athist rule in Syria (Aspden, 2006).
According to Chamieh (1994), the Egyptian government has always been cynical and
circumspect of this official position, and even accused the Muslim Brotherhood of a series of
killings in Egypt after the Second World War. As claimed by the Egyptian government,
following an assortment of bombings and assassination attempts by the Brotherhood’s
supposed secret apparatus, in November 1948 police seized an automobile containing the
apparatus’s classified documents and plans, which also included names of members.
Subsequently, offices were raided and 32 of its leaders were arrested. In December 1948, the
Egyptian Prime Minister, Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi, ordered suspension of the Brotherhood.
In what is assumed to be retaliation for the government’s acts, veterinary student Abdel
Meguid Ahmed Hassan, a member of the Brotherhood, assassinated the Prime Minister on
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December 28, 1948. As part of a series of retaliatory killings, a month and half later, AlBanna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, was killed in Cairo by men believed to be
government agents and/or supporters of the murdered Prime Minister (Chamieh, 1994).
To gain a clearer understanding of the contention between the Egyptian regime and
the Brotherhood, a mention must be made at this juncture of the Muhammad Ali Dynasty that
ruled Egypt (and Sudan) from the 19th to the mid-20th century. According to Hassan (2000),
the reign of the penultimate ruler of Egypt from this dynasty, King Farouk I, was destabilized
by ever increasing nationalist discontent over the British occupation, royal corruption and
incompetence, and a disastrous 1948 Arab-Israeli War. All these factors undermined
Farouk’s position and paved the way for the Revolution of 1952 in Egypt; Farouk was forced
to step down in favor of his infant son Ahmed-Fuad who became King Fuad II, while
administration of the country passed to the Free Officers Movement. The clandestine
revolutionary Free Officers Movement was composed of young junior army officers
committed to challenging and ultimately ousting the Egyptian monarchy and its British
advisors, and was founded by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Revolution proclaimed a
new period of modernization and socialist reform in Egypt, and a significant advancement of
pan-Arab nationalism.
The infant King Fuad II’s rule lasted less than a year with the revolutionaries
abolishing the monarchy and declaring Egypt a republic on June 18, 1953. In the meantime,
disagreements with Gamal Nasser led to Muhammad Naguib’s, the first President of Egypt,
forced removal from office, and Nasser became President in 1956. According to Moaddel
(2005):
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The overthrow of the monarchy by the Free Army Officers’ coup in 1952 and the
inauguration of Gamal Abdel Nassir’s [sic] regime based on pan-Arab nationalism
brought the Muslim Brothers into a violent encounter with the government. The years
following the coup gave rise to an extremist trend in the Muslim Brotherhood. The
new trend was led by Sayyid Qutb [a leading Egyptian intellectual], who rejected the
existing order as an embodiment of the jahiliyya [state of ignorance], the decadent
cultural order 4 that in the Muslim view prevailed in pre-Islamic Arabia. (pp. 5-6)
Qutb, in his Islamic manifesto Milestones (1964) argues that it is only the use of Shari’a law
that gives legitimacy to a state in the Muslim world, and unfortunately not all states,
including his native land Egypt, are legitimate in that respect. He also states that Muslims
should not violate God’s sovereignty (hakimiyyat Allah) over all of creation, and therefore,
resist any system where men are in servitude to other men. A truly Islamic polity would have
no rulers, not even theocratic ones, since Muslims would need neither judges nor police to
obey divine law. According to Qutb, the means to create a true Islamic polity was for a
revolutionary vanguard to fight jahiliyya with a two-fold approach—preaching, and
abolishing the organizations and authorities of the system by physical power and jihad. Once
the vanguard movement were able to establish a truly Islamic community, they would then
spread throughout the Islamic homeland, and finally throughout the entire world attaining
leadership of humanity.
In 1954 the Brotherhood’s alleged attempt to assassinate Gamal Nasser caused it to
be considered an illegal organization by the Egyptian government. However, the
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It must be mentioned that this stance could be considered to border on an extremist fundamentalist
mode of thinking and praxis.
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Brotherhood denied this accusation stating that it was actually an incident staged by the
regime to use as a pretext to persecute the group and its members. But on the basis of this
assassination attempt, from 1954 until Nasser’s death in 1970, several Muslim Brotherhood
members were systemically tortured under Nasser’s secular regime. Nonetheless, Nasser’s
successor, Anwar Sadat, became president of Egypt in 1970 and gradually released
imprisoned Brothers. He also promised the Brotherhood that Shari’a would be implemented
as the Egyptian law and enlisted its help against leftist groups. Since then, and up until the
Egyptian Revolution of January 2011 that led to the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak,
the organization has been tolerated to an extent, but was officially illegal and subjected to
periodic crackdowns (McDonough, 2005).
According to Hassan (2005), following their official ban in 1954, the Brotherhood
had to make sure to abandon all traits of and connections to violence in order to politically
assert its presence; following this, the “underlying themes of the Brotherhood had to take on
a social movement dimension, which has managed to remain consistent in creed and broad in
nature” (p. 4). Hassan also claims that “the Muslim Brotherhood has not only materialized
successfully through its social programs and a consistent historical track, but it also seeks to
assert its presence through a popular appeal that the government has desperately failed to
capture” (p. 4). In recent years the organization’s campaign for democratic reforms in
elections placed it in direct opposition to erstwhile Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s
tyrannical tendencies. The Muslim Brotherhood is on a political pedestal that indulges in the
“open-ended language of equal representation and social justice” (p. 5); in this respect, the
Muslim Brotherhood has come to embody a relentless campaign for democratic reforms and
functions as a civil association (Hassan, 2005).
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Elaborating on the Brotherhood’s political standing and its relationship to the regime
in Egypt during Hosni Mubarak’s rule, it must be mentioned that in the 2005 parliamentary
elections the Brotherhood’s candidates, who had to run as independents due to their illegal
status as a political party, won 88 seats (20% of the total) to form the largest opposition bloc.
The electoral process, however, was tarnished by many irregularities caused by the regime,
including the arrest of hundreds of Brotherhood members. Nevertheless, it was hoped that the
Brotherhood would focus on broad reforms to open up Egypt’s political system, such as
ending the nation’s 24-year-old Emergency Law that severely limited political activity in
Egypt (Otterman, 2005).
Relatively few gains were made by the Brotherhood-led opposition in an assembly
dominated by the National Democratic Party (NDP); despite the Brotherhood’s unexpected
victories, the number of seats held by non-NDP representatives fell short of the more than
one-third minority needed to affect legislation. According to Saad al-Husseini (2010), a
senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s bloc in the Egyptian parliament, the
Brotherhood might have had the largest opposition bloc in Egyptian parliamentary history in
terms of numbers, but in practical terms, they faced an NDP majority that simply
rubberstamped almost everything the party wanted, regardless of its value to the Egyptian
public.
Bleak as it may seem, and despite the Brotherhood’s numerical disadvantage in the
assembly in comparison to the ruling party, Brotherhood officials point to a handful of
parliamentary accomplishments between 2005 to 2010 (Morrow & Al-Omrani, 2010).
According to Al-Husseini (2010), when parliament renewed Egypt’s longstanding
Emergency in early 2010, Brotherhood representatives demanded that this law should be
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applied only to crimes of terrorism and drug trafficking. In addition, they were able to
establish hospitals and schools in most of their respective electoral districts, thus providing
public service to their constituents.
But, according to Husseini (2010), they failed to stop the ruling party from altering
the constitution in its favor in 2007, even though the Brotherhood launched a concerted
campaign against the move. Morrow and Al-Omrani (2010) quote Hassan, another senior
member of the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc—“the constitutional changes, which
effectively did away with judicial oversight of elections, were made by the ruling party
expressly to prevent opposition candidates—especially Brotherhood candidates—from
winning a large number of seats in parliament ever again” (para. 14). Amr Hashem Rabie
(2010), expert in parliamentary affairs at the Egyptian research institute Al-Ahram Centre for
Political and Strategic Studies, claimed that the (now erstwhile) ruling party continued its
hostility with the Brotherhood and did all it could to wreck the group’s parliamentary
initiatives.
In summary, the Egyptian Brotherhood has been perceived by some as dangerously
violent and others as unjustly oppressed; its members have been arbitrarily arrested. At the
same time, it has been the main opposition bloc in the Egyptian Parliament, it functions as a
civil association, and advocates Islamic reform while maintaining a vast network of support
through Islamic charities working among poor Egyptians (IRIN, 2006). The conflicting
perceptions and concerns associated with the Brotherhood in both academic and policy
circles in the West further complicate understanding of the Brotherhood.
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The West and the Muslim Brotherhood
The question of whether Western governments should embrace or shun the Muslim
Brotherhood is a vital topic at present in foreign policy circles. This issue came to the fore
with force when Leiken and Brooke published “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” in the
2007 March-April issue of Foreign Affairs, in which they argue that the Brotherhood can be
considered an effective counterbalance to extremist Islamist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, by
virtue of their evolution into a group that prefers a democratic stance in politics, and thereby
is worthy of acceptance by the West (Breinholt, 2007). This view carried some resonance; on
June 20, 2007, New York Sun’s Eli Lake reported that Leikin has been asked to brief the US
State Department on his views.
In fact, the Leikin-Brooke article set off a firestorm. Critics argued that the authors
had been duped and were relying on poor scholarship. In a June 2007 American Thinker
piece, Poole, an antiterrorism consultant, noted that Leikin had been wrong about the Soviet
influence over the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in the 1980s, and he was wrong again about the
Muslim Brotherhood now. Furthermore, Douglas Farah of the Counterterrorism Blog
critiqued Leikin and Brook’s claim that Milestones, the book by Sayyid Qutb that had long
considered the key source for Muslim Brotherhood’s violent tradition, had been officially
abandoned by the Brotherhood in favor of Hasan al-Hudaybi’s Preachers, Not Judges
(1969), generally taken to be the Brotherhood’s refutation of Qutb’s radical arguments. Farah
(2007) claims that in fact Preachers has not been published in English and has not been
available in the Arab world since 1985. Thus, to both Farah and Poole, the Brotherhood
should not be trusted, since it is camouflaging its true violent intentions to distract the West
(Breinholt, 2007).
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Sayyid Qutb, as aforementioned, contributed significantly to the shaping of the
Brotherhood’s ideology, specifically its extremist strands. Focusing on Qutb-centric debates
in Western academia, Utvik (2009) states, “according to a version of history that has been
promoted by Kepel, among others, in his widely read Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, the
main development of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt after Hasan al-Banna was its
radicalization through the ideological works of Sayyid Qutb” (p. 519). This version resonates
with the likes of Farah and Poole, who perceive the Brotherhood as a violent extremist group.
In her book The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology (2009),
Zollner makes an important, and somewhat contradictory comment on the development of
the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology. Hasan al-Hudaybi was the second general guide, or
leader, of the Muslim Brotherhood appointed after founder Hasan al-Banna’s assassination in
1949. “By outlining Hudaybi’s policies and his understanding of Islam as guidance for
politics and society” Zollner shows how Hudaybi carefully “laid out a path for the Muslim
Brothers that steers away from the extremism of Qutb, while preserving the call for the
individual Muslim to take responsibility in the fight for the cause of Islam and social justice”
(Utvik, 2009, p. 519). Zollner (2009) argues that Hudaybi’s moderation is evident in the fact
that he distanced himself from extremist understandings of the sovereignty of God, extremist
means for the implementation of the Shari’a, and aligned himself with the idea of the
importance of human agency in legislation and general policy making. In other words,
Hudaybi gave importance to human agency that is linked to political power, a power that is
not ordained or delivered to anyone by divine means but emerges through elections and
representation.
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Zollner (2009) further states, considering the significance of Hudaybi’s years as
leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is startling that there is minimal scholarly work on
Hudaybi. There are extensive studies available on Al-Banna, and there has been tremendous
interest in the ideas of Sayyid Qutb; it is important to assess and review the work of these
thinkers to understand currents of Islamist ideology and Islamist movements, however, “this
focus has led to an incorrect perception that the Islamic movement is necessarily radical in its
thinking and/or militant in its deeds” (Zollner, 2009, p. 1). As for Preachers, Not Judges, she
states:
There is reasonable evidence to suggest that the book may in fact have been written
by a circle of [Hudaybi’s] trusted companions. Yet, the completed work was
distributed in his name and it therefore needs to be assumed that it had his editorial
approval…. [This book] calls for tolerance. (p. 5)
Zollner’s work may be significant in shifting the Qutb-centrism of much literature on the
Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist movements, in the West.
Breinholt (2007) states that knowledge and assessment of recent geopolitical events
become vital to the understanding of the dynamics of the Muslim Brotherhood. In January
2007, Hamas, considered to be the Muslim Brotherhood’s branch in Palestine, emerged
victorious as it took over the Palestinian government through democratic elections. This was
the first time that a Brotherhood wing had succeeded in taking over a government through
the ballot box (Breinholt, 2007). According to the Council on Foreign Relations (2009),
Hamas was an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a spiritual
leader who preached and did charitable work in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, created it in
the late 1960s; at this time both West Bank and Gaza were under Israeli control. It was only
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in December 1987 that Yassin officially founded Hamas as the Muslim Brotherhood’s local
political arm following the outbreak of the first intifada (uprising), a Palestinian uprising
against Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza.
The US, the European Union, and a few other countries classify Hamas as a terrorist
organization (BBC News, 2003; Guardia, 2003; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003;
Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook, 2005; US Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005). Ironically, as
Breinholt (2007) claims:
This event [Hamas’s victory in Palestine] proved to be controversial in radical
Muslim circles. Al Qaeda [sic] leader Zahawahiri [sic] issued a statement taking the
Brotherhood to task for even participating in democratic elections (“they [the
Brotherhood] abandoned the movement of resistance and accepted the government of
bargaining…”). To Brotherhood enthusiasts like Leikin and Brooke, this event and
Zawahiri’s reaction showed that the Brotherhood was well posed to thrive as a
Western institution. (para. 16)
This overview suggests that the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood remains an open
question, and its worthiness and scope as an Islamist organization is far from settled. Without
professing empathy for Islamist movements, I argue that Islamism, quite like any other
ideology or movement, should not be treated as a monolith. According to Zollner (2009), in
the West political Islam is often associated with radical thought, and “this may be due to the
creation, on the part of power politics, of a fear of Islam as a religion, which is different,
strange and seemingly in opposition to Western thought” (p. 2); alternatively, it may be
because radical or even militant groups are constantly appearing in the media because of their
extremist actions. While radical thought and militant action make it necessary to study
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extremist groups, the focus on terrorism in the name of Islam marginalizes moderate
Islamists. And as Wickham (2002) claims, “in the Muslim world, the most insistent calls for
reform have come not from movements favoring secular democracy but from those seeking
to establish a political system based on Islam” (p. 1). Thus, it becomes important to advance
contextual understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s goals and capabilities—examine
distinct Brotherhood factions, analyze different discourses and rhetoric emerging from the
myriad Brotherhood sources, evaluate use of resources available to them—so that an
informed comment can be made on the promises and problems the Muslim Brotherhood
holds in today’s challenging global environment, specifically in the context of the Middle
East.
Research Questions
I analyze the English-language rhetoric in www.ikhwanweb.com to gain insights into:
(a) the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology as manifest in its official English website;
(b) the dynamics of its relationship as a counterpublic to militant fundamentalist
organizations, Western agents, and the Egyptian government under Hosni Mubarak’s rule, as
they play out in the Egyptian MB’s cyber rhetoric; and (c) the implication the Egyptian
Brotherhood’s worldview and counterpublic dynamics, manifest in its English-language
cyber rhetoric, might have apropos Western agents and global civil society.
I use counterpublic theory and rhetorical criticism as the theoretical and
methodological frameworks, respectively, to guide this study. Also, it is situated, more
broadly, within the discourse of Islam and the West prominent in both academic and policy
circles, and particularly, within the context of the Egyptian socio-political sphere, specifically
during the final years of the Hosni Mubarak regime. Yet another significant component
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forming the context of this study is the use of the Internet by Islamist organizations in
repressive environments. With these forming the theoretical, methodological, and contextual
bases of this study, to understand and explore the concerns raised I pose two research
questions:
RQ1: What is the ideology manifest in the English-language rhetoric of the Egyptian
Muslim Brothers in www.ikhwanweb.com?
RQ2: What rhetorical strategies provide support for this ideology?
In concluding I discuss what the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and
rhetorical strategies demonstrate about its counterpublic dynamics, and reveal about its use of
www.ikhwanweb.com as a counterpublic sphere. In addition, I make a comment on the
probable implications of the findings on: (a) the way Western agents view the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamist organizations; (b) the potential the Internet might or might
not have for Islamist organizations, specifically in the context of the Middle East; (c) the role
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the global civil sphere; and (d) the discourse on
Islam and the West.
In the following chapter I present an in-depth discussion of ideological criticism, the
form of rhetorical criticism I use to answer my research questions. I review the literature on
ideology that leads me to define the concept as it pertains to this study. Finally, I offer the
justification for my methods, a detailed description of the artifact, a commentary on my role
and epistemological, ontological, and axiological positions, and close with an explanation of
the data analysis techniques.
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Chapter IV: Methods
The purpose of this study is to gain an understanding of the ideology and explore the
counterpublic dynamics exhibited by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as manifest in its
English-language cyber rhetoric in www.ikhwanweb.com, the Muslim Brotherhood’s official
English website. Specifically, ideological criticism, a specific method of rhetorical criticism,
is used to answer the research questions. In this chapter I provide a justification for using
ideological criticism, a detailed description of the artifact for analysis, explain my role as
researcher, and describe the data analysis techniques of the study.
Justification of Method
The aim of this study is to identify the ideology manifest in the rhetoric of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as present in the MB official English website. Rhetoric is
defined as the human use of symbols to create discourse/s, with the purpose to respond to,
reinforce, or alter the understandings of an audience or the social fabric of the community,
with its essential activities located on a political stage. In other words, rhetoric is the use of
specific symbols by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in its website to create discourse/s.
Given this focus on rhetoric, rhetorical analysis is the obvious choice to answer the
research questions. Foss (2004) explains, “rhetorical analysis is a qualitative research method
that is designed for the systematic investigation and explanation of symbolic acts and
artifacts for the purpose of understanding rhetorical processes” (p. 6). The artifact for this
study is text posted on the Muslim Brotherhood’s official English website, authored by or
credited to Egyptian Brotherhood members. The overarching goal of rhetorical criticism is:
(a) increasing, through analysis of an artifact, knowledge of how rhetoric operates in that
artifact; and (b) understanding the implications of this knowledge on the relational and
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discursive dynamics between the creator and audience of this rhetoric. In addition, when the
focus of rhetorical critics also includes unearthing what an artifact suggests about beliefs,
values, and worldviews, as in the instance of this dissertation, their focus is on ideology
(Foss, 2004).
Ideology. The concept of ideology has been the topic of numerous discussions and
debate in the social sciences, in the mass media, and in politics. Numerous books and articles
have been devoted to exploring and understanding it. At the end of the 18th century, French
philosopher Destutt de Tracy coined the term “ideology” and according to van Dijk (1998),
de Tracy conceptualized ideology as “a general science of ideas, the study of how we think,
speak and argue” (p. 6). In the Marxist convention, ideologies were associated with the
notion of class (Joyce, 1995); ideologies were considered to be the tool of the ruling class
who disseminated them to hide or legitimize their power, inequality, or the status quo. In
many strands of thought within Marxism, and specifically in Engels’s interpretation of Marx,
“ideologies were forms of false consciousness, that is, popular but misguided beliefs
inculcated by the ruling class in order to legitimate the status quo, and to conceal the real
socioeconomic conditions of the workers” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 7). Similarly, the Gramscian
notion of hegemony implies ideological domination by a power elite of a large dominated
group of citizens or mass public, whose worldviews are subtly and persuasively inculcated by
these elites. This negative notion of ideology, namely, as a system of false, misleading
beliefs, that serves dominant groups, has prevailed in the social sciences and has been
considered central to the political uses of the term.
However, van Dijk (1998) proposes a more general notion of ideology, without
disregarding the fact that the legitimization of dominance is one of its important functions in
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certain circumstances. He talks about ideologies, such as those of feminism and anti-racism,
as positive ideologies. He suggests that they too are:
Systems that sustain and legitimatize opposition and resistance “against” domination
and social inequality . . . . Ideologies need not be negative, they need not be
dominant—there are also non-dominant ideologies that are often widely considered to
be negative, such as those of religious sects or right-wing extremists. (p. 8)
In addition, van Dijk (1998) claims that ideologies can entail positive functions—for
instance, they can help dominated groups by empowering them to create solidarity, to
organize struggle, and to sustain opposition. On a more neutral note, ideologies aid groups by
enabling their members to organize and manage their goals and everyday social practices. In
other words, according to van Dijk, theorizing the concept of ideology through a broader and
more flexible lens is possible without restricting it to negative and narrow perceptions.
This study focuses on the ideology of a specific counterpublic, the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood. In review, for the purpose of this dissertation, counterpublics are those
alternative, non-dominant publics amid wider publics who voice oppositional needs and
values through discursive practices that affirm their specificity on some axis of difference
from wider publics, and are not restricted by the rigid separation of public and private in their
discourse, or a separatist stance with the state. The emancipatory potential of counterpublics
emerges in the dialectical movement of withdrawal and reengagement with wider publics,
and the discursive aim of counterpublics is not necessarily reaching consensus—besides
addressing and thematizing inequalities, counterpublic discourse may serve a number of
purposes, including expressing identity, raising awareness, celebrating difference, and
enabling play. This definition necessitates use of the concept of ideology more flexibly than
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its traditional, and often pejorative descriptions, to study the ideology of the counterpublic—
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
Moreover, according to van Dijk (1998), ideologies are often associated with systems
of beliefs, be they social, political, or religious, shared by a social movement or a social
group; exemplars can be feminism and sexism, racism and antiracism, pacifism and
militarism. “Group members who share such ideologies stand for a number of very general
ideas that are at the basis of their more specific beliefs about the world, guide their
interpretation of events, and monitor their social practices” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 6). An
ideology is also a mental framework; an ideology is produced through systems of
representation a movement or group deploys to make meaning and define the world or some
aspect of it (Makus, 1990; van Dijk, 1998).
Based on this brief review of ideology, and for the purpose of this study, ideology
entails a social and a cognitive component, and it is not prejudged as essentially dominant
and/or negative. It is defined as beliefs a social group or movement shares, through systems
of representation: (a) to interpret, make sense of, and define some aspect of life; and (b) to
monitor their social practices—these beliefs are acquired, used, and changed in social
situations, and on the basis of the social interests of groups and social relations between
groups, in complex social structures (van Dijk, 1998).
Ideological criticism. Ideological criticism, as a method, is appropriate to answer the
research questions of this study because, through an ideological analysis the critic is able to:
(a) identify the nature of a group or movement’s ideology; (b) the interests included as part of
that ideology; and (c) strategies used to support the ideology (Foss, 2004), as manifest in the
artifact being analyzed. To elaborate, in an ideological analysis the suggestive elements of an

82
artifact are unearthed when the critic looks beyond the surface structures to explore the
beliefs, values, and assumptions of a group. These beliefs, or ideologies, manifest in
rhetorical artifacts potentially reflect a group’s social, economic, political, or cultural
interests (Foss, 2004). Docan (2004) explains:
To identify the nature of the ideology, the critic frequently examines the artifact for
what it asks the audience to believe, understand, feel, or think by exploring
assumptions, premises, and particular characteristics of the artifact. A second step is
to examine the interests included in the artifact, looking for whose voices are included
and excluded, and whose interests are privileged, neglected, or oppressed. Finally an
identification of rhetorical strategies allows for an understanding of how rhetoric is
used to create or support the ideology identified. (p. 281)
With ideology and ideological criticism defined and contextualized for this study, a detailed
description of the artifact follows.
Artifact: Ikhwanweb
The artifact chosen for this study is the Muslim Brotherhood’s official English
website, www.ikhwanweb.com; specifically, the written texts posted on this website credited
to Ikhwanweb—either authored by Egyptian Brotherhood members, or contributed by
independent individuals, groups, and organizations, and bylined by the Egyptian
Brotherhood. The About Us section of the website states that Ikhwanweb is the
“Brotherhood’s only official English website,” and the main mission behind it is to “present
the Muslim Brotherhood vision right from the source and rebut misconceptions about the
movement in Western societies.” Thus, the intended and stated audience for this website is
Western agents. One of the primary objectives of this study is the exploration of the Egyptian
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Brotherhood’s cyber rhetoric in English—to unearth its ideology, to identify rhetorical
strategies supporting the ideology unearthed, and to interpret implications of the same on
Western agents’ treatment of the Egyptian Brotherhood. Hence, the English language website
gains justification for the purpose of analysis. Furthermore, the choice of a website is
justified since one of the broader objectives of the study is to comment on the role of the
Internet as a counterpublic sphere for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
Ikhwanweb was founded by Khairat el Shater, deputy chairman of the Muslim
Brotherhood, and was launched in 2005; in 2009, the website was updated, and this entailed
enhancement and modification of the overall web design without any significant change to
the substantive elements of the website. The term Ikhwanweb basically translates into
Brothers who have a web presence, the term Ikhwan meaning brotherhood or brethren. One
can reach the Home Page of this website through the url: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/.
Ikhwanweb’s main office is located in London; it has Brotherhood correspondents in most
countries, which include both freelance writers and regular employees.
Ikhwanweb also features, as stated in their About Us section, “other views” that they
claim are separate from Muslim Brotherhood opinions, and these have been excluded from
this analysis. Derk (2008) reiterates that Ikhwanweb incorporates a collection of documents
from both Ikhwan members or endorsed by them, as well as “other views” from nonmembers, thus making it a complex and multi-vocal space. This multi-vocality is a rich
rhetorical resource for exploring and interpreting the Egyptian Brotherhood’s ideology and
counterpublic dynamics. However, due to constraints of time and space, and the limited
scope of this project, I undertake a focused analysis only of the Egyptian Brotherhood’s
English-language rhetoric. Therefore, as aforementioned, written texts that are either
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authored by Egyptian Brotherhood members, or contributed by independent individuals,
groups, and organizations and bylined by the Egyptian Brotherhood were chosen for analysis.
The content of this website focuses on two primary areas—the Brotherhood’s history,
organization, structure, and evolution and on-going socio-political controversies in and
outside of Egypt. Specifically, Ikhwanweb contains a plethora of descriptive as well as
analytical pieces, news reports and editorials, academic debates and polemical write-ups, and
transcriptions of speeches and interviews, which fall under numerous sections and subsections that the entire website is divided into; all content is archived since the date of its
creation. For the purpose of my ideological analysis I selected texts from three different
sections featured in Ikhwanweb, namely, MB versus Al-Qaeda, MB and the West, and
Parliament that were most appropriate for answering the research questions posed.
Counterpublic theory forms the theoretical basis of this study, and I have positioned
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a counterpublic to three wider publics—militant
fundamentalist organizations, Western agents, and the Hosni Mubarak Egyptian regime. The
three sections of Ikhwanweb—MB versus Al-Qaeda, MB and the West, and Parliament—
feature texts that are most closely and most clearly representative of the Brotherhood’s
dynamics with the wider publics aforementioned. In other words, to unearth the
counterpublic dynamics exhibited by the Egyptian Brotherhood in relation to these three
wider publics, choice of the aforementioned sections follow naturally, and justifiably so.
The timeframe for choice of texts was from 2005, which is the year of Ikhwanweb’s
creation, to late 2010, that is, a period of approximately five years. Over the period of five
years and in all three sections written texts representing the Egyptian Brotherhood’s rhetoric
were featured inconsistently, with a barrage of documents published around certain times and
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issues, and a conspicuous absence at others. As the focus of this study is not analysis of the
Egyptian Brotherhood’s rhetoric surrounding a specific issue or event, but rather an
exploration of its online rhetoric in totality, the time frame of five years was both justified
and effective.
Also, within this time frame, all written texts that met the requirements for selection
from MB versus Al-Qaeda and MB and the West were analyzed; there was no data sampling
procedure undertaken and every artifact that fit my criterion was studied to answer the
research questions. However, due to the vast number of articles in the third section,
Parliament, and to ensure that the analysis was manageable, quasi-random sampling 5 was
performed to choose articles from this section.
Thus, out of a total of eight web pages in the MB versus Al-Qaeda section that
contain archived material, with each web page containing approximately 20 articles, 53
articles were specifically authored or solicited by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The
average length of each article was one page; this holds true for all three sections. Out of a
total of nine web pages in the MB and the West section, with each web page containing
approximately 20 articles, 42 articles were analyzed. Out of a total of 27 web pages in the
Parliament section, with each web page containing approximately 20 articles, there were 170
articles specifically authored or endorsed by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; after quasirandom sampling 85—half of the 170 articles—were chosen for analysis from this section.

5

According to Castillo (2009), in this method of sampling the items are first arranged in some order.
In the case of this study it was ascending order of year, starting from 2005. The first item is then
chosen at random and subsequent items are then selected at a regular interval known as the period.
The period is determined according to the population and sample sizes. If the population size is N and
the sample size is n, then the period is N/n (or the nearest integer to the value of N/n). The period for
my study was 2 (170/85=2), which means every second article was chosen for analysis.
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Standards of Evaluation and Role of Researcher
The standards used in rhetorical criticism to judge analyses of artifacts are rooted in
two primary assumptions (Foss, 2004). One assumption is that reality is a symbolic creation,
constituted through the rhetoric one uses to talk about it (Foss, 2004). Precisely for this
reason, the analysis of an artifact cannot unearth a reality that can be considered or proven to
explain what the artifact really means, “because there are as many realities about the artifact
as there are vocabularies from which to conduct inquiry about it” (p. 21). A second
assumption, related to the first, is that a critic can explain an artifact only through a personal
interpretation of it (Foss, 2004). “One cannot be objective, impartial, and removed from the
data because one brings to the critical task particular values and experiences that are reflected
in how one sees and writes about the artifact” (p. 21). These assumptions suggest that the
task of a rhetorical critic is to provide one analytic interpretation of what an artifact
symbolizes.
With these two assumptions as bases, the primary standard used in judging an essay
of criticism is the argument made by a critic—in other words, the reasons and evidence
offered by the critic in support of the claims made (Brockriede, 1974). Regarding evidence,
Foss (2004) elaborates:
This evidence constitutes the grounds of the argument—the data from the artifact on
which the argument is based . . . . [such as] ample quotations from a discursive
artifact and ample descriptions of the dimensions of the visual one. You [the critic]
also must quote the evidence accurately, and the evidence you cite should be
representative of the artifact as a whole. This standard of adequate, accurate
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documentation requires that what the critic says exists in an artifact is, in fact, there.
(p. 21)
A second standard is reasonable inference (Foss, 2004), that is, the critic must be able
to show how she/he reasonably inferred the claims made from the data. This can be done by
explaining the warrants of the claims, as the warrants authorize the movement from the
grounds to the claims (Toulmin, 1958). It must be kept in mind that each rhetorical critic
brings biases and a unique framework to the process of criticism; therefore, although the
audience of the critique must be able to follow and appreciate how the critic arrived at the
claims, they do not have to agree with those claims (Foss, 2004).
According to Foss (2004), a third criterion by which essays of rhetorical criticism are
judged is coherence—one must arrange, order, and present findings so they are congruent
and consistent. Congruence results when findings do not contradict one another and are
internally consistent; when all major dimensions of the artifact are included and explained in
the theory the critic offers; and finally, when constructs and labels are parallel in terms of
levels of abstraction and language (Foss, 2004). Yet another requirement of coherence is that
the rhetorical critic has undertaken sufficient analysis of the findings to present them in an
insightful and effective way.
In rhetorical criticism therefore “artifacts are dealt with more as the artist deals with
experience than as the scientist does” (Foss, 2004, p. 22). As a rhetorical critic one needs to
be creative and imaginative; one must be able to write in a way so that the reader can
experience and envision the artifact as the critic does; one must be successful in conveying
one’s passion for the artifact; one must be able to persuade the reader to view the artifact’s
contribution to rhetorical theory in the manner of the critic; and finally, the rhetorical critic
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must be able to offer a compelling account to readers so that they can experience some aspect
of the world in a novel way (Foss, 1983; Wander & Jenkins, 1972). I believe that every
artifact communicates rhetorically, and a rhetorical critic interprets messages manifest in the
artifact through the lens of her/his experience and understanding. The interpretation that
unfolds, thus, is subjective; when it comes to the task of interpretation, no means or method,
no amount of checks and guards can remove the element of subjectivity from the endeavor.
There is no foolproof way of grasping the correct version of reality in an artifact simply
because human actions, such as rhetorical performances, are symbolic creations, and the
interpretation of them is a complex, non-neutral pursuit.
It is impossible to grasp the one true intent of human action. But through logic and
rules, a rhetorical critic can help discover what an artifact teaches about the rhetorical claims
of its authors—in other words, the nature of rhetoric—and in the process make a contribution
to rhetorical theory. According to Foss (2004), through the study of one artifact the rhetorical
critic makes suggestions concerning some process of rhetoric, and the societal reality it
represents. In this manner, theories about rhetorical criticism enable one to develop a
cumulative body of research and thus improve the practice of communication. Therein lies
the value of this enterprise.
With this rationale in mind I chose to study the cyber rhetoric of a counterpublic, the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in this dissertation. A few words also need to be said about
the choice of the Muslim Brotherhood for rhetorical analysis. Several years of study and
research dealing with the Middle East have led to personal insights on issues and phenomena
associated with Muslim societies, such as the role of religion in Muslim societies, the debate
on the compatibility between Islam and modernity, the complex dynamics of fundamentalism
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and Islamism, and the place of Islamic traditions in the age of modern technology. These
issues get further complicated through a varied understanding of concepts such as
democracy, civil society, fundamentalism, and Islamism, and by the exceptionally complex
political, social, and historical scenarios and circumstances characterizing countries,
communities, and cliques in the region. These ambiguities and complications have led to
some unfavorable actions by and towards the Islamic world, eventually leading to several
forms of rejection, neglect, abandonment, and conflict.
I hold that proper communication is often the panacea for the most malignant
problems of humanity. Through this dissertation, by focusing on a specific case—the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—and carrying out a rhetorical criticism of its website, I
endeavor to present a unique way of understanding this organization and making a positive
contribution to the process of communication. Specifically, I hope to formulate effective
strategies of communication that can prove potentially constructive to the ongoing dialogue
between Western agents and the Egyptian Brotherhood. There are undoubtedly other research
methods and means to address the concerns of the region; nevertheless, assessing from the
perspective of feasibility and time, and the research questions raised, this project is original,
effectual, and carries potential.
Data Analysis
In order to explore an artifact for the traces of ideology manifest in it, a rhetorical
critic goes through four steps: (a) identifying the presented elements of the artifact; (b)
identifying the suggested elements linked to the presented elements; (c) formulating an
ideology; and (d) identifying the functions served by the ideology (Foss, 2009). To elaborate,
one way to start the process of identifying the assumptions that contributes to a particular
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ideology for an artifact is to code the artifact for presented or key elements (Foss &
Kanengieter, 1992; Kanengieter, 1990). In other words, identification of presented elements
involves identifying and coding the basic observable features of the artifact that provide clues
to its ideology. In the second step, the critic articulates themes and ideas that are suggested
by the presented elements, which serve as the basis for ideological tenets (Foss, 2009). Thus,
from the list of key elements coded at least one idea or concept is generated that the critic
believes each coded element suggests. According to Foss (2009), in the third step the critic
groups the suggested elements into categories and organizes them into a coherent framework;
this coherent framework constitutes the ideology the critic suggests is implicit in the artifact.
At this stage the critic no longer deals with presented or key elements but with major
ideational clusters, themes, or ideas that characterize all or most of the suggested elements.
The critic brings the presented elements back in later as support or evidence for the
ideological tenets the critic claims.
Cluster analysis. In this study, cluster analysis was used to realize the three
aforementioned steps of data analysis. Cluster analysis involves three basic tasks: (a)
identifying key terms; (b) charting the terms that cluster around the key terms; and (c)
discovering an explanation for the artifact. Burke (1973) explains the central idea of cluster
analysis:
Now, the work of every writer [rhetor] contains a set of implicit equations. He uses
“associational clusters.” And you may, by examining his work, find “what goes with
what” in these clusters- what kinds of acts and images and personalities and situations
go with his notions of heroism, villainy, consolation, despair, etc. (p. 20)
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Thus, the task of a critic using this method is to note “what subjects cluster about other
subjects” (Burke, 1984, p. 232). And the clusters manifest in someone’s rhetoric can:
Reveal, beneath an author’s “official front,” the level at which a lie is impossible. If a
man’s virtuous characters are dull, and his wicked characters are done vigorously, his
art has voted for the wicked ones, regardless of his “official front.” If a man talks
dully of glory, but brilliantly employs the imagery of desolation, his true subject is
desolation. (p. 233)
A cluster analysis, then, provides “a survey of the hills and valleys” of the rhetor’s mind
(Burke, 1984, pp. 232-233), resulting in insights or suggestions into the meanings of key
terms, and thus the worldview of the rhetor.
To identify the key symbols or presented elements of the artifact I coded action verbs.
Action verbs express action, physical or mental, by describing the behavior of the subject, be
that a person, place, or thing (Melzow, 2005). The justification for coding for action verbs in
this analysis is two-fold and is rooted in both the terms action and verb.
Beginning with the latter, the importance of verb rests in its derivation from the Latin
for word: the verb may be considered the key word in the structure of a sentence. While the
noun used as subject indicates what the writer is talking about, the verb indicates what,
according to the writer, that noun is or does. Sometimes the subject can be omitted from a
sentence, but there is no way a grammatically complete sentence can be written without a
verb. Hence, from the point of view of both content and grammatical structure, the verb is an
indispensible part of a sentence and justifies being coded for analysis.
Focusing on action, a Burkean explanation of the term is expedient at this point.
According to Burke (1966):
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Action corresponds to the neurological aspect of the human being . . . it is the ability
of an organism to acquire language or a symbol system . . . . When we strive to reach
goals in arenas such as education, politics, religion, or finance, we are motivated by
our symbolicity . . . . language use constitutes action. (p. 445)
Burke further states that action is separate from motion. Motion corresponds to the biological
or animal aspect of the human being, which is concerned with bodily processes and the
requirements for the maintenance of these processes. This biological level is nonsymbolic
because it does not involve the use of symbols (Burke, 1966).
Motion is a requirement for action (Burke, 1970) although the opposite is not true.
While motion can exist without action, action cannot exist without motion; symbolic activity
or action is grounded in the realm of the nonsymbolic. Foss (2004) states that the distinction
Burke proposes between motion and action is largely a theoretical one because once
organisms acquire a symbol system, we are virtually unable to do anything purely in the
realm of motion. Once we have a symbol system, everything we do is interpreted through the
lens of that symbol system. In the syntactical realm of language, action verbs, by virtue of
the function they perform in a sentence have the ability to manifest both the action and
motion components of language.
Furthermore, the crux of this study lies in the rhetorical interpretation of worldviews
behind actions. Humans use rhetoric to constitute and present a particular view of their
situation. Through rhetoric it is possible to size up a situation and name its structure and
outstanding ingredients. How rhetors describe a situation indicates how they perceive it, the
choices they see available to them, and the action they are likely to take in that situation. Our
language, then, provides clues to why we do what we do. Once it is known how rhetors have
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justified, explained, and accounted for their actions (Burke, 1941), one is able to interpret
their worldview.
Based on this brief review of the relation between language, action, and worldview,
coding for action verbs to identify the presented elements in this artifact can be considered a
logical first step for cluster analysis. For the purpose of this study, the presented elements
were selected on the basis of frequency. A term that is used over and over again by a rhetor is
likely to be a key term in that person’s thought and rhetoric, so if one term frequently appears
in the artifact that term probably should be selected as one of the rhetor’s key terms (Foss,
2004).
After the key terms—the action verbs in this case—were identified, the clusters
around those key terms were charted. This process involves close examination of the artifact
to identify each occurrence of each key term, and identification of the terms that cluster
around each key term. There are several ways in which terms may cluster around key terms;
in this study, proximity, or nearness to the key action verb was the primary criterion that
aided choice of terms that clustered around the key terms. Once the key terms and clusters
around them were identified, I embarked on finding patterns in the linkages discovered in the
charting of the clusters as a way of interpreting the worldview constructed manifest in my
artifact. At this stage, to help find patterns in the clusters identified I turned to Burke’s
dramatism.
Burke and dramatism. Burke’s notion of dramatism (1966) entails two basic
assumptions: (a) language use constitutes action, not motion; and (b) humans develop and
present messages in the same way a play is presented. In other words, humans use rhetoric to
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constitute and present a particular view of their situation, and according to Burke (1945), as
rhetors describe their situations they do so using certain basic elements of a drama:
You must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or
deed)…also you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the
act, [and] what means or instruments he used (agency). (p. xv)
These terms are used as principles for describing a symbolic act. Thus, with dramatism as
basis, I identified the major agents, the major agencies, and the major and minor issues and
acts manifest in each of the three sections 6—MB versus Al-Qaeda, MB and the West, and
Parliament. These, in turn, formed the framework that constituted the ideology.
From clusters to ideology. According to Foss (2004), there are some typical
components of an ideology, each of which functions to organize a number of beliefs.
“Answering the questions about each provides one with a comprehensive view of the
ideology in an artifact” (p. 244):
•

Membership—Who are we? Where are we from? What do we like? Who belongs to
us? Who can become a member of our group?

•

Activities—What do we do? What is expected of us? Why are we here?

•

Goals—Why do we do this? What do we want to realize?

•

Values/norms—What are our main values? How do we evaluate ourselves and others?
What should (not) be done?

6

Scene and purpose are two other elements Burke emphasizes, along with act, agent, and agency.
However, they were not individually identified in this study. This is so because, for all the symbolic
acts I hold Ikhwanweb as the scene. And, one of the aims of this study is to get to purpose by pulling
out the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology as manifest in its rhetoric in Ikhwanweb.
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•

Position and group-relations—What is our social position? Who are our enemies or
opponents? Who is like us, and who is different?

•

Resources—What are the essential social resources that our group has or needs to
have?

For the purpose of articulating the ideology manifest in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s
English-language rhetoric in Ikhwanweb, I used Foss’s aforementioned components loosely
as my framework.
Foss (2004) states that as a result of articulation of the ideology embodied in the
artifact, as interpreted and claimed by the critic, it becomes possible to answer certain
questions about the artifact as well as to identify the functions the ideology may serve—this
forms the fourth and last step of an ideological analysis. Some of these questions are: What
does the artifact ask the audience to believe and feel about an issue, concept, or
phenomenon? What arguments are being made in the artifact and for what purpose? What are
the particular characteristics, roles, actions, or ways of seeing being commended, and which
are being negated in the artifact? What general conceptions of good and bad are suggested?
What does the artifact suggest is unacceptable, negative, undesirable, marginal, or
insignificant? The four steps elaborated above ensured the addressing and answering of RQ 1
of this study.
In order to answer RQ 2, I paid attention to certain dimensions of the rhetoric, such as
content and style, which according to van Dijk (1998) are likely to facilitate acceptance of an
ideology by an audience. In terms of content, as Foss (2004) states, in presenting a set of
beliefs about an issue rhetors cannot include everything they know about it, and therefore
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choose to focus on some things leaving out others. Van Dijk (1998) in a similar vein argues
that speakers/writers make selections, and it is this selection that is liable to multiple forms of
ideological control. Decisions about what content to highlight and feature, and what to
suppress tend to be made according to these principles, wherein the rhetor of the artifact
becomes Us and the wider public Them: 7 (a) express/emphasize information that is positive
about Us; (b) express/emphasize information that is negative about Them; (c) suppress
information that is positive about Them; and (d) suppress information that is negative about
Us. These principles constitute what van Dijk (1998) calls the ideological square, and this
plays a role in the broader contextual strategy of positive self-presentation or face-keeping
and its outgroup corollary, negative other-presentation.
There are a number of ways, such as major topics discussed, level of detail, and
implicitness or explicitness through which artifacts can emphasize and de-emphasize
information according to the aforementioned principles (Foss, 2004). The major topics
discussed or referenced suggest what is most relevant or important for the rhetor. Artifacts
also can emphasize and de-emphasize information in the level of detail they provide about a
situation; for instance, they can provide a great deal of detail even if irrelevant if the details
provide negative information about outgroups or reflect positively on the ingroup.
Conversely, details may be more vague when the information being discussed portrays the
ingroup negatively and outgroup positively. Implicitness and explicitness may be used in a
similar fashion, such as negative properties of an outgroup may be made explicit, whereas
their positive properties are likely to remain implicit in an artifact’s ideology.
7

In an attempt to prevent generalizations, it might be worth conceptualizing Us and Them as two
broad categories which contain within themselves several layers—who belong to Us and to what
degree, and who belong to Them and to what degree.
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As with content, style or form also can be used to signal ideological beliefs (Foss,
2004). Active or passive voice, which can show individuals either as agents or objects of
action, respectively, is one way. Word order is another stylistic mechanism through which
information can be placed in a more or a less prominent position. Also, while expressing
concepts, outgroups usually are described in ideologies in neutral or negative terms and
ingroups in neutral or positive terms. Other aspects of style include repetition of ideas thus
ensuring emphasis, and use of figures of speech such as metaphors, rhyme, alliteration,
euphemism, and understatement.
The data analysis techniques detailed above steered this study towards addressing the
research questions, thereby enabling commentary on the monolithic treatment of the Muslim
Brotherhood by Western agents, the potential of the Internet as a tool for counterpublic
expression, and the role Islamist organizations might (or might not) play in strengthening
civil society. In the following chapter I elucidate the details of analysis, and summarize the
findings of each section analyzed.
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Chapter V: A Worldview in the Details
The primary focus of this study is to explore and understand the rhetoric of a
counterpublic—the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—as featured in its official Englishlanguage website www.ikhwanweb.com, during the final years of the Mubarak regime in
Egypt. This goal is accomplished through a rhetorical analysis of archival material in the
website. In this chapter I present a detailed outline of the several steps involved in the
process of analysis, and summarize the findings and symbolic dramas manifest in each
section analyzed, namely, MB versus Al-Qaeda, MB and the West, and Parliament. In the
next chapter I answer the research questions of this study; in other words, I take the leap from
the details to the big picture.
As elaborated in Chapter 4, I used cluster analysis to identify the presented or key
elements, and the suggested elements, which led to the identification of assumptions
contributing to the ideology present in the artifact (Foss & Kanengieter, 1992; Kanengieter,
1990). Cluster analysis involves three basic tasks: (a) identifying key terms; (b) charting the
terms that cluster around the key terms; and (c) discovering an explanation for the artifact
that entails unearthing the ideology manifest. This chapter will detail the first two tasks, and
present the third task partially. That is, after identifying the key terms and the clusters with
Burke’s dramatism as basis I interpreted the symbolic dramas in each of the three sections,
which in turn aided in constituting the ideology; in this chapter I present details of the
symbolic dramas, and elaborate on the ideology in Chapter 6.
To unearth the worldview present in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Englishlanguage rhetoric in their official English website, written texts posted and credited to
Ikhwanweb—either authored by Egyptian Brotherhood members, or contributed by
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independent individuals, groups, and organizations and bylined by the Egyptian
Brotherhood—were chosen. Specifically, I selected texts from three different sections
featured in Ikhwanweb: Muslim Brotherhood versus Al-Qaeda, Muslim Brotherhood and the
West, and Parliament. I have positioned the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a
counterpublic to militant fundamentalist organizations, Western agents, and the Hosni
Mubarak regime; thus these three sections feature texts that are most representative of the
Egyptian Brotherhood’s counterpublic dynamics.
Task I
To identify the key symbols or presented elements of the artifact I coded action verbs,
and these were selected on the basis of frequency. In the section Muslim Brotherhood versus
Al-Qaeda, which included 53 articles for analysis, the key elements or the action verbs
identified were: (a) say; (b) use; (c) have; (d) reject; (e) claim; (f) lead; (g) point out; (h)
confirm; and (i) condemn. Thus, 9 action verbs stood out as key elements based on frequency
of their occurrence.
In the section Muslim Brotherhood and the West, which included 42 articles for
analysis, the action verbs identified were: (a) hold; (b) say; (c) support; (d) have; (e) use; (f)
believe; (g) add; (h) make; (i) come; (j) allow; and (k) reject. These 11 verbs were selected
based on frequency of their occurrence in the 42 articles coded for analysis from this section.
In Parliament, the key elements were: (a) say; (b) call; (c) hold; (d) confirm; and (e) submit.
These 5 verbs were selected based on frequency of occurrence in the 85 articles coded for
analysis from this section.
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Task II
After the key terms—the action verbs in this case—were identified, the clusters
around those key terms were charted. This process involves close examination of the artifact
to identify each occurrence of each key term and identification of the terms that cluster
around each key term. There are several ways terms may cluster around key terms; in this
study, proximity, or nearness to the key action verb was the primary criterion that aided
choice of terms that clustered around the key terms. I demonstrate the clusters with quotes
from Ikhwanweb below; these are representative of the quotes that function as supportive
evidence for claims I make later in the chapter, and to answer the research questions. 8
In the Muslim Brotherhood versus Al-Qaeda section, the terms that clustered around
each key action verb were:
1) Say—Al-Zawahiri 9, Muslim Brotherhood, Resistance, Elections, Ikhwanweb, Jihad
Some examples:
a. “…Hamdan, a Hamas leader and representative in Lebanon said to Ikhwanweb
that Al-Zawahiri’s statements and criticism to Hamas movement will never have
any impact…” (“Al Zawahiri [sic] Should Reconsider Political Views on Hamas,”
2007)
b. “The MB rejects…claims that Al-Zawahiri has been affiliated to it, said an MB
leader to Ikhwanweb.” (“Ayman Al-Zawahiri No MB Member: Leader,” 2007)

8

In view of the fact that proximity was the criterion behind choice of terms that clustered around key
terms, the examples presented include quotes that: (a) either feature only the terms clustering around
the key term based on proximity; or (b) feature both the key term and terms clustering around it.
9
Ayman Al-Zawahiri became the leader of Al-Qaeda after Osama bin Laden’s death. During bin
Laden’s leadership, Zawahiri was often described as a lieutenant to the former, though bin Laden’s
chosen biographer has called Zawahiri the real brains of Al-Qaeda (Baldauf, 2001).
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c. “…MB said in a statement to Ikhwanweb to push the peace process…” (Shehata,
2007)
d. “A lot has been said and published lately about the Muslim Brotherhood…”
(“The Debate About the Moderate Muslim Brotherhood Continues,” 2007)
e. “The Jihad group 10 declared days ago completing its juristic reviews over the
repelling violence and not using it as a means to change rule in Egypt.” (Ismail,
2007)
f.

“…Moderate Muslim Brotherhood…” (Salam, 2007)

2) Use—Oppression, Muslim Brotherhood, Violence
Some examples:
a. “…Israeli occupation and using violence indiscriminately…” (Shehata, 2007)
b. “… [Egyptian] regime may think of using oppression as a counterforce…”
(Ismail, 2007)
c. “…destroying properties, something the MB fully rejects.” (Shehata, 2007)
d. “MB is shattered by Pakistani government’s oppressive actions against the
political opposition.” (“MB Condemned the Heinous Crime Which Terrorized
Pakistan Today,” 2007)
e. “…justifying their [Al-Qaeda] oppression and their use of force…” (“Habib
Denounces Al-Zawahri’s [sic] Criticism of the Judges,” 2006)

10

The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, or the Jihad Group, is an Egyptian Islamist group active since the late
1970s. As an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, it is under worldwide embargo by the United Nations (UN
Security Council Committee, 2007); since the early 1990s the Jihad Group has been led by Ayman
Al-Zawahiri.
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f. “…Jihad will not be used as a counterforce against the Muslim Brotherhood…”
(Ismail, 2007)
3) Have—Representative/s, Peaceful, Contact/s
Some examples:
a. “…Osama Hamdan, a Hamas leader and representative in Lebanon…” (“Hamas
Dismisses Zawahiri’s Criticism,” 2007)
b. “…to have contacts with people…” (Raouf, 2008)
c. “…we [MB] still have our means for a peaceful change…” (“Habib: MB Adopts
Democracy, Rejects Revolutions,” 2007)
d. “MB representatives are credible and have the right contacts…” (Raouf, 2008)
e. “…there are no contacts between the Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood…”
(Abbadi, 2008)
f. “…Jihad movement will emerge again but in a peaceful method…” (Ismail,
Ikhwanweb, 2007)
4) Reject—Hamas, Ideology, Occupation, Islam, Constitutional
Some examples:
a. “Islam bans that resisters deviate from the tenets of righteous Shari’a to adopt
methods which are totally rejected by Islam.” (“MB Demand Taliban Release
Korean Hostages,” 2007)
b. “…actions which are totally rejected by Islam.” (“MB Demand Taliban Release
Korean Hostages,” 2007)
c. “…adopt right tenets of Islam and reject violence…” (Abbadi, 2007)
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d. “Al-Zawahiri urges Hamas reject elections.” (“Hamdan: Hamas and Al Qaeda
[sic] are Incompatible,” 2006)
e. “…Israeli occupation 11 and using violence indiscriminately…” (Shehata, 2007)
f. “…[Al-Masri] claimed that MB cooperates with occupation forces…” (Abbadi,
2007)
5) Claim—Movement, Islam/Islamic, Al-Qaeda
Some examples:
a. “…frustration that hit Al-Qaeda network after it has been rejected…” (Abbadi,
2007)
b. “What kind of jihad has the Al-Qaeda network claimed to have done?” (Abbadi,
2007)
c. “…Islam prohibits military attacks against civilians and hospitals.” (Ikhwanweb
& News Agencies, 2010)
d. “Morsy urged western researchers to come closer to Islamic movements…”
(“Morsi [sic]: MB Never Exercised Violence and Always condemned It, No
Relation with Al-Qaeda,” 2007)

11

Certain territories occupied by Israel from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria are termed Israeli-occupied
territories. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are two such territories, which are, however, also referred
to as Occupied Palestinian Territory, and herein lies a major point of contention between Israel and
Palestine. To elaborate, Occupied Palestinian Territory is the term used to refer to the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem (United Nations, 2008) and the Gaza Strip—territories which were captured
by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War, having formerly been controlled by Jordan and Egypt,
respectively (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). The Israeli government, on the other hand,
uses the term Disputed Territories, to indicate that some territories cannot be called occupied as no
nation had clear rights to them when Israel acquired them in 1967 (Gold, 2002; Israel Ministry of
foreign Affairs, 2001).
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e. “… MB hardliners 12 to block the movement’s evolution in a more democratic
direction.” (Elad-Altman, 2007)
f. “Prominent Islamic scholar al-Qaradawi [sic] denounced the recent violent
attacks…” (“Qaradawi: Islam is a Religion of Tolerance, Patience, Forbearance
and Peace,” 2010)
6) Lead—Factor/s, Palestine/Palestinian, Extremism
Some examples:
a. “…all motives and factors that have led to extremism will come to an end…”
(Solaiman, 2007)
b. “…authorizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization 13…” (“Abu Marzouk:
Hamas Rejects Al Zawahri [sic] Statements,” 2006)
c. “…[the Zionist enemy14] seeks to lead slyly and maliciously the Palestinian
people…” (“Abu Marzouk: Hamas Rejects Al Zawahri [sic] Statements,” 2006)
d. “Lacking a solution from the Palestinian powers for the current crisis…”
(Shehata, 2007)
e. “…confirming that they [juristic reviews] lead to giving a halt to extremism…”
(Ismail, 2007)
12

In politics, a position that is usually extremist and uncompromising.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a political and paramilitary organization founded in
1964. It is recognized as the only legitimate representative of the people of Palestine by over 100
states with which it holds diplomatic relations (Al-Madfai, 1993). The PLO was considered by the
United States and Israel to be a terrorist organization until the Madrid Conference in 1991. In 1993,
the PLO rejected terrorism and violence; in response, Israel officially recognized the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people (Murphy, 1993). In 2004, the United States Congress redeclared the PLO to be a terrorist organization (Legal Information Institute).
14
Zionism is a Jewish political movement that basically has supported the self-determination of the
Jewish people in a sovereign Jewish national homeland (Laqueur, 2003). Since the establishment of
the State of Israel this movement advocates on behalf of the Jewish state and addresses threats to its
existence.
13
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f. “…several factors that lead to violence…” (Solaiman, 2007)
7) Point out—Marzouk, Morsy, Enemy, Al-Sameraie
Some examples:
a. “Abu Marzouk pointed out that the operation Wasted Illusion took place under
Hamas government.” (“Abu Marzouk: Hamas Rejects Al Zawahri [sic]
Statements,” 2006)
b.

“Morsi [sic] pointed out that peaceful change does not happen overnight…”
(“MB Leaders: We Will Maintain Our Peaceful Reformist Methods,” 2007)

c. “…Al-Qaeda’s method is based on the absolute enemy…” (“MB Leaders: We
Will Maintain Our Peaceful Reformist Methods,” 2007)
d. “Al-Sameraie pointed out that Al-Qaeda network in Iraq attacked all resistance
factions…” (Abbadi, 2007)
e. “Al-Sameraie pointed out that Al-Qaeda network in Iraq has a foreign
agenda…” (Abbadi, 2007)
f. “Morsi [sic] pointed out that the violent incidents allegedly committed by the
MB, are separate and individual incidents…” (“Morsi [sic]: MB Never Exercised
Violence and Always Condemned It, No Relation with Al-Qaeda,” 2007)
8) Confirm—Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hamdan
Some examples:
a. “Hamdan confirmed that Hamas rejects Al-Qaeda…” (“Hamas Rejects Al
Qaeda [sic], Rebuts Abbas Claims,” 2007)
b. “…Hamas ideology is miles away from the ideology of Al-Qaeda…” (“Hamas
Dismisses Zawahiri’s Criticism,” 2007)
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c. “Hamdan confirmed Al-Zawahiri’s continuous attack against Hamas…”
(“Hamas Rejects Al Qaeda [sic], Rebuts Abbas Claims,” 2007)
d. “The MB strongly confirms this criminal act…” (“Muslim Brotherhood
Condemns Jordan Hotel Bombings,” 2005)
e. “The MB confirm their refusal and strongly condemn all such criminal acts.”
(“Muslim Brotherhood Condemns Jordan Hotel Bombings,” 2005)
f. “The MB and others [not clearly specified] demanded a transparent trial…”
(“Morsi [sic]: 9/11 a Calamity, Not Only for U.S. [sic],” 2007)
9) Condemn—Strongly, Denounce, Muslim Brotherhood, Violent/ce, Islam/Islamic
Some examples:
a. “MB strongly condemns these heinous attacks…” (“MB Strongly Condemns
Attack on Christians in Baghdad,” 2010)
b. “The MB condemns the massacre of tourists in Cairo.” (“Muslim Brotherhood
Condemns Attack on Tourists in Cairo,” 2005)
c. “The MB strongly condemns the criminal and savage attack…” (“Muslim
Brotherhood Condemns Jordan Hotel Bombings,” 2005)
d. “…[MB] strongly condemn all such criminal acts.” (“Muslim Brotherhood
Condemns Jordan Hotel Bombings,” 2005)
e. “…[MB] denounce and condemn the extremist and violent religious trends…”
(Radwan, 2008)
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f. “…establishing of a world-wide Islamic Caliphate 15…” (“Workshop in Cairo
Discusses Al-qaeda’s [sic] Future,” 2009)
In the Muslim Brotherhood and the West section, the terms that clustered around each
key action verb were:
1) Hold—Dialogue, Government, West/Western
Some examples:
a. “… MB’s attitude towards holding a dialogue with the West…” (Abbadi, 2007)
b. “… MB does not refuse to hold dialogue with the West…” (Abbadi, 2007)
c. “… several Western diplomats had held talks on several occasions with Egyptian
Parliament members of the MB…” (“El-Shater: We Do Not Promote an AntiWestern Agenda,” 2006)
d. “…UK government to hold vis-à-vis dialogues with Hamas…” (Mansour, 2007)
e. “…Hamas is ready to hold any dialogue with the West…” (Mansour, 2007)
f. “…US government holds internal discussions…” (Mansour & Assem, 2007)
2) Say—Islamists, Modernization, Muslims, Islam/Islamic
Some examples:

15

Caliphate, or dominion of a caliph (successor, in this context, that of the Prophet Muhammad),
refers to the first system of government established in Islam; this also represents the political unity of
the Muslim ummah (nation). In theory, it is a constitutional republic (Lecker, 2008), which in
simplistic terms means that the head of state, or the Caliph, and other officials are representatives of
the people, and must govern according to an existing constitutional law that limits the government’s
power over citizens. This kind of society was initially led by Muhammad’s disciples, specifically the
first four caliphs, to continue the political system the Prophet established known as the rashidun
caliphate. It represented the political unity, not the theological unity of Muslims, as theology was a
personal matter. According to Voll (2007), the caliphate is considered to be the fundamental political
concept of Sunni Islam.
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a. “Islam, as Al Banna [sic] says, is a comprehensive system…” (“Habib: MB
Adopts Democracy; Rejects Revolutions,” 2006)
b. “…it is enough to say that Islamists and the West…” (Al-Katatny, 2007)
c. “…an Islamic source of authority…” (Ramadan, 2007)
d. “…Sadek Shaban [a Tunisian academic] (he was quoted as saying all Islamists
deserve prison…” (Said, 2006)
e. “This is to say, the material under modernization remains…” (Al-Amri, 2006)
f. “… said [Jean-Louis Tauran, the Roman Catholic Cardinal] that Muslims do not
accept to deeply discuss the Qur’an…” (“Aboul Fotouh: Interfaith Dialogue
Should Handle Moral, Humanitarian Issues, Not Creed Issues,” 2007)
3) Support—Brotherhood, West/Western, Government, Democracy, Palestinian,
Fatah 16, Regime, Israel/Israelis
Some examples:
a. “…we [US Embassy in Cairo] support peace between the Israelis and the
Palestinians…” (“Cairo: MB and US Embassy Deny Dialogue,” 2007)
b.

“…while they [Western governments] continue to support regimes that
suppress…” (Ismail, 2008)

c. “This support for authoritarian regimes is destructive…” (Al-Katatny, 2007)
d.

“…rejection to the policy of supporting one Palestinian party against
another…” (Mansour & Assem, 2007)

16

Fatah is a major Palestinian political party and the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, a multi-party confederation. Its main goal, as stated in Article 12 of the official 1965
Fatah constitution, is the “complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic,
political, military and cultural existence.”
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e. “…US should support any government democratically elected.” (Mansour &
Assem, 2007)
f. “I [Nestor 17] do not support US providing Fatah movement with weapons…”
(Mansour & Assem, 2007)
4) Have—Muslim Brotherhood, Rights, Security
Some examples:
a. “…[Egyptian] people have the genuine right…” (“Habib: MB Adopts
Democracy, Rejects Revolutions,” 2008)
b. “They [Copts 18] are citizens who have all the citizenship rights.” (Habib, 2007)
c. “…and we [MB] have the right to reject that.” (Ismail, 2008)
d.

“MB have won a popular mandate after the last elections…” (“El-Shater: We Do
Not Promote an Anti Western Agenda,” 2009)

e. “…MB do not have an ideological stance against the West…” (Al-Katatny, 2007)
f.

“Western governments have been silent about the crime committed against
human rights and security.” (Al-Katatny, 2007)

5) Use—Islam/Islamic, Hamas, Support
Some examples:
a. “…the file they [Egyptian authorities] wanted to use against the moderate Islamic
movement [MB]…” (Said, 2006)

17

Bruce Nestor visited Cairo in 2007 to monitor the military tribunal against top MB leaders.
The Copts are native Egyptian Christians, and constitute the largest religious minority in the Middle
East (Cole, 2008). As a religious minority, they are often subject to discrimination in modern Egypt,
and attacks, usually by militant Islamic extremist groups.

18
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b. “… [the military tribunal 19] failed to prove that…money is ill gotten, used to
support the Muslim Brotherhood group…” (Mansour, 2007)
c. “Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas… next legislative elections using the
method of proportional representation 20…unscrupulously targets defeating
Hamas.” (Mansour, 2007)
d. “…fringe extremist elements using their distortion of Islam as a pretext.”
(Frykberg, 2007)
e. “…UK government to open direct channels with the Muslim Brotherhood and
Hamas…” (Mansour, 2007)
f. “…it is to the US interest to support democracy and human rights in Egypt.”
(Mansour & Assem, 2007)
6) Believe—Dialogue, Movement, Modernization, Islamist, US, Muslim Brotherhood
Some examples:
a. “…[the Tablighi 21] movement that believes in spreading the Islamic mission…”
(Said, 2006)

19

Egypt’s military tribunals try civilian suspects in addition to military ones, and they have been
harshly criticized by international human rights organizations for their quick verdicts, and lack of the
provision for appeal. Several Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members have been tried by these courts,
and convicted.
20
This is an electoral system that seeks to create a representative body that reflects the overall
distribution of public support for each political party. Majority systems effectively reward strong
parties and penalize weak ones by providing the representation of a whole constituency to a single
candidate who may have received fewer than half of the votes cast, but proportional representation
ensures minority groups a measure of representation proportionate to their electoral support.
According to Hill’s (2011) opinion in The New York Times, in the Palestinian elections in 2006,
Hamas won a majority of legislative seats as a result of the “winner take all” (para. 2) electoral
system, which resulted in unrepresentative results. Thus, in the case of the forthcoming Egyptian
elections, a polarizing outcome can be avoided through proportional representation, which would
“ensure that the Muslim Brotherhood, former Mubarak supporters as well as the many secular
constituencies in Tahrir Square would each get their fair share of representation” (para. 11).
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b. “…the US administration believes the untrue allegations about the MB…”
(“Essam El-Erian: Dialogue is a Foundation of Our Movement,” 2007)
c.

“…[MB] support dialogue, and believe in the necessity of openness…” (AlKatatny, 2007)

d. “This movement [Salafist Jihad 22] believes in Al-Qaeda ideas and adopts its
ideology…” (Said, 2006)
e. “…Islam refuses that aspect of modernization which believes in the materialistic
philosophy…” (Al-Amri, 2006)
f. “…[MB] do not believe US efforts for reform were sincere…” (Mansour &
Assem, 2007)
7) Add—Dialogue, Muslim Brotherhood, US
Some examples:
21

Within Sunni Islamism there are two key currents of religious activism: the Tablighi movement,
that took off in India in 1926, and the Salafiyya, which dates back to the 1880s, but has donned a new
form hundred years later. In essence, both movements are often considered fundamentalist in terms of
being backward-looking; and both are not wholly without political objectives, but they usually do not
seek political power for themselves and reject party competition, elections, and so on, and concentrate
on the religious mission of preaching and proselytizing (al-da’wa).
More specifically, the central feature of the organizationally cohesive and politically quietist
Tablighi movement is to preserve the faith, cohesion, and identity of the Muslim population (usually
in minority contexts) by offering elaborate definitions and explanations based on and legitimated by
scripture. The Salafiyya movement, on the other hand, started as a modernist reform movement in the
Middle East, to empower the Muslim world to rise to the challenge of the West. This reformist
combination wore off following the First World War when the Salafiyya movement started moving
towards an anti-Western direction. This involved a coming together of the Salafiyya movement and
the Wahhabi doctrines epitomized by the Al-Saud dynasty in Arabia in the late 1920s; this has
eventually resulted in the Salafiyya movement to be identified with the rigidly puritan
fundamentalism of the Wahhabi tradition. In fact, today there is a significant strand of the Salafiyya
movement, the Salafist Jihadi that includes individuals who have been radicalized, and have
abandoned the non-violent activism of the da’wa (International Crisis Group Middle East/North
Africa Report No. 37, 2005).
22
Salafist Jihadism is a school of thought of Salafi Muslims who support violent jihad; a Salafi is a
follower of the pious predecessors, the Salaf (forefather) of the patristic period of early Islam (Moosa,
2005).
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a. “…adding that the MB doesn’t object to any dialogue…” (Abbady, 2007)
b. “…the MB group said, “Dialogue is a means for joint communication…””
(“Essam EL-Erian: Dialogue is a Foundation of Our Movement,” 2007)
c. “El Erian [sic] added that the US administration has become a main factor…”
(“Essam EL-Erian: Dialogue is a Foundation of Our Movement,” 2007)
d.

“Dr. Mohamed Habib, First Deputy Leader of the MB, added that there are no
prospects of any dialogue with US…” (“Cairo: MB and US Embassy deny
dialogue,” 2007)

e. “Dr. Erian added that dialogue between MB and any foreign government has
reached a deadlock…” (“Cairo: MB and US Embassy deny dialogue,” 2007)
f. “…including European and US officials and academic powers…” (Abbady, 2008)
8) Make—Egyptian, Choice, Movement, Security, Coalition
Some examples:
a.

“… this movement [MB] doesn’t pose a challenge…” (Said, 2006)

b. “The popular choice if made, nobody could stop it.” (“Habib: MB Adopts
Democracy, Rejects Revolutions,” 2007)
c. “…all refuse making a coalition with it [Al-Nahda (Renaissance) Movement 23],
for fear of it…” (Said, 2006)

23

The Al-Nahda Renaissance Party is an Islamist opposition political party in Tunisia. This party is
believed to have been shaped by the thinking of Sayyid Qutb, the leading Islamic theologian of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Around the 1980s this party was beginning to be described as
moderate Islamist, and recently, in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia on March 1, 2011,
after the government of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali collapsed, Tunisia’s interim government has granted
the group permission to form a political party, something not possible during Ben Ali’s presidency.
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d. “…meet and make coalitions with it [the Left 24] in the fight for freedom…”
(Said, 2006)
e. “…making a coalition with the nationalist powers 25…” (“Future of Political
Islam,” 2006)
f. “Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak conveniently use the Brotherhood as an
excuse to prevent serious reform…” (Frykberg, 2007)
9) Come—Brotherhood, Power, West/Western, Islamists, Realization
Some examples:
a. “…have to come to realize that different views can be present in one single
Western society.” (“Katatny: Dialogue Between Islamists and the West a
Necessity,” 2006)
b. “…reject any person to undemocratically come to power…” (“Habib: MB
Adopts Democracy, Rejects Revolutions,” 2009)
c. “…should Brotherhood come to power,” (Masrey, 2009)
d. “If Brotherhood came to power…” (Masrey, 2009)
e. “…Islamists will eventually come to power…” (“Muslim Brotherhood
Parliamentary Bloc Leader Calls for Dialogue with USG,” 2006)

24

According to Said (2006), “there should be a methodic and clear differentiation between the radical
opportunist Left which should be put in the same boat with the current authority and between a Left
that kept away from authority and corrected its path, and it had heroic situations in support of
people’s issues first, and even with the Islamists, like the bloc fighters, the communist Labor Party
and the Democratic Progressive Party or some independent, human rights and media activists” (para.
20).
25
According to Said (2006), “all the frustrations that this movement represented across its different
shapes for all elites and leaving it for the Unionist to represent the national movement inside and
outside the country” (para. 21).
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f. “…Western presence in the region will change if the Islamists were to come to
power.” (“Muslim Brotherhood Parliamentary Bloc Leader Calls for Dialogue
with USG,” 2006)
10) Allow—Government, Regime
Some examples:
a. “…[MB] demanded the Egyptian government cancel the decree of Egyptian
President Mubarak…” (Mansour, 2007)
b. “US government allows violations from the Egyptian government…” (Mansour
& Assem, 2007)
c. “US government’s claimed reform efforts…” (Mansour & Assem, 2007)
d. “…[US government] allow a friendly regime to maintain power.” (Mansour &
Assem, 2007)
e. “…US government is ready to allow human rights violations…” (“Nestor:
Western Governments Don’t back Trials Against MB Leaders,” 2007)
f. “…political regime that allows discussions…” (Mansour & Assem, 2007)
11) Reject—Form
Some examples:
a. “…we [MB] frankly reject in form and content.” (“Muslim Brotherhood and
Democracy in Egypt,” 2007)
b. “…[MB] rejects all forms of American control…” (“The Political Dialogue of
the Moslem [sic] Brotherhood,” 2005)
c. “The MB is against all forms of foreign interference and domination.” (“Muslim
Brotherhood and Democracy in Egypt,” 2007)
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In the Parliament section, the terms that clustered around each key action verb were:
1) Say—Statement/s, Anti-terrorism, Rights, Delegation
Some examples:
a. “Dr. Boutros Ghali 26 said, in press statements held on Sunday…” (“MB Bloc
Calls for Activating Society’s Role to Stop Torture,” 2007)
b. “Al Husseini [sic] said in his statement that Egypt is seeking to provide Israeli
territories…” (Abdullah, 2007)
c. “…Sobhi Saleh said that the anti-terrorism 27 draft bill confirms…” (Al-Abbadi,
2007)
d. “In a statement to Ikhwanweb, Hussein Ibrahim said…” (“Brotherhood MPs
[Members of Parliament] Criticize new Anti-Terrorism Law,” 2007)
e. “…MB and human rights organizations staunchly opposed it [anti-terrorism
amendments].” (“Brotherhood MPs Criticize new Anti-Terrorism Law,” 2007)
f. “…mercy, justice, equity, human rights as well as respect and honoring pledges
and treaties…” (“Ikhwan MPs [sic] Delegation Meets with UN Representative,”
2006)
26

As a result of the 2011 Egyptian protests, Dr. Boutros Ghali was replaced by Samir Radwan as
Minister of Finance. Just before Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011, Dr. Ghali fled to
Lebanon with his wife. Egypt’s Prosecutor General called for Boutros Ghali’s arrest for charges that
include corruption.
27
President Hosni Mubarak proposed amendments to 34 articles of the Egyptian Constitution in late
December 2006, claiming it was an important step toward democratization, and these amendments
were passed by March 2007. However, opposition and civil society activists complained that these
amendments “infringe dangerously on human rights protections and close off possibilities for
peaceful political activity, particularly by the Muslim Brotherhood” (Brown & Dunne, 2007, p. 1). In
2007, the Mubarak regime started drafting an anti-terrorism law based on the new constitutional
amendments. It was feared that if this law comes to pass, it would lead to violation of public freedoms
and the regime would tighten the security grip on its critics, especially Islamists, under the ruse of
combating terrorism.
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2) Call—Egyptian, Amendment/s, Political, Abolish, Muslim Brotherhood
Some examples:
a. “…MB Parliamentary bloc called on the Egyptian government to do more efforts
for the Palestinian cause…” (Abdullah, 2007)
b. “These amendments [amendment to article 86 in 1992] were called at that time
anti-terrorism amendments.” (“Brotherhood MPs Criticize new Anti-Terrorism
Law,” 2007)
c.

“…the current charters are insufficient and Articles require major amendments
in order to achieve the law’s [the law of organ transplants 28] goals.” (“Organ
Transport Law Debate Continues,” 2010)

d. “…El Baradei 29 [sic] has called on all political movements and trends,
intellectuals and scholars, to converge with him.” (“Egypt’s Representatives Meet
with El Baradei [sic],” 2009)
e. “It [MB], moreover, calls on the abolishment of the Parties Court 30.” (“New
Draft Law for Parties, a New Fruit of Brotherhood-Front Cooperation,” 2005)

28

Ikhwanweb, February-March, 2010: It is debated by a number of Egyptian MPs, including MB
MPs that the new draft law—the Law of Organ Transplants—supported in principle by the Egyptian
Parliament, would open the door for human trafficking in Egypt; it will turn the Egyptian people into
human spare parts, which violate the resolutions of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs. The
MPs, in their arguments against the new law, called on the end of permitting the donation of organs
from Egyptians to non-relatives and foreigners, and demanded ending the penalty law in order to
prevent this from happening. According to Saad el-Katatni (2010), head of the Muslim Brotherhood
Parliamentary bloc, it is imperative and a social necessity to pass a law that will regulate organ
transplants, mainly because Egypt has become the third ranking country in the world in organ
trafficking.
29
Mohamed El-Baradei is an Egyptian law scholar and diplomat, who was the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). El-Baradei and the IAEA were jointly awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. He was an important figure in the 2011 Egyptian protests, which
culminated in the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. El-Baradei has emerged as the leading voice of
political reform and a challenger for Egypt’s (2011) presidency.
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g. “…calling for abolishing the emergency law 31 and unconditional freedom of
creating political parties…” (“Ikhwan MPs [sic] Delegation Meets with UN
Representative,” 2006)
3) Hold—Muslim Brotherhood MP/Parliamentary Bloc, Amendment/s, Egyptian, Sitin/s, Schedule/d, Conference/s
Some examples:
a. “MB Parliamentary bloc held on Thursday afternoon a press conference…” (“2
Muslim Brotherhood MPs Released on Bail,” 2007)
b. “A discussion on the state’s general budget was held at MB MP Al-Shoura’s
office.” (“Ruling NDP’s Policy Sink Egypt Into the Abyss,” 2010)
c. “…MB MPs held a sit-in in the Egyptian parliament…” (Ben Gharbia, 2007)
d. “…there is no MB MP in the meeting scheduled to be held today…” (“Muslim
Brotherhood MP’s Complain,” 2008)
30

President Anwar Sadat created the Political Parties Committee (PPC) after the implementation of
the multi-party system in Egypt to both regulate party activities and license new parties within the
guidelines of Law 40 (Maye, 2004). Law 40 empowers a committee chaired by the National
Democratic Party (NDP), formed by President Sadat in 1978, to suspend other parties’ activities in
the national interest (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The PPC continued in form and purpose under
President Hosni Mubarak; only two parties were approved by the PPC under the Mubarak presidency
(BBC News, 2007; Maye, 2004). Although it is possible to appeal a PPC decision to the Political
Parties Court, which has proved to be more independent, overturning sometimes the former’s
decisions and allowing some parties to see the light of day, it nevertheless in reality is only an
irregular body composed of senior administrative court judges, and mostly regime loyalists. In this
manner, the NDP has enjoyed uncontested power in state politics, usually considered a de facto single
party with authoritarian characteristics inside an officially multi-party system, for over three decades.
31
Emergency Law was first enacted in Egypt in 1958, and has remained in effect since 1967, except
for an 18-month break in 1980. It has been continuously extended every three years since 1981 under
Hosni Mubarak. Quintessentially, under the law, police powers are increased, constitutional rights are
suspended, and censorship is legalized. Under state of Emergency, the Egyptian government has
imprisoned individuals without any stated reason, and kept them in prison for uncertain periods
without trials; it has circumscribed non-governmental political activity and street demonstrations at
whim, and so on. Pro-democracy advocates have argued that the state of Emergency has been used by
the Egyptian regime to violate individuals’ democratic rights.
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e. “MB MPs, independents, Karama Party 32 held a press conference in which they
declared boycotting House sessions and rejecting President Mubarak’s proposed
constitutional amendments.” (Mahmoud, 2007)
f. “MB MPs and other political and national powers held many conferences and
seminars all over Egypt…” (Mahmoud, 2007)
4) Confirm—Bill, Egypt, MB MP/Parliamentary Bloc, Regime
Some examples:
a. “The sources confirmed that the bill [anti-terrorism bill] will be presented at the
end of the current parliamentary round…” (Abbadi, 2007)
b. “…bill confirms that the Egyptian regime is planning to prevent any voice
opposing it.” (Abbadi, 2007)
c. “…MB Parliamentary bloc confirms its support to the journalists…” (“MB
Parliamentary Bloc Backs Egyptian Journalists, Praises Role Against Regime’s
Tyranny,” 2007)
d.

“The MB Parliamentary bloc confirmed that it does not object to visiting US
Congress and contacting it.” (“MB House Bloc: OK to Visiting US Congress,”
2007)

32

The Dignity (Al-Karama) Party is a left-leaning Nasserist Party, which was founded by Hamdeen
Sabahi in 1996. Sabahi is a former parliamentary representative of the Arab Democratic Nasserist
Party, who had left the group over disagreements with its leader. The Dignity Party has socialist
tendencies and calls for political pluralism. The Party has condemned Mubarak’s regime for its
authoritarian ways, specifically, monopolizing political power and restricting opposition activities.
The Party has petitioned the Political Parties Committee several times for legal party status, but with
no success. However, in the 2000 parliamentary elections Sabahi ran as an independent candidate,
and won a seat.
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e. “The MB Parliamentary bloc confirms to place the bill [Parties Law bill 33]
under scrutiny to evaluate its feasibility.” (“New Draft Law for Parties, a New
Fruit of Brotherhood-Front Cooperation,” 2005)
f.

“The MB Parliamentary bloc issued a statement rejecting the judiciary bill 34
proposed by the government.” (“MB Parliamentary Bloc Rejects Gov’t’s
Proposed Judiciary Bill,” 2006)

5) Submit—MB MP/Parliamentary Bloc, Urgent, Government
Some examples:
a. “…they [MB MP] submitted dozens of urgent interpellations and written
questions…” (“MB Bloc Calls for Activating Society’s Role to Stop Torture,”
2007)
b. “…Egyptian government’s failure in getting rid of mines left after the World
War…” (Omar, 2009)
c. “…an urgent statement submitted to the Egyptian Prime Minister by MB
MP…” (Al-Masry, 2007)
d. “ 3 parliamentary questions have been submitted by members of the MB
Parliamentary bloc revealing that the government has wasted approximately 15

33

In 2005, a draft law pertaining to Parties Law was prepared by the president of the Unified National
Front for Change, Yahya el-Gamel, also a Professor of Constitutions at Cairo University. This bill
designed a formula for launching and licensing parties in a way that would grant release from the PPC
and the government’s control; it also called for abolishing the Parties Court.
34
In 2006, the Egyptian government proposed a judiciary bill that would leave all significant
judiciary posts under the control of the Executive Authority, and which would give it the absolute
right to nominate or unseat judges. It would give the Executive Authority the right to refer a judge to
the Disciplinary Council, in addition to appointing the head of the Supreme Judiciary Council, the
Attorney General, and the Minister of Justice.
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billion pounds…” (“Questioning by MB MPs Reveal Waste of L.E15 Billion!”,
2010)
e. “All MPs submitted nine urgent statements in the Parliament to the Prime
Minister…” (“Date Scheduled to Discuss the Interrogations by MB MPs in
Parliament,” 2010)
f. “…MB MP submitted an urgent statement to the Prime Minister regarding the
government’s construction of an iron wall on our borders with the Palestinians.”
(Al-Masry, 2009)
Tasks I and II constitute the steps that led to the last and final task of this study. Task
III was instrumental in unpacking the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideology, as well as
bringing forth the rhetorical strategies supporting the ideology. In the remainder of this
chapter I analyze the clusters from all three sections, and present the symbolic dramas that
manifest following analysis; this I term Task IIIA. In the following chapter, with the
symbolic dramas as premise, I interpret the Egyptian Brotherhood’s ideology and answer the
research questions of this study; this forms Task IIIB.
Task III
Task III involves identifying the suggested elements, which serve as basis for
ideological tenets, as well as unearthing the rhetorical strategies that support the ideology. In
that endeavor, I started with Task IIIA, which included analyzing the clusters and identifying
the symbolic dramas manifest therein. The symbolic dramas entailed the major agents, the
major agencies, and the major and minor issues and acts manifest in each of the three
sections—MB versus Al-Qaeda, MB and the West, and Parliament. These are presented: (a)
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as a table first; (b) elaborated and discussed thereafter 35; and (c) summarized at the end of
each section.
Table 1. From Clusters to Symbolic Categories/Dramas

35

All words, phrases, and statements cited from Ikhwanweb, as evidence for claims made, have been
enclosed by double quotation marks.
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Table 1. Continued

Muslim Brotherhood versus Al-Qaeda. Discussion and elaboration of the main
findings (presented in Table 1) that emerge after analysis of the nine clusters in this section
follows.
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Major agents and agencies. The major agents identified in this section are the MB;
MB associate Dr. Mohamed Morsy, a senior member of the MB’s Executive Bureau; Hamas;
Hamas associates Osama Hamdan, a Hamas leader and representative in Lebanon, and Dr.
Moussa Abu Marzouk, deputy chief of the Hamas Political Bureau; Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the
leader of Al-Qaeda after Osama bin Laden’s death; Islam; and few generalized agents,
namely, army or a resistance group, others, and Islamic groups. The predominant agencies
in this section are jihad and violence; none of the agencies are attributed being used by any of
the above agents.
Issues and acts. There are major and minor issues and acts, and these have been
elaborated in this section. First I have discussed the major issues and acts, followed by the
minor issues and acts, as outlined in Table 1.
Portrayal of relationship between the MB and Al-Qaeda, and Al-Zawahiri. A
relationship of opposition is established between the MB and Al-Qaeda and the MB and AlZawahiri. The main point of difference is in ideology, although the specifics of the difference
are not explicit. Ikhwanweb is the stated forum where this stance is presented. In addition, it
is either the MB, or MB associates, who function as agents presenting and portraying this
stance. The statements, “there are no contacts between the Al-Qaeda and the Muslim
Brotherhood,” “difference between MB’s ideology and that of the Al-Qaeda network,” “AlZawahiri was never a member of the Muslim Brotherhood,” “the MB rejects…claims that
Al-Zawahiri has been affiliated to it, said an MB leader to Ikhwanweb,” are some examples
that provide evidence for the aforementioned claims. The opposition is manifest in extensive
use of negatives such as “never,” “not the same,” and “no contacts,” performance of negative
acts, such as rejection and defaming, and through pathos, like in the expression of
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displeasure. In sum, the oppositional stance is portrayed clearly and directly, without any
equivocation or ambiguity.
Portrayal of relationship between Hamas and Al-Qaeda, and Al-Zawahiri.
Opposition is portrayed between Hamas and Al-Qaeda, and Hamas and Al-Zawahiri. The
main points of difference are in praxis and ideology, specifically, in their stance towards
elections and vision of resistance, respectively. Whereas Al-Qaeda is against elections,
Hamas is for it; however, no specifics providing more details on the difference in ideology,
and difference in vision of resistance comes forth. Ikhwanweb is the stated forum for the
expression of this stance.
In addition, the agents who are active in presenting this stance are Hamas and its
associates, like Hamdan. They make most comments and statements, and when they are not
opposing Al-Qaeda, the acts performed are those of advising and counseling. In other words,
Hamas and its associates are in control; whereas, Al-Qaeda and its associates, such as AlZawahiri, play a rather passive role. They are rarely present as agents, and when they are
agents the acts performed are either negative, like “continuously attacking Hamas,” or ones
where they are urging or appealing.
The opposition is also manifest in the use of adjectives such as “huge” to intensify the
opposition, or extensive use of negative terms and acts such as “never” and “denied any
link,” and finally, the portrayal of contradictions in statements such as “confirmed…rejects,”
“ideology…miles away,” “vision of resistance…completely different,” and
“confirmed…continuous attacks.” Thus, through the means described above that exhibit a
confident and forceful directness, the portrayal of the oppositional stance lacks any
ambiguity or equivocation.
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General portrayal of and stance towards Al-Qaeda. The portrayal of Al-Qaeda in the
Egyptian MB rhetoric is negative. It is associated with negative phenomena such as
oppression and violence, and this is manifest in “justifying” “oppression” and “use of force.”
It is portrayed to have negative intent as manifest in “in Iraq…has foreign agenda,” thereby
also featuring ethos. The acts it is seen performing are negative, for instance, “attacked all
resistance factions” and “criticized.” However, the specifics of “all” of the resistance
factions that were attacked and the nature of the foreign agenda remain unexplained.
The agent who embarks on many of these portrayals of Al-Qaeda is Al-Samaraie, a
senior member of the Iraqi political system; the fact that a senior member makes these direct
and negative portrayals add credibility to these claims. Finally, “Al-Qaeda’s method is based
on the absolute enemy” provides an insight into Al-Qaeda’s method, but adds negativity by
associating Al-Qaeda’s method with the negative term “enemy.” However, a clear definition
and description of “absolute enemy” is not discussed.

In addition, at times Al-Qaeda is

seen challenged and questioned, for instance with regards to its practice and
conceptualization of jihad as seen in “What kind of jihad has the Al-Qaeda network claimed
to have done?” Also, Al-Qaeda’s image is portrayed as one that is compromised when it is
presented as “rejected,” “frustrated,” and “hit.” But here again the specifics of the nature of
jihad, and the identity of the agent rejecting Al-Qaeda remain unknown.
The Palestine-Israel conflict. In the Palestine-Israel discourse, Israel and the Zionists
are portrayed negatively. The Palestinian “powers” ironically are portrayed as helpless, and
the Palestinian people are portrayed positively though gullible. To elaborate, Israel is
associated with negative phenomena such as oppression and violence, as seen in use of the
conjunction “and” to connect Israel with the same. Israel is also associated with negative acts
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and adjectives, namely, Israel’s use of “violence indiscriminately” and “dangerous” for
global security. The agents who “point out” these nuances about Israel are often senior MB
members, such as Morsy. Another specific tactic is use of Western agents as testimony to
support the negative portrayal of Israel. For instance as manifest in “polls in Europe” suggest
Israel is dangerous for global security; however, the details of the polls remain undisclosed.
The use of negative qualifiers like “enemy” for Zionists, and the association of Zionists with
negative instruments such as sly and malice for negative purposes, like duping and leading
Palestinian people, portray the former as crafty and thus, negatively.
The use of adjectives like “legitimate” in “legitimate resistance” that is being carried
out by the Palestinian people portray them positively, although, because they are getting
influenced by the Zionist “enemy,” they are gullible. In this “crisis,” the Palestinian “powers”
are seen as helpless due to “lack of any solution,” calling into question how powerful these
powers really are; the specifics of the crisis and the specific identity of these powers remain
unknown.
The use of the qualifier “Islamic” for the Palestinian constitution directly
characterizes the nature of the Palestinian constitution. Finally, although the portrayal of
Israel is negative, the MB’s stance towards Israel becomes ambiguous as a result of
accusatory and direct statements such as “[Al-Masri] claimed that MB cooperates with
occupation forces;” important to bear in mind is that the agent of this “claim” is an Al-Qaeda
associate.
General stance towards violence and stance towards peace; the MB and Hamas’s
stance towards violence and peace. An overall stance against violence and support for peace
and peaceful means is observed. An effort to contextualize use of, and define what violence
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entails is manifest; though at some instances ambiguity is noticeable, which calls into
question the stance on total rejection of violence and violent means. In the process of this
portrayal discourse centering on the issues of violence and Israel, violence and Al-Qaeda,
violence and jihad, violence and army and resistance groups, and extremism get featured.
For example, “ideology of violence and destruction” suggests that violence and
destruction have their own ideological basis, and “several factors that lead to violence” points
to the fact that no one factor or motive can be held solely responsible for propagating
violence. The statement, “use of violence to change governments” expresses the
possibility/fact of how violence can be/is used to “change governments,” but “never be
through violence, coups, and use of force,” in the use of the negative “never,” confidently
suggests that “violence, coups, and use of force” are useless. However, in the last comment,
for what purpose and in which context these become “useless” is not categorically specified.
Therefore, even though these statements portray the effort at explaining what violence
entails, and show an opposition towards its use, a complete rejection of violence in totality
cannot be ascertained.
This lack of clarity is further noticed in “vocally denounce racial discrimination and
terrorism” and “they [Islamic groups] would give up violence.” The first comment makes
clear that both “vocally” and in praxis, such as the act of “giving up,” violence is opposed.
However, the second statement insinuates that Islamic groups do use violence, and in future
“would” give it up; the context of this action is missing and the future stance makes this
statement speculative, thus making any accurate inference about the stance towards violence
ambiguous.
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As for Israel and Al-Qaeda, the statements “Israeli occupation and using violence
indiscriminately” and “justifying their [Al-Qaeda] oppression and their use of force”
associate both Israel and Al-Qaeda with oppression and violence unequivocally. In the first
statement, use of the conjunction “and” to connect “Israeli occupation,” and the qualifier
“violence indiscriminately” point to the association. With regard to Al-Qaeda, its act of
“justifying” “oppression” and “use of force” clearly associates it with oppression. Also,
“there are some factors that might help Al-Qaeda to renew its vitality” suggests that at
present Al-Qaeda is lacking vitality, but “some” factors are probable to renew it; the
definition or description of “vitality” is not put in context here.
An effort is made at dissociating jihad from violence and associating it with peace,
although these portrayals lack certainty. For example, “the Jihad group declared days ago
completing its juristic reviews over the repelling violence and not using it as a means to
change rule in Egypt” shows that an oppositional stance towards violence—which is
qualified by the adjective “repelling”—has been adopted even by the Jihad Group, which,
following its “juristic reviews” has publicly announced its decision to not use violence to
change rule in Egypt. In other words, violence, frequently attributed to the Jihad Group, is
being renounced in the context of rule change in Egypt. At the same time, “any way other
than the method of jihad will only lead to loss and failure” insinuates that for success—an
interpretation of which could be changing rule in Egypt—jihad is the way; but as seen in the
case of the Jihad Group, violence need not be associated with jihad. Therefore, although a
clear definition of what jihad means and entails cannot be put forth, support for jihad,
opposition toward violence, and the possibility of the two being mutually exclusive can be
assumed.
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In addition, “Jihad movement will emerge again but in a peaceful method” shows
support for a peaceful way, which will enable the Jihad movement to “emerge again.” This
statement also suggests that the Jihad movement has taken a back seat “again” for some
reason, and the use of the conjunction “but” introduces an element of contrast (Algeo, 2006)
insinuating that usually peaceful means are not used “but” this time will be to help the Jihad
movement re-emerge. This new peaceful stance is perhaps an indicator of a new Jihad
movement that will support peace. At the same time, the term “will” makes this hopeful
statement a future-oriented, speculative claim.
In terms of army and resistance groups, the statement “whether it [targeting civilians
in armed conflicts] is done by an army or a resistance group” insinuates that heinous acts like
“targeting civilians in armed conflicts” are often attributed to the “army” or “resistance
groups;” here both groups have been generalized. Finally, as regards extremism, “all motives
and factors that have led to extremism will come to an end,” “confirming that they [juristic
reviews] lead to giving a halt to extremism,” and “peace is choice over extremism” clearly
insinuate the stance against extremism and choice of peace “over” it. There is hope in the
belief that the “motives and factors” leading to extremism will come to an “end,” and one
specific means—“juristic reviews”—can “halt” extremism. Here again, the manner in which
the “motives and factors” that have led to extremism will come to an end, and context are not
specified, making this claim hopeful, yet speculative.
In terms of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood specifically, the concern that the MB
has regarding use of violence against it, or attribution of violence to it for the purpose of
tarnishing its image by opposition forces, is portrayed; this concern, however, is mostly
speculative. The statement “MB is shattered by Pakistani government’s oppressive actions
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against the political opposition” shows that the MB is shocked and filled with despair at the
Pakistani government’s actions, and that could be for two reasons. First, the actions are
“oppressive,” and second, the actions are against the “political opposition;” it becomes
difficult to infer, however, whether the MB’s feeling “shattered” is primarily due to the fact
that the actions are oppressive, or because these oppressive actions are against the political
opposition considering the MB itself is a political opposition in Egypt. The statement
“[Egyptian] regime may think of using oppression as a counterforce” points to this concern;
since the Pakistani government has used oppression the Egyptian regime might also follow
suit and use oppression against its political opposition. Nevertheless, the target of the
Egyptian regime is not specified, and the use of “may think” in this statement, as
aforementioned, places this concern in the realm of speculation.
Again, in “Jihad will not be used as a counterforce against the Muslim Brotherhood,”
use of the modal auxiliary verb 36 “will,” and the negative “not” insinuate a confident claim
that “jihad will not be used.” However, the possibility of jihad being used as an opposing
force to damage and destroy the MB is manifest, although the manner in which this will
transpire, and who will use jihad against the MB is not stated. In addition, the statement
“[Egyptian media] defaming the group [MB] with political violence” is a complaint and
grievance against the Egyptian media, which is portrayed to be falsely “defaming” the MB
by associating the MB with “political violence.”

36

A modal or modal auxiliary verb is a type of auxiliary verb—a verb that gives further semantic or
syntactic information about the main verb (Harrison, 1985)—that indicates modality. In linguistics,
modality enables evaluation of a proposition relative to a set of other propositions (Kratzer, 1991).
Thus, a modal auxiliary verb gives further information about the function of the main verb that
follows it; these functions can all be related to a scale ranging from possibility (can) to necessity and
obligation (must) (Jacobs, 1995).
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Furthermore, as regards the MB, an overall stance against violence and support for
peace and peaceful means is portrayed; here again, some ambiguity is noticeable at times. In
“destroying properties, something the MB fully rejects,” a clear picture of the MB’s stance is
manifest—that of “full” rejection of destruction of property, an act that can be described as
violent and/or oppressive. The statements “the MB strongly confirms this criminal act,” “the
MB confirm their refusal and strongly condemn all such criminal acts,” and “the MB and
others [not clearly specified] demanded a transparent trial,” portray the MB to be against
criminal acts and supportive of transparency. The use of direct, potent, and forceful terms
and actions such as “strongly confirms,” “confirm refusal…strongly condemn,” and
“demanded” makes this portrayal convincing and compelling; repeated use of the adjective
“strong” also points to the intensity with which they disagree and disapprove of criminal acts.
But, the specific nature of the criminal acts, their particulars, the context of these events, and
the identity of the “others” stay unknown.
“MB strongly condemns these heinous attacks,” “the MB condemns the massacre of
tourists in Cairo,” “the MB strongly condemns the criminal and savage attack,” and “[MB]
denounce and condemn the extremist and violent religious trends” show the MB’s
oppositional stance towards violence; they are seen to “condemn” specific incidents of
violence, or in general heinous attacks, massacres, criminal and savage attacks, extremist and
violent religious trends. The multiple use of the adjective “strongly,” and the qualifier
“heinous” further emphasize the degree and intensity with which the MB condemns violence.
In expressing their opposition to violence and agents of violence such as “extremist and
violent religious trends,” the MB is also distancing itself from the same. Thus, in sum, the
MB does not support criminal acts, violence, and extremism.
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As regards peace, “we [MB] will maintain our peaceful method” and “we (MB) still
have our means for a peaceful change” position the MB as a supporter of peaceful means and
methods for “change;” the terms “maintain” in the first statement, and “still have” in the
second insinuate that this stance towards peace is not a recent and new development. “MB
said in a statement to Ikhwanweb to push the peace process” and “moderate Muslim
Brotherhood” position the MB as a group that is opposed to violence; “pushing” the “peace
process,” and the adjective “moderate” to qualify the MB provide evidence for this inference.
Here, it must be noted, that Ikhwanweb is the stated forum for this particular positioning
around peace.
The element of ambiguity, nevertheless, comes in through the two statements made
by Morsy, a senior member of MB and its media spokesperson. “Morsi [sic] pointed out that
the violent incidents allegedly committed by the MB, are separate and individual incidents”
and “Morsi [sic] pointed out that peaceful change does not happen overnight;” these can be
interpreted as a means to justify MB’s “alleged” violent incidents and define the nature of
peaceful change, respectively. Thus, by portraying MB’s acts of violence as exceptions, since
they “are separate and individual events,” and most importantly unproven and “alleged,”
Morsy is trying to differentiate the MB from extremist tendencies and associate it with
peaceful change, which in itself is conditional to the fact that it does not happen overnight.
Finally, as for Hamas, the statement “our [Hamas] weapons are only directed towards
the occupation,” suggests that Hamas’s use of violence, or “weapons,” is “only” in the
context of the occupation. Thus, it uses violence, but in a specific context. At the same time,
“Hamas never abandoned rational resistance” insinuates that Hamas is in favor of rational
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resistance, although what “rational resistance” entails and how Hamas defines it is not
elaborated.
The MB’s stance on elections and constitutional means. A positive stance towards
elections is portrayed; also, the MB is presented as active regarding the matter of elections.
The acts “calling for” and “defending,” performed by the MB with respect to elections,
portray the positive stance and show the MB to be active. Furthermore, voicing of
disagreement in “can’t be considered elections” for Shura council elections 37 points to the
MB’s clout. This criticism also places the MB in opposition to the Shura Council elections,
although does not specify the reason why the Shura Council elections can’t be considered
elections. Like elections, the MB is seen supporting constitutional means. This is manifest in
the use of qualifiers such as “right approach” to describe constitutional means, as well as use
of the modal verb “must” insinuating obligation with the positive act of “respecting,” to
express respect for constitutional means. In addition, the positive adjective “non-violent” to
qualify constitutional means provides further information on the nature of constitutional
means being supported.
Portrayal of Islam and Islamic groups/movements. Islam is portrayed to be
preoccupied with righteousness, somewhat rigid, especially about Shari’a, and opposed to
violence. The acts “banning” and “rejecting” performed by Islam as agent towards
37

The Shura Council is the upper house of the Egyptian bicameral Parliament. The lower house is the
People’s Assembly. The Shura Council was created in 1980 through a constitutional amendment. Of
the 264 members who compose the Council, 174 are directly elected, and 88 are appointed by the
President of the Republic for six-year terms. Membership is rotating with one-half of the Council
renewed every three years. It is believed that the Council’s legislative powers are limited, since on
most matters of legislation, the People’s Assembly retains the last word in the event of a
disagreement.
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anyone/anything it holds deviant, the presence of the negative term “resisters,” and negative
act “deviate” for those who do not follow Shari’a, a “total” and complete rejection of
methods other than Shari’a, use of the adjective “right” in “adopt right tenets of Islam,” and
the act “reject violence,” all contribute to the abovementioned portrayal of Islam.
Furthermore, use of the qualifiers “prominent Islamic,” and the noun “scholar”—someone
important, learned, and knowledgeable of Islam—for Al-Qaradawi who performed the act of
“denouncing” violent attacks, and finally, the act of “prohibiting” military attack on
innocuous civilians and hospitals attributed to Islam, portray Islam to be strongly and
zealously against violence. In fact, use of adjectives “tolerant” and “peaceful” for teachings
of Islam portray Islam as peace loving. It must be noted that in the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood rhetoric, Islam is personified at numerous instances.
In terms of portrayal of Islamic movements, an effort to contextualize Islamic
movements to garner better understanding and support for it, specifically from western
agents, is prominent. One of the ways to contextualize is through the use of logos; through
the claim that there are “different” political movements, and by logical reasoning that
therefore there must be “different” Islamic movements too, an instance of contextualization
is seen. Use of a senior MB member, Morsy, to appeal to “western researchers” to “come
closer” to Islamic movements insinuates presence of distance, and therefore lack of
understanding by western agents of Islamic movements. However, by logical reasoning
again, “coming closer” can reduce misunderstandings. Another effort at contextualizing is by
specifying, for instance, “MB hardliners” are in opposition to democracy; this insinuates that
the MB as a whole is not against democracy.
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As for Islamic groups’ stance on violence, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric
renders this ambiguous. For instance, the act of “giving up” violence insinuates that Islamic
groups are actually associated with violence, but they will give it up. Nevertheless, the use of
“would,” and thus the future tense, makes the act of giving up violence a matter of
speculation rendering Islamic groups’ stance on violence, as aforementioned, ambiguous. On
the issue of portrayal of Islam and Islamic groups/movements, a final issue needs to be
mentioned, that of the clear and direct statement of the goal of “establishing” a “world-wide
Islamic Caliphate;” however, the agents, agencies, and any further details associated with this
goal, are not clearly specified.
Portrayal of the role of Hamas in Palestine. Hamas is portrayed to be playing an
active role in Palestine; it is also featured to be against occupation, with the interest of the
Palestinian people as its priority and purpose. These are manifest through use of a senior
leader of Hamas, in other words, a credible representative to “point out” and “confirm” the
Hamas government’s active role. Also, the presence of antithetical ideas associated with
Hamas such as “end” the occupation and “liberate” the Palestinian people, emphasizes
Hamas’s intent. The acts performed by Hamas, for instance “end,” “liberate,” Hamas
“exercises” resistance, and resistance movement “took place” under Hamas, manifest
definiteness and directness, although the nature of resistance is not defined or described.
Hamas is also portrayed to be in opposition with the Zionists. This is manifest in the use of
the adjective “enemy” by Hamas, specifically a senior Hamas leader, Marzouk, to qualify
Zionists, as well as attribution of negative acts and events such as “infighting” to Zionists.
Portrayal of MB representatives. Through extensive use of adjectives such as
“credible,” having “right” contacts, and working “publicly” the MB representatives are
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qualified by the Egyptian Brotherhood and portrayed positively. Furthermore, since they are
credible and have right contacts, the clear and direct message expressed is that, information
about the MB must be sought from MB representatives.
To sum up. Although several agents performing specific acts feature in this section,
only few gain prominence in terms of the frequency with which they feature and are
portrayed to be instrumental in some way. A similar comment can be made about instruments
used by agents; many get featured, however, only some are used frequently. Nevertheless,
the ones that do not appear frequently also gain prominence at times because of intensity.
Foss (2004) elaborates on intensity by stating that “a term may not appear very often in a
rhetor’s work, but it may be critical because it is central to the argument being made,
represents an ultimate commitment, or conveys great depth of feeling” (p. 73). In terms of
issues, certain ones become conspicuous based on the amount of coverage they receive; there
are also some that do not receive much emphasis. These patterns are a common feature in all
three sections analyzed for this study.
Specifically for this section, the MB and its associates and Hamas and its associates
are seen as the most active, positive, and influential agents. In the data analyzed, Hamas and
its associates have received more mention and prominence when compared even with MB
and its associates. When Al-Zawahiri or other Al-Qaeda associates are presented as agents,
they are portrayed as passive and/or performing negative acts. Islam has been personified at
several instances, and is portrayed as righteous, rigid about its stance on Shari’a, and opposed
to violence. There are several generalized groups that serve as agents as well. Jihad and
violence stand out as most frequently used agencies; interestingly, an explicit statement that
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shows any of the major agents using either jihad or violence is absent. In other words, the use
of jihad and violence is implied.
In addition, in this section the MB portrays its opposition towards Al-Qaeda and AlZawahiri, and it portrays Hamas’s stance towards Al-Qaeda and Al-Zawahiri to be similar to
the MB stance—one of opposition. The Egyptian MB’s rhetoric portrays Al-Qaeda
negatively and its position somewhat compromised. Also, an oppositional stance towards
Israel and Zionists, and support for Palestinian people are manifest. A stance against violence
and extremism, and support for peace is portrayed; an effort at dissociating jihad from
violence and associating it with peace is seen. In addition, several pointers are present that
help define what violence entails as regards the Egyptian MB. Support for elections, and
constitutional means are manifest, and in this regard the MB is portrayed as an active
political agent. An effort at contextualizing Islamic movements is exhibited. These form the
major focuses of this section of Ikhwanweb.
Less emphasis is attached to the issue of Hamas’s role in Palestine, although its
stances are noticeably similar to the Egyptian MB’s; for instance, opposition for Zionists and
support for the Palestinian people. Finally, MB representatives are portrayed positively and
as an important resource for the Egyptian MB. Nevertheless, the presence of ambiguity and
uncertainty around several of the aforementioned issues is a striking characteristic of this
section.
Muslim Brotherhood and the West. Discussion and elaboration of the main
findings (presented in Table 1) that emerge after analysis of the eleven clusters in this section
follows.
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Major agents and agencies. The major agents in this section are the MB; Western
agents, namely, US Embassy in Cairo, and Western governments, specifically, UK
government, and US government/administration; the generalized West; Islamists
(generalized); and other generalized agents, such as, We (people in general), all, political
regime, Muslims, fringe extremist elements, and Islamic movement. The major agency is
dialogues. Agents associated with dialogue are the MB; MB associates Dr. Essam El-Erian, a
leading figure in the MB, and Dr. Mohamed Habib, a senior leader of the MB; Hamas; and
Western agents, specifically, UK government, US government, and Western diplomats.
Issues and acts. There are major and minor issues and acts, and these have been
elaborated in this section. First I have discussed the major issues and acts, followed by the
minor issues and acts, as outlined in Table D.
The MB’s relationship with Western agents, and the stance on MB’s dialogue with
Western agents. The portrayal of the MB’s relationship with Western agents and its stance
on dialogue are characterized by inconsistency and ambiguity. To elaborate, several
contradictory statements and comments portray that the MB’s relationship and stance
towards, and position on dialogue with Western agents changes with time and context,
although Western agents are presented as priority for the MB. Also, Western agents are
portrayed to be more certain about holding dialogue in general.
The statement “[MB] support dialogue, and believe in the necessity of openness”
emphasizes need for openness, and shows the MB’s “support” for dialogue in general.
Furthermore, “we [MB] believe that the dialogue with the West is the ideal method,”
suggests through the use of the adjective “ideal” the MB’s positive stance towards “dialogue
with the West.” “The MB group said, ‘dialogue is a means for joint communication’” is yet
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another instance of clear support for the use of dialogue, which is also described and
qualified as a method of “joint communication.” These statements manifest the MB’s
positive stance towards dialogue, specifically, the use of dialogue to communicate with the
West. They also manifest some characteristics and qualities of dialogue such as ideal method,
joint communication, and openness.
On the other hand, in some instances the attitude towards dialogue becomes
uncertain. The statement “MB does not refuse to hold dialogue with the West” introduces an
element of uncertainty; the use of litotes 38—“does not refuse”—which is expressing an
affirmative by negating its contrary (Smyth, 1920), and the future tense “to hold” make the
true intent of the Muslim Brotherhood towards holding dialogue ambiguous, uncertain, and a
matter of speculation. “We [MB] hold no grudges against them” and “we object to certain
policies by some Western governments towards the Middle East” bring in more ambiguity;
yet again the use of litotes—“hold no grudges”—and the verb “object” raise doubt about the
Muslim Brotherhood’s intent for dialogue.
This lack of clarity is further portrayed in “MB doesn’t object to any dialogue,” “Dr.
Mohamed Habib… added that there are no prospects of any dialogue with the US,” and “Dr.
Erian added that dialogue between MB and foreign government has reached a deadlock.” In
case of the first sentence, the use of litotes “doesn’t object” presents an element of ambiguity
and confusion regarding the use of dialogue. The second statement clearly indicates “no
prospects” of any dialogue with the US. The final statement informs that dialogue between
MB and foreign government “has reached a deadlock,” in other words, a dialogue was taking

38

According to Allen (1992), “in its…semantic vagueness…litotes betrays an underlying uncertainty,
a lack of assurance that equanimity can be preserved if any intended meaning is clarified” (p. 109).
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place but a point has come where no progress can be made for fundamental disagreements;
what or who is/are responsible for this deadlock is not known though.
In terms of overall stance towards Western agents, from the end of the MB certain
ambiguities are manifest. The emphasis implied through the act “added,” and the term
“main” in “El Erian [sic] added that the US administration has become a main factor,”
insinuate that the US administration has gained priority with the MB. Nevertheless, the US
administration has become a priority in which context remains unclear. At the same time, the
statements “the US administration believes the untrue allegations about the MB” and “[MB]
do not believe US efforts for reform were sincere” show the MB’s opposition towards the US
administration; the phrase “believes…untrue allegations” manifests grievance from the MB’s
end towards the US administration, and “do not believe” manifests skepticism and a
somewhat retaliatory attitude of the MB.
However, the statement “especially the US administration, need to clarify their
stance” suggests that the US administration is being given a chance to make their “stance”
clear so that misunderstandings, if any, can be addressed. Thus, there is a requirement and
necessity for the US administration to be transparent. Finally, the claim “MB do not have an
ideological stance against the West” insinuates that the opposition and disagreement from the
end of the MB is towards specific Western agents and acts, and in specific contexts, not
necessarily the West in totality; nevertheless, the essence of “ideological stance” from the
MB perspective is not elaborated.
It becomes important to point to the portrayal of Western agents’ stance towards
dialogue and communication. In case of Western agents such as Western diplomats, US and
UK governments, the statement “Western diplomats had held talks on several occasions”
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presents concrete evidence through the use of past tense that talks have been “held.” “US
government holds internal discussions” uses the present tense “hold,” and shows that
“discussions” are an oft-used means for the US government, thus insinuating that there is a
high probability for the US government to get into discussions because it is a frequently used
and familiar instrument. In addition, “US President Obama in Cairo…a positive language”
shows that the instance of President Obama’s speech in Cairo is associated with language
that is qualified as “positive,” and this has positive connotations for the way the US
administration’s approach towards dialogue and communication in general is viewed.
The MB’s stand on foreign interference. The MB is against foreign interference. The
statements “we frankly reject in form and content,” “rejects all forms of American control,”
and “against all forms of foreign interference and domination” illustrate the MB’s opposition
towards foreign domination, interference, and control, specifically “American.” Furthermore,
the adjective “frankly” insinuates directness and forthrightness, the act “reject” insinuates
dismissal and refusal, and “all” forms suggests finality and no room for alternatives. All these
terms add emphasis to the determination and certainty of the MB’s stand against foreign
interference.
General stance towards Western agents. The stance towards Western agents is one of
opposition and skepticism, and in several instances Western agents are portrayed negatively.
But in other instances the Egyptian MB rhetoric manifests potential for cooperation and
hope, and the importance of context. Certain instances, wherein Western agents are being
cautioned, are also present. For example, in the statements “contradict with western [sic]
interests,” “used to support the Muslim Brotherhood,” and “unconditionally “cooperate” with
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Western governments,” the word “contradict,” the past tense “used to support,” and the scare
quote around “cooperate” suggest a breach in the relationship with some Western agents.
A disagreement is noticeable in the grievance “West continues to support
undemocratic regimes.” Nevertheless, despite the opposition, disagreement, and cynicism,
the advisory statements “U.S. [sic] should support any government democratically elected,”
“coherent approach to supporting democracy abroad,” and “dichotomy between Eastern and
Western powers end up into one multi-language, multi-experience, and multi-good power”
through the terms “support,” “coherent,” and “one” suggest a coming together and hope. In
the last statement, however, the use of the term “power” with Eastern and Western begets the
question, specifically, which are the Eastern and Western powers being referred to?
“Western governments have been silent about the crime committed against human
rights and security” and “with regard to the MB, we [US Embassy in Cairo] disagree with
them on a lot of subjects” feature opposition, specifically towards Western governments in
the former statement, and towards the Muslim Brotherhood by the US Embassy in Cairo in
the latter. Nevertheless, the claim “MB do not have an ideological stance against the West”
can be inferred as opposition and disagreement from the end of the MB towards specific
Western agents and acts, in specific contexts, and not necessarily the West in totality.
“US government allows violations from the Egyptian government,” “US government
allow a friendly regime to maintain power,” and “US government is ready to allow human
rights violations” portray grievance, disagreement, and opposition to the US government’s
act of allowing violations by the Egyptian government—US government’s ally—and letting
the Egyptian government maintain power. This scenario paints a negative image of the US
government because it allows its allies to perform questionable acts. Furthermore, the
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statement “West must not pressure regimes to curb Islamists” insinuates that the “West,”
generalized here, has considerable clout with regimes, and by virtue of being allies,
supporters, or through authority the “West” can persuade, influence, or intimidate these
regimes to act according to its wishes. The use of “must not…curb” in “West must not
pressure regimes to curb Islamists” suggests empathy towards Islamists.
In addition, “US government’s claimed reform efforts” and “resignations have clearly
changed the government [US]” add to the unflattering portrayal. The US government has to
“claim” reform efforts, and the act of claiming suggests asserting something without
providing evidence; hence, the use of “claim” makes the US government’s reform efforts
questionable. Also, resignations often are undesirable and insinuate that things are not
working well within the US government. Yet, “have to come to realize that different views
can be present in one single Western society” and “coming closer to Western arenas,”
suggest awareness of the mistake of treating Western society as a monolith, and empathy and
closeness with Western agents.
Finally, the rhetoric of the Egyptian MB on the issue of portrayal of the relationship
with Western agents also features cautionary stances. A cautionary message is present in “the
West has to come to a realization” and “Western presence in the region will change if the
Islamists were to come to power,” which insinuate that Western agents can be vulnerable and
need to stay grounded. The statement “it is to the US interest to support democracy and
human rights in Egypt” is advisory as well as cautionary; in addition, this statement implies a
positive stance towards the promotion of democracy and human rights in Egypt.
Stance towards Hamas. The stance towards Hamas is supportive; the MB rhetoric is,
for the most part, direct and clear about supporting Hamas. For instance, the phrase
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“Brotherhood supports Hamas” portrays in the most direct manner the Muslim Brotherhood’s
backing for Hamas. In the statement “UK government to open direct channels with the MB
and Hamas,” the use of the conjunction “and” to connect the MB and Hamas, and the fact
that a Western agent, namely, the UK government is keen to communicate with both,
establishes a positive association between the MB and Hamas.
In addition, the statements “Palestinian President…next legislative elections using the
method of proportional representation…unscrupulously targets defeating Hamas” and
“Muslim Brotherhood supports Hamas although it is a terrorist organization” suggest a strong
backing for Hamas; use of the term “unscrupulous” to qualify the way in which the
Palestinian President is “targeting” Hamas, and the fact that the MB unconditionally
“supports” Hamas, are evidence to the claim. However, the term “although” in “although it
[Hamas] being a terrorist organization” introduces a contradiction and complicates
understanding of the nature of support.
Stance on modernization. Modernization is not a completely rejected and opposed
concept, although certain versions and praxis of modernization are; accepting modernization
on Islamic terms is manifest. The statement “modernization in that sense highlights the
importance of the faculties of (pure) reason” is informative; at the same time, the phrase “in
that sense” suggests a way of characterizing modernization, where prominence is given to the
“faculties of (pure) reason.” In addition, “Islam refuses that aspect of modernization which
believes in the materialistic philosophy” and “Islamic movement does not adopt that feature
of modernization which calls for atheism” show that modernization is not being accepted in
totality. Islam is in opposition to the “materialistic philosophy” of modernization, and
Islamist movements disagree with the atheistic emphasis of modernization.
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“The material under modernization remains” and “legislation is at the heart of
modernization” insinuate that modernization is considered important, and a certain
conception of modernization is also present—one in which “legislation” is central. However,
in “Islamists have reservations about modernization,” “Islamic stance on modernization, as a
general approach, is not a total agreement about it,” and “vision of Islamic movement of
modernization differs,” use of the term “reservations,” the negative “not” a total agreement,
and “vision…differs,” respectively, exhibit that modernization as a general concept is not
supported, rather an Islamic version of modernization is espoused.
Portrayal of the MB’s relationship with the Egyptian regime. The portrayal of the
MB’s relationship with the Egyptian regime is one of tension and opposition; the Egyptian
regime is presented negatively for the most part. Also, the clout the MB holds vis-à-vis the
Egyptian regime is inconsistent, and insinuates being dependent on context. In the statements
“the file they [Egyptian authority] wanted to use against the moderate Islamic movement
[MB]” and “[the military tribunal] failed to prove that…money is ill gotten, used to support
the Muslim Brotherhood group,” use of the terms “against” and “ill gotten” show that the
Egyptian regime frequently takes measures to attack the dignity of the Muslim Brotherhood.
However, the phrase “failed to prove” implies, despite the attacks by the regime the MB
remains unscathed and is innocent. Thus, from these statements the innocence and moderate
position of the MB, and the apparent tension between the MB and the Egyptian regime
become evident.
“Independent members of the Egyptian parliament” and “the group [MB] says that
the Egyptian regime” are fairly neutral statements; from these statements it can only be stated
that there are independent members in the Egyptian regime, and that the MB has the
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opportunity to “say” something about the Egyptian regime. Whereas “this movement [MB]
does not pose a challenge” is a justification and explanation for the MB “movement.”
Although it cannot be known whether the MB “does not pose a challenge” to
someone/something specific, or this is a general comment, the statement functions either to
clarify preconceived notions, or allay concerns. The MB is clearly identified as a
“movement” in this statement.
“Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak conveniently use the Brotherhood as an excuse
to prevent serious reform” is an expression of grievance, where the MB is positioned as an
instrument used by Hosni Mubarak; “convenience” insinuates the clout Hosni Mubarak has,
“excuse” implies that Mubarak is at fault and has committed offence, and prevention of
“serious reform” insinuates that Hosni Mubarak is not invested in earnest reform measures.
Thus, all these statements position the MB as holding less influence than the Egyptian
regime, and places the “movement” in opposition to the latter, specifically Hosni Mubarak.
The statement “demanded the Egyptian government cancel the decree of the Egyptian
President Mubarak,” however, clearly shows disagreement with Hosni Mubarak’s decree,
and also suggests MB’s authority in presenting a “demand” to the government. “Political
regime that allows discussions” does not provide information on which political regime is
being referred to, whether a specific regime is being referred to at all, or the statement
portrays an ideal political regime that allows discussions; in any case, an insinuation that
discussions must be allowed is evident.
Portrayal of Western agents’ relationship with authoritarian regimes. Western
agents are portrayed as supporting authoritarian regimes like the Egyptian regime that
suppress, allow violations of human rights, and do not allow promotion of democracy.
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“Western governments have been supporting authoritarian regimes,” “Western governments
continue to support regimes that suppress,” and “the West continues to support the Egyptian
regime” show that Western agents have been promoting the interests and cause of
authoritarian, suppressive regimes. Opposition towards this act of “support” is manifest in
“this support for authoritarian regimes is destructive,” “whether to allow the Muslim
Brotherhood to participate openly,” “obstacles in the way of their [Western governments]
support to the Egyptian government,” and “impossible to believe that Western governments
are sincere in their promotion of democracy.” The use of the adjective “destructive” is an
outright show of opposition, and has a cautionary function; the term “whether” introduces an
element of doubt about the MB’s ability to “participate openly” in an authoritarian
environment; “obstacles” insinuates that Western agents’ support to the Egyptian government
will not be opposition free; the phrase “impossible to believe” and the questioning stance
towards the sincerity of Western agents’ intent to promote democracy manifests criticism and
cynicism.
Furthermore, “US government allows violations from the Egyptian government,”
“US government allow a friendly regime to maintain power,” and “US government is ready
to allow human rights violations,” portray grievance, disagreement, and opposition to the US
government’s act of allowing violations by the Egyptian government—US government’s
ally—and letting the government maintain “power.” This scenario paints a negative image of
the US government by showing that it allows its allies to perform questionable acts. The
statement “West must not pressure regimes to curb Islamists” insinuates that the “West,”
generalized here, has considerable clout with regimes; either by virtue of being allies,
supporters, or through authority the “West” can persuade, influence, or intimidate these
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regimes to act according to its wishes. Use of the term “pressure” problematizes
understanding of the true nature of the relationship between Western agents and authoritarian
regimes, as well as the reason behind the former’s support. However, the use of “must
not…curb” in “West must not pressure regimes to curb Islamists” suggests empathy towards
Islamists, and the West’s opposition towards them.
The discourse around and portrayal of Muslims, Islam, Islamic groups and
movements, and Islamists. Muslims are portrayed in a manner that shows them lacking clout,
specifically in relation to Western agents. The statement “significant number of Muslims in
the West” points to the fact that the “West” is home to Muslims. Nevertheless, the use of the
word “can” in “Muslims can build mosques in Europe” suggests possibility, but at the same
time permission. The statement made by Jean-Louis Tauran, a French Cardinal of the Roman
Catholic Church, “Muslims do not accept to deeply discuss the Qu’ran [sic]” portray
Muslims unflatteringly. In Tauran’s comment yet another generalization of “Muslims” has
been done, and that they “do not accept…to deeply discuss the Qu’ran [sic]” insinuates that
Muslims intentionally have “not accepted” to “deeply discuss” the Qur’an, which could mean
with an intent to let the Qur’an remain incomprehensible, and its understanding perfunctory.
As for Islam, “Islam, as Al Banna [sic] says, is a comprehensive system,” “an Islamic
source of authority,” and “Islamic world was then extending” feature the terms
“comprehensive,” “authority,” and “extending,” which emphasize an all-encompassing,
influential image and vision of Islam. At the same time the claims “fringe extremist elements
using their distortion of Islam as a pretext” and “Muslim Brotherhood supports Hamas
although it is a terrorist organization,” in the use of “distortion of Islam as a pretext” and
“although” it (Hamas) is a terrorist organization insinuate a distancing from terrorism and
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extremism. The phrase “distortion of Islam as a pretext” manifests a defense for Islam. Thus,
an opposition towards terrorism and support for Islam in general, is clear. This also
insinuates that Islam and terrorism can be mutually exclusive.
On the issue of movements, the Muslim Brotherhood clearly and unequivocally
identifies itself as a “Muslim movement” in “Muslim movements as the Muslim
Brotherhood.” In terms of the other movements specified in the Egyptian MB rhetoric, only
certain ideas about those are featured: for instance, “[the Tablighi] movement that believes in
spreading the Islamic mission,” “this movement [Salafist Jihad] believes in Al Qaeda [sic]
ideas and adopts its ideology,” “the Islamists believe also that the Muslims have freedom,”
and “worries that Islamists may assume power.” Thus, the Tablighi movement “spreads the
Islamic mission,” the Salafist Jihad movement not only holds the Al-Qaeda ideology true, but
also “adopts” it, and finally, Islamists believe in “freedom” for Muslims, and Islamists are
anticipated to be in “power” and this is a “worry,” although for whom and why is not stated.
These statements do not state anything directly about the MB’s position towards these
movements, or whether the MB agrees, disagrees, or identifies with either of these.
Specifically about Islamists, “enough to say that Islamists and the West” insinuates
Islamists’ association with the generalized “West” through the use of the conjunction “and;”
the nature of the association remains unknown. “If Brotherhood came to power,” “should
Brotherhood come to power,” “Islamists will eventually come to power,” and “Western
presence in the region will change if the lslamists were to come to power” feature a gradual
progression of thought about “coming” to power, from speculation to certainty and assertion.
The use of “if” and “should” keep the idea of the Brotherhood coming to power in the realm
of speculation, albeit portraying possibility. However, with the generalized “Islamists” the
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scenario is more certain; “will eventually come” is a future-oriented claim but manifests
more certainty than in the case of the Brotherhood through the use of “eventually,” which
connotes finality. The certainty is further manifest in the assertion that with Islamists coming
to power “Western presence in the region will change.” Thus, albeit in different degrees,
association of “power” with the Brotherhood and Islamists is evident; also the deterministic
relationship between Islamists and Western presence is manifest. But, whether the
Brotherhood is an Islamist movement is not clearly stated at any point.
Continuing with the issue of the Islamists, “Islamists will not impose their beliefs”
adds to what shall happen when they come to power, and here, in the use of the negative
“not” in “not impose” a positive portrayal of Islamists is manifest. In fact, the use of
“inability” in the statement “Islamists themselves in their inability to communicate their
agenda” insinuates Islamists’ helplessness for their lack of ability to communicate their
agenda; this statement is, therefore, in defense of lslamists. However, to complicate this
discourse, the statement made by Sadek Shaban, a professor at the University of Tunis, “all
Islamists deserve prison,” portray the Islamists unflatteringly; here Islamists have not only
been generalized, but this statement also manifests a strong conviction that Islamists
“deserve” prison even though the context is not specified. This last comment introduces some
contradiction and ambiguity to the portrayal of and stance towards Islamists.
Israel and Palestine. An oppositional stance towards Israel and Fatah, and support
for democracy, the Palestinian people, and Hamas are featured. The statement
“disappointment towards Israel’s destruction of the Palestinian society” shows opposition
and displeasure towards Israel’s negative action of “destruction.” The term “rejection” in
“rejection to the policy of supporting one Palestinian party against another,” the act “destroy”
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and the use of logos to state that “Israel adopts the policy of supporting Fatah to destroy the
Palestinian people,” and the negative “do not support” in Bruce Nestor’s (political activist
and attorney, and president of the National Lawyers Guild, a bar association in the US)
comment, “I do not support US providing Fatah movement with weapons” manifest
opposition towards certain policies, especially those that would harm Palestine and its
people. The position that Israel supports Fatah is also made explicit here. Important to bear in
mind is that the agent for this claim is not Israel. In addition, opposition towards US’s act of
siding with Fatah and providing it “weapons” is featured, but at the same time, the fact that
the agent expressing this opposition represents the US in a sense redeems the US.
In the statement “we should respect the democratic option of the Palestinian people,”
use of the modal verb “should” manifests support for democracy and the Palestinian people
as obligatory and recommended. Through the antithesis “supporting Hamas at the expense of
Fatah,” and negating Hamas’s association with Israel in “do not mean Hamas is made by
Israel,” an obvious support for Hamas and opposition towards Fatah is expressed.
The issue of rights. On the issue of rights the statements “they are citizens who have
all the citizenship rights” and “practice their rights in picking the reference they like,”
referring to the Copts, portray that Copts enjoy freedom of rights and are recognized citizens.
“People have the genuine right” and “we [MB] have the right to reject that” also show that
both the Egyptian people and the Muslim Brotherhood, like the Copts, enjoy freedom of
rights. In addition, “MB have won a popular mandate after the last elections” insinuates that
not only do the people have genuine rights, they also have exercised this right to support the
MB; through the use of the qualifier “popular” in “popular mandate,” this statement points to
the support the MB enjoys with the people. Thus, the Copts, the Egyptian people, and the
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Muslim Brotherhood are in association on the matter of rights, and their ability to enjoy and
exercise the same. However, the statement “Western governments have been silent about the
crime committed against human rights and security” is an expression of disapproval towards
Western governments’ act of remaining silent as regards violation of human rights and
security.
The issue of security, and security services. A preoccupation with security and
security services is manifest, although much ambiguity surrounds this issue. For instance,
“anti-Western sentiment is harmful for Western security” and “Israel in terms of Egypt’s
security” show that Western and Egyptian security are of concern. For the former, that is
Western security, anti-Western sentiment is considered to be the stated threat, and the
statement has a cautionary function because it features the qualifier “is harmful.” But, the
agent of anti-Western sentiment is not explicit. For the latter no specific threat can be
deciphered, but the phrase “in terms of” connotes that Israel has a bearing on Egypt’s
security; nevertheless, “Israel in terms of Egypt’s security” introduces ambiguity.
In terms of security services, “elements of this group [Tablighi movement], and the
state security services,” “relations with the security services,” and “it is Tunisian security
trend” insinuate that there is a connection between the Tablighi movement and the state
security services, especially manifest in the use of the conjunction “and.” But the specific
nature of the state security services’ “relation” with the Tablighi movement, or any other
entity is not clear; furthermore, what the Tunisian security “trend” is remains unknown.
The issue of choices. On the question of choice, “ruling is a popular choice,” “the
popular choice if made, nobody could stop it,” and “violence is not a choice” manifest a
directness of language and clarity of position. For instance, there is no equivocation around

153
“ruling” being a popular choice, and “violence” not being a choice. Furthermore, there is a
certainty of tone and confidence in the prediction “nobody could stop” popular choice; the
use of the negative “nobody” with the modal auxiliary “could” stop manifests the confidence
and certainty. However, whether “nobody” is a generalized pronoun or a pronoun specific to
a noun, remains unknown; thus, it cannot be inferred whether a direct opposition against
someone/something is being insinuated here. This confident prediction asserts the power of
“popular choice” and a strong agreement with “ruling.”
The issue of coalitions. A comprehensive comment cannot be made on the issue of
coalitions; for different groups and movements different positions and portrayals are
manifest. “All refuse making a coalition with it [Al-Nahda (Renaissance) Movement], for
fear of it” shows that a generalized “all” are in opposition to the Al-Nahda Movement, and
the reason clearly stated is “fear,” thus manifesting pathos. Whereas, “meet and make
coalitions with it [the Left] in the fight for freedom” although does not specify an agent,
nevertheless shows the affinity for the Left in “meet and make.” The purpose remains the
“fight for freedom,” herein manifesting ethos. Finally, “making a coalition with the
nationalist powers” and “nationalist movements’ agenda in our Arab region” neither
insinuate a stance towards “making a coalition” with the nationalist powers, nor specify this
movement’s agenda in the Arab region, thus rendering the discourse around the nationalist
movement ambiguous. However, the use of “powers” with nationalist insinuates that this
movement possesses leverage, although with whom and where remains unknown. The
presence of nationalist movements in the Arab region is clearly manifest.
The question of power. In different degrees, but the association of “power” with the
Brotherhood and Islamists is evident. “If Brotherhood came to power,” “should Brotherhood
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come to power,” “Islamists will eventually come to power,” and “Western presence in the
region will change if the lslamists were to come to power” feature a gradual progression of
thought, from speculation to certainty and assertion. The use of “if” and “should” in the first
two comments keep the idea of the Brotherhood coming to power in the realm of speculation,
albeit portraying possibility, but not confidence before certainty. However, with the
generalized “Islamists” the scenario is more certain; “will eventually come” is a futureoriented claim but manifests more certainty than in the case of the Brotherhood through the
use of “eventually,” which connotes finality. The certainty is further manifest in the assertion
that with Islamists coming to power “Western presence in region will change.” Although
Western presence is not qualified here, this comment insinuates that a deterministic
relationship exists between Islamists and Western agents. In addition, “Gamal Mubarak come
to power?” and “reject any person to undemocratically come to power,” through
questioning/challenging, and the act “reject,” show opposition towards and rejection for
anyone such as Gamal Mubarak, who use undemocratic means such as inheritance from his
father Hosni Mubarak, to come to “power” in Egypt.
To sum up. The Muslim Brotherhood as an organization and several Western agents
find prominence in this section; all these agents are portrayed as influential. Interestingly,
several generalized groups also are featured as agents, such as “the West” and “Islamists.”
Dialogue is the instrument that features most in this section, and the agents using it are the
MB and its associates, Hamas, and several Western agents. One of the major issues in this
section is the portrayal of the MB’s relationship with Western agents and its stance on
dialogue; this stance varies with time and context. In fact, the MB forthrightly portrays a
mélange of stances towards Western agents and the issue of holding dialogue with the
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latter—skepticism, retaliation, hope, support, understanding. However, the portrayal of
Western agents’ positive stance towards holding dialogue in general manifests no
inconsistency.
In this section the MB positions itself to be clearly supportive of the Hamas, although,
unlike the earlier section, Hamas does not get much coverage and prominence here. On the
issue of modernization emphasis on accepting modernization on Islamic terms is indicated.
An all-encompassing and influential image and vision of Islam, and insinuation that Islam
and terrorism can be mutually exclusive, is portrayed. However, even though Islam is
portrayed as all-encompassing the status of Muslims is portrayed in a manner that shows
them lacking influence, specifically in relation to Western agents. Also in this section, albeit
in different degrees and intensities, the Brotherhood and Islamists are seen associated with
“power.” Furthermore, and importantly, the identity of the Brotherhood as an Islamist
movement is only implied, and never clearly stated; the Brotherhood is clearly identified as a
moderate, Muslim movement. The Egyptian regime is portrayed negatively, and the MB’s
relation with the former is featured as one of tension and opposition. Grievance and
opposition towards Western agents for supporting the Egyptian and other authoritarian
regimes is clearly voiced. In addition, the clout the Egyptian MB holds with the Egyptian
regime and in the Egyptian political scene is seen to be dependent on context, and
consequently, inconsistent. These form the major focuses of this section.
Several issues are minor in terms of coverage. The Egyptian MB rhetoric portrays an
oppositional stance towards Israel and Fatah, and support for democracy and the Palestinian
people. Association with the Copts and the Egyptian people on the issue of rights is manifest.
Support for popular choice, and a preoccupation with security and security services is
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expressed. Although not a comprehensive comment, focus is laid on the topic of coalitions
with different groups and movements, wherein different positions are manifest depending on
context. Finally, as in the earlier section, ambiguity and equivocation around several of the
issues discussed mark this section as well.
Parliament. Discussion and elaboration of the main findings (presented in Table 1)
that emerge after analysis of the five clusters in this section follows.
Major agents and agencies. The major agents in this section are the MB; the MB
Parliamentary bloc; MB MPs; Hussein Ibrahim, former MB MP and a senior leader; US
Congress delegation; and few generalized agents, namely, human rights organizations,
independents, students, national and political powers, dictatorial regimes, and sources. The
major agency is statements, specifically, press statements. Agents associated with this
instrument are Dr. Boutros Ghali, Egyptian Minister of Finance during Hosni Mubarak’s
rule; Saad Al-Husseini, a member of the MB Parliamentary bloc; Hussein Ibrahim, former
MB MP; and MB Parliamentary bloc/MB MPs.
Issues and acts. There are major and minor issues and acts, and these have been
elaborated in this section. First I have discussed the major issues and acts, followed by the
minor issues and acts as outlined in Table A.
General portrayal of the Egyptian regime. The Egyptian regime is portrayed
negatively. It is presented to be dictatorial, specifically in its association with negative acts of
“tightening” security grip on critics, “prevent” voices opposing it, and “harass” movements.
In addition, an insinuation is made to the regime’s dictatorial measures specifically towards
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Through the use of the phrase “specially Islamists” in
“tightening the security grip on the regime’s critics, specially lslamists,” the insinuation to
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the Muslim Brotherhood is made as well as the regime’s dictatorial attitude is exhibited. This
can be inferred from the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is considered to be an Islamist
movement, and has been a voice opposing the Egyptian regime. Thus, criticism of and
opposition towards the Egyptian regime are manifest.
Portrayal of relationship between MB MPs/ MB Parliamentary bloc and Egyptian
regime. The MB MPs/Parliamentary bloc are/is positioned in opposition to the Egyptian
regime. However, the former are seen to exercise influence, and are not passive in their role
as an oppositional force to the Egyptian regime. Several strategies point to this portrayal. For
instance, the issue of amendments; the frequency with which the issue of amendments feature
in the MB rhetoric, be it in the form of mere descriptions and information about amendments
such as “these amendments were called…anti-terrorism amendments” and “amendment
made public and added to Egyptian penal code,” or amendments as instruments such as
“require major amendments in order to achieve the law’s goals,” the importance of
amendments as a significant backdrop for the MB’s acts, especially those dealing with the
Egyptian regime cannot be overlooked. Using the issue of amendments as backdrop, the MB
voices disagreement, criticizes, presents conditions and modifications, makes demands,
negotiates, boycotts, and rejects vis-à-vis the Egyptian regime.
An example is the opposition and disagreement portrayed in statements such as “MB
MPs…declared boycotting House sessions and rejecting President Mubarak’s proposed
constitutional amendments” and “bad consequences of these amendments on the future of
Egypt.” From these statements it can be inferred that the disagreements, in this case over
Mubarak’s proposed constitutional amendments of 2007, are not just passive and verbal, but
expressed through acts of “boycotting” and “rejecting.”
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The opposition is also manifest in the negative portrayal of the Egyptian regime. The
negative portrayal is manifest in the Egyptian government being associated with acts and
terms that present it as ineffectual and incompetent such as “failure” and “wasted.” At the
same time, the negative portrayal is manifest in the Egyptian regime being presented as
aggressive and reactionary, for instance in the use of adjectives such as “fierce” in “fierce
criticism from the Egyptian government” and negative acts such as “Egyptian regime turned
the political competition into a security manhunt.”
As for the portrayal of the MB MPs, along with being active as an opposition force
for the Egyptian regime as aforementioned and manifest in “MB MPs held a sit-in [a form of
protest] in the Egyptian Parliament,” they are also featured as active in the overall political
scenario and involved in acts like “submitting” statements, questions, and interpellations. In
addition, frequent use of the adjective “urgent” while describing the MB MPs acts directly
points to the priority the MB bloc attaches to addressing issues and concerns, and challenging
the government thus playing an active role in the Egyptian political scene. Hence, without
much ambiguity and equivocation the Egyptian political scene is qualified as “the theatre of a
ferocious confrontation” between “Egyptian regime and opposition political forces,” by
implication the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, wherein the Egyptian Brotherhood is active
and a determining force.
Issue of bills, laws, and amendments. Several statements exhibit that the
preoccupation with bills and laws, necessary steps for political reform, within the Egyptian
political scene is high. These statements also show that both the Egyptian government and
the MB Parliamentary bloc are active in this regard. For instance, MB MP Hussein Ibrahim
“confirms” there is no need for anti-terrorism law proposed by the Egyptian government, MB
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“confirms” to place the Parties Law bill under scrutiny, and MB Parliamentary bloc
“rejected” the judiciary bill proposed by the government. Thus, as much as the government
has the capacity for and interest in political reform, the MB Parliamentary bloc also shows
active participation by introducing, evaluating, rejecting, voicing, and enacting their support
or disagreement. The paradigm, however, is one of criticism, disagreement, and rejection on
the part of the MB Parliamentary bloc towards the government’s proposals and steps.
The frequency with which the issue of amendments feature in the Egyptian MB
rhetoric, be it in the form of mere descriptions and information about amendments,
presentation of amendments as instruments, or the function of amendments as a significant
backdrop for the MB’s acts, especially those dealing with the Egyptian regime, cannot be
overlooked. Using the issue of amendments as backdrop the MB voices disagreement,
criticizes, presents conditions and modifications, makes demands, negotiates, boycotts, and
rejects. Thus, bills, laws, and amendments frequently feature in this section of Ikhwanweb. In
most cases, these become the basis on which the MB MPs/Parliamentary bloc can show their
opposition towards the Egyptian regime, and also portray their active role in the Egyptian
political scene.
An instance of opposition is when the MB paired itself with human rights
organizations through the use of the conjunction “and” as agents to “staunchly oppose” the
anti-terrorism amendments; the qualifier “staunchly” and the act “oppose” make a clear and
direct statement of opposition. In addition, “in Egypt, need no new anti-terrorism law”
directly negates the need for the anti-terrorism law. However, the statement “MB supports
the Algerian peoples’ anti-terrorism move” shows that the MB supports moves against
terrorism, but as aforementioned, it opposes the Egyptian government’s anti-terrorism

160
amendments. This insinuates the Muslim Brotherhood’s lack of trust in the Egyptian regime;
there is doubt that the anti-terrorism law, if it comes to pass, will actually function to combat
terrorism instead of being used as a means to persecute the Muslim Brotherhood.
Yet another example is the issue of organ transplants. The two statements “abolish
donating of organs to non-relatives” and “current charters are insufficient and Articles
require major amendments in order to achieve law’s goals” insinuate that the Law of Organ
Transplants is not being completely dismissed. Instead, some conditions are being put, and
some modifications such as donation of organs to relatives only, and major amendments to
Articles since current charters are qualified as “insufficient” are being sought. This can be
anticipated as the starting point of a negotiation and points to the capacity of the agent (MB
MPs in this case) to verbalize disagreement.
On the issue of the Parties Court and the Emergency Law, the statements “calls on the
abolishment of the Parties Court,” “calling for abolishing the emergency law,” and “calling
for…unconditional freedom of creating political parties” express the agent’s (MB MPs)
demands—the statements manifest the agent’s disagreement towards the Parties Court and
the Emergency Law, hence the act of calling for their “abolishment.” The final statement
expresses the agent’s demand and need for “freedom,” qualified by the use of the adjective
“unconditional.”
Portrayal of relationship and communication between Egyptian MPs, including MB
MPs, and Western agents (US Congress, European delegation). The portrayal of this
relationship and communication is inconsistent. The discourse around this issue at times
features acts and qualifiers such as “will meet,” “previous visit,” and “welcomed,” which are
clear and direct, insinuating that meetings between delegations from the West and the
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Egyptian MPs, including MB MPs, have taken place before, will take place in future, are
ongoing and appreciated. To add, the short phrase “MB MPs and the Congress delegation”
although does not present any comprehensive information, but the use of the conjunction
“and” insinuates the MB MPs’ association with the US Congress delegation—a Western
agent.
In some instances though the discourse lacks any clear assurance. “Egypt must have
an important role in order to establish a dialogue” and “MB Parliamentary bloc confirmed
that it does not object to visiting US Congress and contacting it” show that communication is
under consideration. Specifically, the use of phrases “Egypt…must have an important role”
and “does not object” complicate understanding, especially of the MB Parliamentary bloc’s
stance towards communication. The MB Parliamentary bloc states that a “dialogue” can be
established when Egypt has an important role, thus introducing a condition and prerequisite
while renouncing full responsibility and commitment towards communication; also, the use
of litotes “does not object” creates confusion about the MB Parliamentary bloc’s true intent.
Nevertheless, the paradox must be noted that the primary act of the agent, the MB
Parliamentary bloc, in the second statement is “confirmed,” an act that insinuates certainty.
Human rights and fundamental values. The statements “mercy, justice, equity,
human rights as well as respect and honoring pledges and treaties,” “MB believes in
democracy,” and “MB advocates democracy and transparency which enjoin rotation of
power and rights of citizenship,” in their directness and presence of acts like “honoring” and
“advocating” point to the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood not only upholds these values and
rights, but also presents some details and clarity regarding what they entail; in other words,
these are not abstract ideals.
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Student protests. Students in general are portrayed as discontented, and they actively
and fearlessly take it upon themselves to show their dissent. For instance, “a sit-in they
[students] staged in protest at the situations that the universities are witnessing” and “there is
no harm in sit-ins” feature “sit-in” as instrument, and qualifiers “in protest” and “no harm”
point to students’ discontent, dynamism, and fearlessness. However, the source or agent of
the discontent is not directly stated.
Palestine. In terms of Palestine, the “MB Parliamentary bloc called on the Egyptian
government to do more efforts for the Palestinian cause” shows that the MB Parliamentary
bloc believes the Egyptian government is not doing enough, and that the MB is an apologist
for the Palestinian cause. The act of “calling on” and the adjective “more” in “do more
efforts” clearly and directly portray the Egyptian government as inefficient, show the MB
Parliamentary bloc to be active and influential, and position the MB Parliamentary bloc and
the Egyptian government in opposition.
Miscellaneous. There are some miscellaneous issues that could not be grouped under
one umbrella scenario. Yet, they too contribute to manifest the Egyptian MB worldview. The
statement “MB Parliamentary bloc confirms its support to the journalists” is not only
informative, but also throws light on the MB bloc’s supportive stance towards journalists; the
directness of the act and phrase “confirms its support” is evidence to this claim. Also, “MB
Parliamentary bloc stated that the group hasn’t made its mind over its main candidates”
seems to present the information about the MB Parliamentary bloc’s status on candidates, but
the statement could actually be a euphemistic way of evading commitment and sharing of the
bloc’s true decision.
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Several statements merely inform. For instance, “no MB MP in the meeting
scheduled to be held today,” “Shura Council elections will be held scheduled in late April
(2007),” and “to task the Human Rights Committee to schedule meetings to survey and
discuss the violations committed” show that one important act being performed is that of
“scheduling” (an act that denotes some kind of planning). However, no agent is directly
associated with it; in the last statement although the Human Rights Committee is associated
with the act of “scheduling,” some other agent, unknown here, is “task”ing it to perform the
act. Thus, these statements inform—that the “Shura Council elections will be held,” and that
“violations” are being committed and the Human Rights Committee can help in that regard
through “surveys and discussions”—and they demonstrate planning, but they do not manifest
any other information.
Other informative statements are, “El Baradei [sic] has called on all political
movements and trends, intellectuals and scholars, to converge with him” and “the MB
stances are approved by the Copts.” These point to El-Baradei’s call for convergence, and the
Copts’ support for the MB stances; nevertheless, context for both comments remain
undisclosed.
To sum up. In this section the MB Parliamentary bloc and MB MPs stand out as
significant agents. Other agents are the MB as an organization, the US congress, and, similar
to the earlier sections of this study, some generalized groups. Statements, specifically press
statements feature as most frequently used instruments, and these are seen to be used by MB
MPs as well as Egyptian regime associates. One of the major issues in this section is the
portrayal of the Egyptian regime; it is portrayed negatively, specifically, as dictatorial. The
MB MPs and the Parliamentary bloc are presented to be in opposition to the Egyptian
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regime, and in fact, function as an active opposition that holds significant clout.
Preoccupation with amendments, bills, laws—necessary instruments for political reform—is
manifest, and both the regime and the MB Parliamentary bloc are seen to be active in the area
of political reform. In addition, by using the issue of amendments as backdrop, the MB is
seen voicing disagreement, criticizing, presenting conditions and modifications, making
demands, negotiating, boycotting, and rejecting with respect to the Egyptian regime. Yet
another major issue is the portrayal of the relationship and communication between Egyptian
MPs, including MB MPs, and Western agents; this portrayal is inconsistent, with stances
varying from one context to another.
As regards the minor issues, insinuations are made towards upholding certain
fundamental rights and values, and an effort at qualifying and defining the stated values is
also manifest. University students are portrayed to carry clout when they voice their
discontent and act upon their ideals. In terms of Palestine, the positioning of the MB as an
apologist for the Palestinian cause is clear, and discontent towards the Egyptian
government’s lack of effort towards the Palestinian cause is also expressed. In addition, there
are some miscellaneous issues that feature in this section as well, which could be termed
merely informational. Finally, the ambiguity characteristic of the earlier sections is manifest
in “Parliament” as well.
This summary closes this chapter, wherein I have presented the details of the analysis,
and the symbolic dramas unearthed through analysis of clusters. In the following chapter I
answer the two research questions of this study.
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Chapter VI: Answering the Research Questions: MB Ideology and Rhetorical Moves
Analysis of clusters that emerged from the three sections, MB versus Al-Qaeda, MB
and the West, and Parliament brought forth the main agents, primary agencies, the major and
minor issues, and consequently, the symbolic dramas manifest in each of the sections; these
findings, or symbolic scenarios, were discussed in depth in Chapter 5. These findings formed
the basis for answering the research questions of this study:
RQ1: What is the ideology manifest in the English-language rhetoric of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood in www.ikhwanweb.com?
RQ2: What rhetorical strategies provide support for this ideology?
In this chapter, I perform Task IIIB while maintaining continuity with the tasks performed in
Chapter 5, and answer the research questions. Thus, I move from the symbolic scenarios to
the big picture—the ideology—and present the rhetorical strategies that support it.
Dialectical Contradictions: A Worldview in Flux
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s rhetoric manifests dialectical contradictions.
Borrowing from a concept within communication theory—relational dialectics—and
applying it to social processes and movements, this concept shows that communication
patterns in relationships are seen as a result of endemic dialectical tensions, or contradictions
(Baxter, 1988; Rawlins, 1988). To elaborate, in relationships, when making decisions,
individuals, groups, movements, etc., give voice to multiple viewpoints, positioning, and
desires that often contradict each other (Cheney, Christensen, Zorn, & Ganesh, 2011). When
understood in terms of social processes, instances such as a group or movement fluctuating
between disclosure and secretiveness, between periods of honest and open communication
(Miller, 2005), and between ambiguity and equivocation are manifestations of dialectical
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contradictions. The English-language rhetoric of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood reveals
endemic dialectical tensions, which characterize its ideology.
Four core contradictions are identified in the Egyptian MB rhetoric. The first three are
consistent with core tensions identified in previous research (Cheney et al., 2011):
•

Openness and Closedness—The desire to be open and share information versus the
desire to be private

•

Autonomy and Connectedness—The need to separate to maintain uniqueness versus
the desire to have ties and connections with others

•

Equality and Inequality—The desire to be considered as equals versus the desire to
develop levels of superiority

The fourth core tension is unique to the Egyptian MB rhetoric:
•

Possession and Deficiency—The need to portray what we have versus the desire to
manifest deficiency, or what we do not have

In the following sections I elaborate on these core tensions to answer the first research
question. In other words, after discussing the dialectical tensions, supported by rhetorical
exemplars from Ikhwanweb, I embark upon naming and detailing the ideology. Thereafter, I
specify the rhetorical moves that manifest the ideology to address the second research
question.
Openness and closedness. This dialectical tension, to reiterate, manifests a desire to
be open and share information versus a desire to be private and secretive. It is predominant in
the Egyptian MB rhetoric, and is noticeable across all three sections of Ikhwanweb analyzed
in this study. To elaborate, the dialectical contradiction of openness and closedness is evident
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in the Egyptian MB’s implicitness associated with the Islamist identity, in the portrayal of
complete opposition towards Al-Qaeda yet remaining evasive on the details of the axis of
difference, and in the expression of what the ideal society for the Egyptian MB looks like
while keeping fundamental details that characterize this ideal society unnamed and
unexplained. Each of these open and closed tensions is further elaborated.
Islamists: To be or not to be. The English-language rhetoric of the Egyptian MB
explicitly and clearly identifies it as a moderate Islamic movement and a Muslim movement,
and implicitly through innuendo as Islamists. Thus, being qualified as moderate in its overall
stance and Islamic in its orientation is the Egyptian MB’s clear choice and the identity and
image it openly promotes. As stated in the Oxford English Dictionary (2011), the moderate
stance in politics and religion is one that distances itself from extremism, radicalism, and any
partisan affinities. The Islamic identity emphasizes a religious positioning by the Egyptian
MB.
Interestingly, although the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization is often
characterized as an Islamist organization (Biot Report, 2005; Leiken & Brooke, 2007), the
Egyptian MB rhetoric does not explicitly avow the Islamist identity. Nevertheless, innuendos
abound around the issue of Islamism. In the rhetoric analyzed, several instances featuring
implications and insinuations associate the Egyptian MB with Islamists or “Muslims who
draw upon the belief, symbols, and language of Islam to inspire, shape, and animate political
activity” (Pelletreau, Address at the Council on Foreign Relations, 1996). In this implicitness
lies the element of the closed, if we consider implicitness as a form of informational
closedness (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996) in the way indirectness (Buller & Burgoon, 1994;
O’Hair & Cody, 1994) is.
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To explicate with examples, the openness surrounding the Egyptian MB’s Muslim,
Islamic, and moderate identities is discerned in the mention of qualifiers in: “Muslim
movements as the Muslim Brotherhood” and “the file they [Egyptian authorities] wanted to
use against the moderate Islamic movement [MB].” The association with Islamists, however,
is implied; the statements “if Brotherhood came to power,” “should Brotherhood come to
power,” “Islamists will eventually come to power,” and “Western presence in the region will
change if the lslamists were to come to power,” do not show any explicit identification
between Brotherhood and Islamists, but a clear association in the use of “power” as the
fulcrum about which both Brotherhood and Islamists pivot. This by implication points to the
Brotherhood sharing an aspect of the Islamist ethos.
Furthermore, in the Egyptian MB rhetoric Islamists are portrayed positively; at
numerous instances the rhetoric presents a defense and support for Islamism; Islamists are
also depicted to be influential and powerful, with the clout to affect even Western agents.
Exemplars are “Islamists will not impose their beliefs,” “the Islamists believe also that the
Muslims have the freedom,” “Islamists themselves in their inability to communicate and
defend their agenda,” and “Western presence in the region will change if the Islamists were
to come to power.”
These dynamics point to the portrayal of the Egyptian MB’s preoccupation with
Islamism and its core tension and dilemma surrounding positioning itself as an Islamist
organization. In other words, to be or not to be with an Islamist identity becomes a crucial
issue for the Egyptian MB’s positioning of itself. The core tension of openness and
closedness is manifest herein. On the one hand, the Egyptian MB rhetoric features several
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explicit expressions of its moderate and religious identities, and on the other implications of
an Islamist ethos, yet never an open avowal of it.
We are different…but exactly how? There is no ambiguity present in the Egyptian
MB rhetoric surrounding the opposition it exhibits towards Al-Qaeda and Ayman AlZawahiri. And although Ayman Al-Zawahiri features as an important agent in Ikhwanweb,
he is presented as an agent performing negative acts, and with negative ideas and intent.
Certain instances of this are, “Al-Zawahiri was never a member of the Muslim Brotherhood”
and “Al-Zawahiri urges Hamas reject elections [a positive component in the Egyptian MB
rhetoric].” Thus, opposition and negative portrayal of Al-Qaeda and Al-Zawahiri
characterizes the relationship between the Egyptian MB and Al-Qaeda. Also, the Egyptian
MB states that the primary point of difference between it and Al-Qaeda is in their respective
ideologies, for example, “there is difference between MB’s ideology and that of the AlQaeda network” and “our [MB] ideology is not the same as Al-Qaeda’s.”
However, no description or definition to qualify factors that entail the difference in
ideology is openly stated. Thus, all factors that get portrayed as negatives in the Egyptian
MB rhetoric and form the basis on which Al-Qaeda or Al-Zawahiri are presented
unflatteringly become implicit pointers to the ideological difference. The negatives are AlQaeda’s use of violence and oppression and carrying a foreign agenda; its act of attacking
resistance factions; its creed of the absolute enemy, and its questionable practice and
conceptualization of jihad. The following statements exemplify this: “justifying their [AlQaeda] oppression and their use of force,” “Al-Qaeda network in Iraq has a foreign agenda,”
“Al-Qaeda network in Iraq attacked all resistance factions,” “Al-Qaeda’s method is based on
the absolute enemy,” and “What kind of jihad has the Al-Qaeda network claimed to have
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done?” By implication, the Egyptian MB exhibits a departure from these beliefs and praxis
attributed to Al-Qaeda.
Moreover, several of these concepts and issues vis-à-vis Al-Qaeda lack context and
elaboration. For instance, the nature of foreign agenda, the identity of specific resistance
factions, the definition and description of the absolute enemy, and the nature of jihad
practised by Al-Qaeda are issues that remain elusive; as a result, the ideological difference
aforementioned falls short of reinforcement.
Therefore, although the oppositional stance and a negative portrayal of Al-Qaeda are
explicit and unambiguous, and by implication the general areas of difference can be outlined,
the distinct nature and context of the differences that separate the Egyptian MB ideology
from that of Al-Qaeda remain unstated. The audience becomes aware of the opposition, but
what explicitly makes the Egyptian MB different remains evasive. This contradiction points
to the tension between openness and closedness, that is, the need to be open about its
oppositional stance, yet the necessity to keep some aspects unrevealed and somewhat
implicit.
Our ideal society…or a semblance of it? The Egyptian MB rhetoric presents several
pointers that enable interpretation of what an ideal society looks like. This society is based on
Islam and is open to adopt new concepts and praxis, such as modernization, but on Islamic
terms. The type of government this society promotes is one that supports democracy,
elections, non-violent constitutional means, popular choice, and political reform. This society
does not believe in use of violence without context, and promotes human rights and values.
The Egyptian MB rhetoric presents an all-encompassing, and influential image and
vision of Islam; in addition, Islam promotes the path of righteousness, it is somewhat rigid in

171
its support of methods based on Shari’a, or the Islamic law, and it is tolerant and peace
loving, opposed to violence and terrorism. These are manifest in such statements as, “Islam,
as Al Banna [sic] says, is a comprehensive system,” “Islam bans that resisters deviate from
the tenets of righteous Shari’a to adopt methods which are totally rejected by Islam,” and
“adopt right tenets of Islam and reject violence.” Although based on Islam, concepts and
praxis not rooted in Islam are embraced in this society. But these are accepted and
contextualized in Islamic terms. For instance, modernization is not opposed yet its emphasis
on the materialist philosophy and atheism are rejected. To exemplify, “Islam refuses that
aspect of modernization which believes in the materialistic philosophy” and “[Islamists] does
not adopt that feature of modernization which calls for atheism.” In this manner, although
certain versions and praxis of modernization are opposed, an Islamic version of
modernization is espoused.
Also, the Egyptian MB rhetoric shows support for democracy and transparency,
which enjoin rotation of political power and rights of citizenship. This is seen in “MB
advocates democracy and transparency which enjoin rotation of power and rights of
citizenship.” It rejects power and position acquired by undemocratic means, such as
inheritance, as in the case of the Mubarak regime; it also rejects farce in the name of
elections, insinuating the pointlessness of the Shura council elections in Egypt. For instance,
“reject any person to undemocratically come to power” and “the Shura Council elections [see
footnote 37 in Chapter 5] can’t be considered elections.” The Egyptian MB rhetoric shows
support for elections and the power of popular choice; it also promotes non-violent
constitutional means and the presence of a robust opposition for healthy governance and
political reform. Some exemplars are, “the popular choice if made, nobody could stop it,”
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“[MB] called for holding early elections,” and “[MB] believes in non-violent constitutional
strife.” Important to mention here is that the Egyptian MB distances itself from MB
hardliners who oppose democracy, as clearly stated in, “MB hardliners [see footnote 12 in
Chapter 5] to block the movement’s [MB] evolution in a more democratic direction.”
The Egyptian MB rhetoric also stresses that citizens of an ideal society distance
themselves from violence in general and uphold peace and peaceful means. Its rhetoric gives
an idea, mostly by implication, of what violence entails—violence has its own ideological
basis, and is dependent on several factors; it entails destruction of property, criminal and
savage attacks, massacres, oppression and use of force, extremist tendencies associated with
religion, political violence, criminal acts, targeting of civilians in armed conflicts, racial
discrimination, and terrorism. Certain statements that manifest this are, “destroying
properties, something the MB fully rejects,” “[MB] denounce and condemn the extremist and
violent religious trends,” “Islam prohibits military attacks against civilians and hospitals,” as
against “peace is choice over extremism,” “we [MB] will maintain our peaceful method,”
and “we [MB] still have our means for a peaceful change.”
However, violence is portrayed to be context-specific; that is, a total rejection of
violence and violent means is not promoted. For instance, “several factors that lead to
violence” and “Morsi [sic] [a senior MB leader] pointed out that the violent incidents
allegedly committed by the MB, are separate and individual incidents.” Support is shown
towards moderation, opposition is featured towards extremism, and it is stated that peaceful
change demands time and does not happen fast. Some instances from the Egyptian MB
rhetoric are, “allow discussions,” “moderate movements, like the MB,” and “Morsi [sic]
pointed out that peaceful change does not happen overnight.” The Egyptian MB rhetoric does
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not define what jihad entails, but shows support for it and lays emphasis on the fact that jihad
and violence can be mutually exclusive. This is manifest in the statements, “any way other
than the method of jihad will only lead to loss and failure” and “jihad movement will emerge
again but in a peaceful method.” Mercy, justice, equity, human rights, and respect and honor
for pledges and treaties, are values that are espoused in this society, as seen in “mercy,
justice, equity, human rights as well as respect and honoring pledges and treaties.” In
addition, all these values and rights are guaranteed to all citizens, irrespective of position or
religious differences; an example in relation to Copts [see footnote 18 in Chapter 5] is
“practice their [Copts] rights in picking the reference they like.”
Despite the pointers that mark the kind of society the Egyptian MB rhetoric espouses,
many of these inferences are drawn based on implications. Thereby portraying lack of
openness and rendering questions such as: what does jihad for the Egyptian MB really look
like?; what does democracy explicitly entail in a society based on Islam?; how does Islam,
Shari’a, and democracy work harmoniously together? These are some questions that remain
unanswered.
Along with the absence of answers to these elemental concerns, the pointers in the
Egyptian MB rhetoric that show that the Egyptian MB society strongly opposes foreign
interference, promotes Islamism and associates it with power, cautions Western agents
against Islamists, and insinuates establishing a worldwide Islamic Caliphate [see footnote 15
in Chapter 5]—all of which lack context—call into question the authenticity of many of the
Egyptian MB’s intentions and positionings in the portrayal of its ideal society. Exemplars
are: “the MB is against all forms of foreign interference and domination,” “Islamists will
eventually come to power,” and “establishing of a world-wide Islamic Caliphate.” This
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scenario points to the dialectical contradiction of openness and closedness; the rhetoric
provides a portrayal of the Egyptian MB’s ideal society, and at the same time keeps certain
fundamental aspects characterizing that ideal society hidden and unexplained, thus raising
concern whether the portrayal is a mere semblance.
To summarize, the Egyptian MB rhetoric portrays the openness and closedness
dialectic through: (a) explicit avowal of a moderate stance and its Islamic/religious identity,
and implicit pointers to its Islamist ethos, without any open assertion of the Islamist identity;
(b) show of opposition towards Al-Qaeda, but conspicuous absence of context and
clarifications that could ascertain and denote the axis of difference; and (c) portrayal of an
ideal society, which upon closer analysis seems to be a semblance of it. In these
explicit/implicit rhetorical dynamics the dialectical contradiction of openness and closedness
finds expression.
Autonomy and connectedness. This dialectical tension manifests the need to
separate to maintain uniqueness versus the desire to have ties and connections with others. In
the Egyptian MB rhetoric, it features primarily in the Egyptian MB’s portrayal of its
relationship with Hamas; the sections MB versus Al-Qaeda and MB and the West primarily
present this scenario. The Egyptian MB expresses support for Hamas, and there is an element
of unconditional manifest in this support; however, on the issue of terrorism the former
disconnects itself from Hamas, thus exhibiting the dialectic of autonomy and connectedness.
If an explicit depiction of support and friendship is brought to question, Hamas
unquestioningly stands out as the Egyptian MB’s favorite ally. In the Egyptian MB rhetoric,
unequivocal support is manifest towards Hamas. By positioning and associating Hamas
positively with substances the Egyptian MB qualifies positive, and dissociating Hamas from
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anything the Egyptian MB portrays as negative, the Egyptian MB rhetoric manifests a
consubstantial relationship between Hamas and the Egyptian MB. Burke (1945; 1950) uses
the term consubstantial to describe the sort of association where two entities are united in
substance through common ideas, attitudes, and material possessions that leads to
identification. The positive stance the Egyptian MB and Hamas share towards elections and
the Palestinian people, and the negative stance towards Al-Qaeda and Al-Zawahiri are
instances of their consubstantial relationship. Examples from the Egyptian MB rhetoric
portraying this relationship are, “[MB] defended participating in the election” and “AlZawahiri urges Hamas reject elections,” which show that both the MB and Hamas support
elections; in addition, “our [MB] ideology is not the same as Al-Qaeda’s” and “Hamas
ideology is miles away from the ideology of Al-Qaeda” manifest their opposition towards
Al-Qaeda.
The expression of support does not stop at consubstantiality; like a supportive ally,
the Egyptian MB shares its resources with Hamas. Providing a forum in Ikhwanweb for
Hamas agents such as Osama Hamdan and Dr. Moussa Abu Marzouk, to express their ideas
and promote Hamas views, stands as an example. A statement reflecting this is, “Hamdan, a
Hamas leader and representative in Lebanon said to Ikhwanweb that Al-Zawahiri’s
statements and criticism to Hamas movement will never have any impact.”
Nevertheless, although the Egyptian MB rhetoric shows support, a prominent instance
of distancing from Hamas is decried in the Egyptian MB’s positioning of Hamas as a terrorist
organization. The use of although in “Muslim Brotherhood supports Hamas although it is a
terrorist organization” illustrates distancing from Hamas. Hence, the unconditional support of
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the Egyptian MB for Hamas manifests itself in not sharing consubstantiality with Hamas on
the issue of terrorism, yet being supportive of the latter.
On another note, the US and the European Union (among others) classify Hamas as a
terrorist organization (BBC News, 2003; Guardia, 2003; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2003; Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook, 2005; US Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005). In this
regard, the Egyptian MB is in agreement with the US, the European Union, and countries that
identify Hamas as a terrorist organization. Thus, despite being unconditional, the autonomy
and connectedness aspect of dialectic contradiction comes forth in the Egyptian MB openly
professing its support for Hamas, but maintaining distance and its unique stance on the
question of terrorism.
Equality and inequality. The equality and inequality dialectic exhibits the core
tension between the desire to be considered equals versus the desire to develop levels of
superiority. This dialectic finds manifestation in the Egyptian MB’s relation to Western
agents, and is prominent in the MB and the West and Parliament sections. The Egyptian MB
manifests the desire to cooperate and have dialogue with Western agents, thereby exhibiting
the desire to be considered equal. On the other hand, by showing inconsistency towards the
issue of dialogue with Western agents and by taking on an advisorial stance towards the latter
at times, the Egyptian MB also places itself in a position of superiority.
To elaborate, at times a distinct and positive approach towards dialogue and
cooperation with Western agents is explicit. For instance, “We [MB] believe that the
dialogue with the West is the ideal method.” Sometimes the Egyptian MB rhetoric presents
the positive idea that Western agents cannot and should not be seen as a monolith, and it is
faulty to approach the West as a totality. An exemplar of this stance is, “have to come to
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realize that different views can be present in one single Western society.” Thus, cooperation
with certain Western agents appears desirable.
On the other hand, in some other instances the attitude manifest towards Western
agents ranges from uncertainty to skepticism to strong opposition to retaliation to an impasse.
In the expression of all these non-conforming and pro-active attitudes, the Egyptian MB
exhibits the exercise of agency, a position of power, and therefore, a certain level of
superiority. In fact, this range of attitudes exhibited by the Egyptian MB calls into question
Western agents’ actual intent towards democracy promotion, respect for human rights,
reform efforts, and support for Islamists, in the context of Egypt. Some instances of this in
the rhetoric are, “West continues to support undemocratic regimes,” “US government is
ready to allow human rights violations,” “US government allows violations from the
Egyptian government,” “[MB] do not believe US efforts for reform were sincere,” and “West
must not pressure regimes to curb Islamists.”
Also, the Egyptian MB cautions Western agents and makes advisory gestures to the
latter on issues such as democracy promotion, the necessity of being transparent and curbing
support for authoritarian regimes, and understanding the consequences of Islamist victory in
the Middle East. Exemplars of these cautionary and advisory rhetoric are, “the West has to
come to a realization,” “US should support any government democratically elected,” and
“Western presence in the region will change if the Islamists were to come to power.”
The dialectic characteristic of the Egyptian MB’s relationship with Western agents is
noticeable also in the portrayal of the relationship between the Egyptian MB Members of
Parliament/MB Parliamentary bloc and Western agents, and the stance toward dialogue
between the two. At times a coming together is evident, and at others an ambiguous attitude
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towards the possibility of dialogue and positive relationship with Western agents is
displayed. To elaborate, the short phrase “MB MPs and the Congress delegation” does not
present any comprehensive information, but the use of the conjunction “and” insinuates the
MB MPs’ association with the US Congress delegation, a Western agent. In this association
the desire to be considered equals is manifest. On the other hand, the use of litotes “does not
object” in the statement “MB Parliamentary bloc does not object to visiting US Congress and
contacting it,” raises questions about the MB MPs true intent; litotes, as defined in Chapter 5,
is the expression of an affirmative by negating its contrary, and is used to create uncertainty
and ambiguity around an issue. The portrayal of uncertainty and ambiguity can create
confusion and render Western agents helpless; in this manner the Egyptian MB MPs exercise
agency and exhibit a level of superiority.
Thus, not only the Egyptian MB as a movement, but also its representatives in the
Egyptian political scene portray the dialectic of equality and inequality. The Egyptian MB
and the MB MPs at times explicitly empathize and associate itself/themselves with Western
agents, and in the process show the desire for cooperation and equality. Yet, at other
instances, it/they voice disagreement and opposition, or advise and extend caution, as regards
Western agents thus exercising agency and exhibiting a level of superiority. This scenario
presents the dialectical contradiction of equality and inequality.
Possession and deficiency. This core tension exhibits the desire to portray
possession, that is, what we have versus the desire to manifest deficiency, or what we do not
have. This dialectic finds expression in the Egyptian MB rhetoric across all three sections,
specifically in the portrayal of its relationship with the Egyptian regime, and the resources it
sees available and unavailable to it.
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The theatre of conflict—the Egyptian political scene. Before embarking on the
dialectic, it must be mentioned that the Egyptian MB rhetoric portrays the Egyptian political
scene as the overarching setting where the Egyptian MB and the Hosni Mubarak regime
display a relationship of tension. Within this setting, the portrayal of agency the Egyptian
MB holds vis-à-vis the Egyptian regime is where the dialectical tension between possession
and deficiency is manifest.
To elaborate, the Egyptian regime frequently takes measures to attack the dignity and
image of the Egyptian MB; the latter is used by the regime as an instrument and excuse to
prevent serious reform. Some examples that corroborate this are, “the file they [Egyptian
authorities] wanted to use against the moderate Islamic movement [MB],” “the Egyptian
media [working under the regime] defames the MB with political violence,” and “Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak conveniently use the Brotherhood as an excuse to prevent serious
reform.” To clarify, the Mubarak regime uses the discourse of violence and positions the
Egyptian MB as an extremist organization to eject it from the political scene. In this manner,
the Egyptian regime hopes to gain empathy and clout with Western agents, as well as rule
unhindered and unquestioned in the absence of a significant opposition force, the Egyptian
MB. This scenario portrays the Egyptian MB to be in a position of compromised agency.
On another note, the Egyptian regime’s efforts at demonizing the Egyptian MB, and
associating it with extremist tendencies have implications. They imply that the dynamics of
the Egyptian political scene can serve as motivation that shapes much of the Egyptian MB
ideology and praxis, specifically in its relationship with Western agents, its stance towards
militant fundamentalist organizations, and its goals and actions (this is discussed in the final
chapter of this dissertation).
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Reverting to the core tension of possession and deficiency, the Egyptian MB rhetoric
does not portray it as completely devoid of agency though, with respect to the Hosni
Mubarak regime. Through its representatives in the Egyptian Parliament, the MB MPs, the
Egyptian MB makes demands, shows disagreement, and clarifies misconceptions. The MB
MPs/Parliamentary bloc are/is not portrayed to be passive in their/its role as oppositional
force to the Egyptian regime. By using the issue of amendments, bills, and laws, necessary
tools for political reform, as basis, the MB MPs voice disagreement, criticize, present
conditions and modifications, make demands, negotiate, boycott, and reject. In this sense the
Egyptian MB possesses agency. Some instances that depict the possession of agency are:
“calling for abolishing the emergency law [see footnote 31 in Chapter 5] and unconditional
freedom of creating political parties,” “MB MPs, independents, Karama Party [see footnote
32 in Chapter 5] held a press conference in which they declared boycotting House sessions
and rejecting President Mubarak’s proposed constitutional amendments,” “the MB
Parliamentary bloc confirms to place the bill [Parties Law bill; see footnote 33 in Chapter 5]
under scrutiny to evaluate its feasibility,” and “the MB Parliamentary bloc issued a statement
rejecting the judiciary bill [see footnote 34 in Chapter 5] proposed by the government.”
In summary, the Egyptian MB portrays lack of agency when the Hosni Mubarak
regime attacks its dignity and image and tries to defame it with the intent to oust it from the
Egyptian political scene. On the other hand, the Egyptian MB representatives in the Egyptian
Parliament, the MB MPs, not only function as active opposition to the regime, but also
participate zealously in political reform efforts. This manifests the dialectic of deficiency and
possession, wherein, the Egyptian MB organization portrays compromised agency, but at the
same time the MB MPs exhibit exercise of agency.
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What we have, and what we have not. The Egyptian MB rhetoric manifests the core
tension of possession and deficiency also through the desire to portray that resources are
available to them versus the desire to portray that they are deficient in certain resources. By
broad generalization, two types of resources manifest in the rhetoric: (a) social; and (b)
political. The Egyptian MB rhetoric exhibits possession and deficiency on both counts.
Ikhwanweb and MB representatives stand out as two significant and beneficial social
resources the Egyptian MB owns. Ikhwanweb functions as a forum for voicing dissent,
opposition, support, and caution, for conjecture, and for providing information and
clarification. MB representatives are portrayed as credible and correct channels of
information dissemination about the Egyptian MB. Two examples depicting this are, “MB
said in a statement to Ikhwanweb to push the peace process” and “MB representatives are
credible and have the right contacts,” respectively.
The Egyptian MB is also portrayed to be functioning in a society that has a fair
degree of social capital. According to Putnam (2000), social capital refers to “the
connections among individuals’ social networks [whom people know] and the norms of
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (p. 19). It is an elemental component to
building and maintaining democracy. The presence of social capital is manifest in the
Egyptian MB rhetoric in the portrayal of: a society where Egyptian citizens and different
religious groups/movements, such as Islamic movements and Coptic Christians, are not in
brutal opposition to one another, can exercise rights and in certain instances even support one
another; a society where journalists and human rights committees are present; and a society
where students and discontented groups can voice their opposition, through sit-ins for
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instance, and reformists such as El-Baradei [see footnote 29 in Chapter 5] can be socially
active.
Examples that point to this portrayal are, “[Egyptian] people have the genuine right,”
“they [Copts] are citizens who have all the citizenship rights,” “the MB stances are approved
by the Copts,” “MB and human rights organizations staunchly opposed it [anti-terrorism
amendments; see footnote 27 in Chapter 5],” “MB Parliamentary bloc confirms its support to
the journalists,” “a sit-in they [students] staged in protest at the situations that the universities
are witnessing,” and “El Baradei [sic] has called on all political movements and trends,
intellectuals and scholars, to converge with him.”
On the other hand, the social resource that the Egyptian MB lacks is a good image.
The rhetoric presents this in “the Egyptian media defames the MB with political violence”
and “the Egyptian regime attacks it by portraying it as an extremist movement.” Connected
to and consequent to this negative image is another intangible resource that the Egyptian MB
fails to own—understanding. The Egyptian MB rhetoric shows that prejudices and negative
predispositions are attached to it primarily due to lack of understanding of its goals and
actions, especially by Western agents. The lack of understanding is manifest in, “the US
administration believes the untrue allegations about the MB.”
From the point of view of political resources, a vital resource of positive implication
the Egyptian MB owns is the MB Parliamentary bloc within the Egyptian regime, wherein
MB MPs function as an active opposition, participate in facilitating political reform, advance
and encourage dialogue and communication with Western agents, and represent the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood organization. By using instruments and tools such as press statements,
interpellations, questions, sit-ins, dialogue, amendments, bills, and laws, MB MPs exercise
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influence and act within the Egyptian political system. Thus, in an authoritarian environment,
and despite being outlawed as an organization, by fielding independent candidates the
Egyptian MB is able to find representation in the Egyptian Parliament and voice within the
Egyptian political scene.
At the same time, a dictatorial regime supported by Western agents also brings in the
element of deficiency for the Egyptian MB organization in the political sphere. “[Egyptian]
regime may think of using oppression as a counterforce” points to the dictatorial attitude of
the Egyptian regime, and “while they [Western governments] continue to support regimes
that suppress,” shows Western governments’ support for suppressive regimes such as Hosni
Mubarak and his regime. In addition to being oppressive, the Egyptian regime attacks the
Egyptian Brotherhood’s image by portraying it as an extremist movement that is responsible
for promoting political violence. In this manner it maneuvers to oust the Egyptian MB from
the political scene. And although elections are in place, the Shura Council elections are
claimed to be a façade, with the power to govern and hold office resting mainly on
inheritance instead of participatory democratic practices. This is manifest in the statements,
“the Shura Council elections can’t be considered elections” and “Gamal Mubarak [Hosni
Mubarak’s son] come to power?” Thus, a dictatorial, corrupt, and conniving regime, with
Western agents as allies constricts and represses the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
To summarize, in the Egyptian MB’s portrayal of what it possesses and what it does
not, a core tension is manifest in the rhetoric. Through MB representatives in the Egyptian
Parliament the MB organization finds voice, and is able to exercise a certain amount of
agency as an opposition force to the Egyptian regime, within the Egyptian political scene.
However, the Hosni Mubarak regime vilifies the MB organization by promoting the latter as
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an extremist and violent Islamist group, thus creating a negative image and misconceptions
about it, with the intent to demonize the MB in the mind of Western agents as well as eject it
from the Egyptian political scene. Furthermore, the rhetoric portrays the Egyptian MB’s
existence within a society with a certain degree of social capital, and at the same time, it is
also portrayed to function within the framework of a political regime that is dictatorial, which
has a negative impact on social capital. This brings the discussion on dialectical
contradictions to an end, and leads this study towards formulation of the ideology of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, as manifest in its rhetoric in Ikhwanweb.
The ideology. To reiterate, for the purpose of this study ideology has been defined as
beliefs a social group or movement shares, through systems of representation: (a) to interpret,
make sense of, and define some aspect of life; and (b) to monitor their social practices—these
beliefs are acquired, used, and changed in social situations, and on the basis of the social
interests of groups and social relations between groups, in complex social structures (van
Dijk, 1998). Ideology entails a social and a cognitive component, and it is not prejudged as
essentially dominant and/or negative.
With this definition of ideology as my anchor and based on my analysis of the
Egyptian MB’s rhetoric in Ikhwanweb, I contend that the Egyptian MB’s ideology as
manifest in its rhetoric is one that albeit entails certain beliefs, values, and goals, but is
predominantly characterized by dialectical tensions. The rhetorical representation of these
tensions problematizes understanding of the Egyptian MB’s true intent. That is, ambiguities,
tensions, inconsistencies, and incongruities render nebulous the true objectives, purposes, and
motives of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The question of its strategic or long-term goals
versus its tactical or short-term maneuvers for immediate gain becomes an important one to
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consider. To address these concerns I elaborate on some of the beliefs and values that have
emerged following analysis, as well as focus on dialectics characterizing them.
•

The Egyptian MB considers its moderate and Muslim identities to be significant, and
does not equivocate ascribing itself as such. As aforementioned, the moderate stance
in politics and religion is one that distances itself from extremism, radicalism, and
any partisan affinities; the Islamic identity emphasizes a religious positioning. Thus,
the Egyptian MB does not promote extremism, radicalism, or partisan behavior and
beliefs, and holds its Islamic identity, and religion, to be significant.

•

Implications and insinuations abound that show the Egyptian MB’s support for
Islamists, or “Muslims who draw upon the belief, symbols, and language of Islam to
inspire, shape, and animate political activity” (Pelletreau, Address at the Council on
Foreign Relations, 1996). However, there are no explicit and clear ascriptions of itself
as Islamist in the rhetoric. Thus, although the Egyptian MB believes in the coming
together of Islam and politics, and the importance of Islam in shaping its political
activity, it holds the term Islamist as a contentious one.

•

The Egyptian MB considers Islam to be all-encompassing; it is a religion that
promotes the path of righteousness, is tolerant and peace-loving, and opposed to
violence and terrorism. The Egyptian MB is somewhat rigid around support of
methods based on Shari’a, or the Islamic law, and it embraces concepts and praxis not
rooted in Islam, but contextualizes them in Islamic terms. For instance, modernization
is not opposed, yet its focus on the materialist philosophy and atheism is rejected.
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•

Violence is considered to be context-specific, although extremism is completely
opposed, and moderation, peace, and peaceful means, are strongly espoused. The
belief that peaceful change demands time and does not happen fast is also promoted.
Support is shown for non-violent jihad.

•

Support for a political system that is democratic, transparent, enjoins rotation of
power, and safeguards rights of citizenship is promoted. The Egyptian MB rhetoric
rejects political power and position gained through undemocratic means such as
inheritance; it shows support for elections and popular choice; and it promotes nonviolent constitutional methods. The Egyptian MB believes in the presence of an
active political opposition in the Parliament that can ensure healthy, effective, and
democratic governance, and political reform. Also, the Egyptian MB explicitly
distances itself from MB hardliners who oppose democracy.

•

The Egyptian MB believes in promoting social capital, an elemental component to
building and maintaining democracy, and creating a strong civil society. It promotes a
society where Egyptian citizens and different religious groups/movements, such as
Islamic movements and Coptic Christians, are not hostile towards one another and
hold equal rights; a society where journalists and human rights committees are free
and functional; a society where students and discontented groups can voice their
opposition, and reformists can be active; and a society where technology is used as a
means to promote communication and networking. Mercy, justice, equity, human
rights, and respect and honor for pledges and treaties, are values that are espoused,
and all these values and rights are guaranteed to all citizens, irrespective of position
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or religious differences. A society marked by diversity, and where differences
enhance rather than curb the healthy functioning of life; in other words, the Egyptian
MB believes in a strong civil society, or “the arena of uncoerced collective action
around shared interests, purposes, and values….[which] commonly embraces a
diversity of spaces, actors, and institutional forms, varying in their degree of
formality, autonomy and power” (Tlanhlua, 2008, para. 1).
•

The Egyptian MB separates itself ideologically from Al-Qaeda, an extremist,
fundamentalist, Islamic group. By implication it can be inferred that the Egyptian MB
reprimands the use of violence and oppression, holding of a foreign agenda, attack on
resistance factions, creed of the absolute enemy, and questionable practice of jihad—
all of which it accuses Al-Qaeda of.

•

The support for Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood’s arm in Palestine, is explicit.
Specifically, the Egyptian MB supports and shares Hamas’s positive stance towards
elections and the Palestinian people, and Hamas’s negative stance towards Al-Qaeda.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian MB distances itself from Hamas’s positive stance towards
terrorism, thereby explicating that it does not support terrorism.

•

The Egyptian MB rhetoric unreservedly criticizes authoritarianism and dictatorial
regimes and considers Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt to be one such. It also
shows discontent towards certain Western agents’ acts of supporting and forming
alliance with these dictatorial, corrupt, conniving regimes that constrict, tyrannize,
and oppress individuals, groups, or movements, such as the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, opposing them. Distinctly, the Egyptian MB declares that the Mubarak
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regime uses the discourse of violence to position the Egyptian MB as an extremist
organization with the intent to eject it from the political scene. In this manner, the
Egyptian regime gains empathy with Western agents, and continues to rule
unhindered and unchallenged in the absence of a significant opposition force that
ensures prevention of any serious political reform. In addition, under the Hosni
Mubarak regime, although elections seem to be in place they are a façade and actual
power rests in inheritance. In sum, the Egyptian MB voices dissent against the
authoritarian, secular, corrupt, and conniving regime headed by Hosni Mubarak and
supported by certain Western agents.
•

The Egyptian MB presents itself as an organization that is oppressed, demonized, and
victimized by the Hosni Mubarak regime. Nevertheless, the Egyptian MB rhetoric
also shows that its representatives in the Parliament, the MB MPs, are an active and
apparently influential force within the Egyptian political scene. Thus, as part of the
official political framework, the Egyptian MB MPs have the potential to exercise
more clout and influence than the Egyptian MB as an organization can.

•

The Egyptian MB expresses discontent, as aforementioned, and criticizes certain
Western agents’ act of supporting authoritarian regimes. Thus, the former also
questions Western agents’ true intent towards promotion of democratic institutions,
human rights, reform, and a robust civil society. At the same time, the Egyptian MB
rhetoric shows open-mindedness and flexibility by stating that the West must not be
viewed and understood as a monolith, and that different Western agents have
different values and goals. Extending that vein of thought the Egyptian MB believes
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that dialogue and communication can be established with certain Western agents. The
Egyptian MB considers it absolutely important for Western agents to gain a
contextual understanding of the former’s objectives and actions so that
misconceptions can be cleared and prejudices can be reduced.
These issues make evident that the Egyptian MB: (a) believes in the coming together
of Islam and politics and emphasizes Islam’s preeminence in shaping its political activity; (b)
complies with Shari’a and Islam’s all-encompassing potential, and promotes foreign ideas
and values following contextualization in Islamic terms; (c) believes in democratic
institutions, a democratic form of government, and the importance of a robust civil society;
(d) opposes extremism and distances itself from extremist, fundamentalist organizations such
as Al-Qaeda; (e) supports Hamas’s political aspirations and support for Palestinian people in
Palestine, but rejects the former’s association with terrorism; (f) supports violence only when
the context demands, but believes in an altogether non-violent jihad; (g) criticizes and
believes in standing up against the authoritarian, secular regime of Hosni Mubarak, which
suppresses and demonizes the Egyptian MB; however, it also believes that Egyptian MB
representatives in Parliament are capable of exercising more influence and agency, thereby
reinforcing the need for the Egyptian MB as an organization to gain political legitimation;
and (h) criticizes certain Western agents’ alliance with dictatorial regimes, and questions
these Western agents’ true intent behind promotion of human rights, democracy, reform, and
civil society in Egypt; at the same time, the Egyptian MB advances the claim that Western
agents should not be seen as a monolith, and it is possible and necessary for Western agents
to make efforts to come closer to the Egyptian MB and vice versa so that misconceptions and
prejudices are lessened.
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Although these issues are made prominent in the Egyptian MB rhetoric and detail
some significant beliefs and values held by the Egyptian MB, they are not devoid of
ambiguities and dialectical tensions: (a) how does the Egyptian MB ensure a functional
enmeshment of Islam and the inherently secular ideal of democracy? (b) how does the
Egyptian MB contextualize the Western concept of democracy in Islamic terms? (c) if Islam
is all-encompassing, and the Egyptian MB advocates Shari’a, how does it uphold the rights
of other religious groups and individuals? (d) what are the specific axes of difference, other
than extremism, that separate the Egyptian MB from Al-Qaeda? (e) how does the Egyptian
MB maintain the balance between espousing Hamas, but not the latter’s support for
terrorism? (f) what are the contexts in which the Egyptian MB legitimizes the use of
violence? (g) how does it define non-violent jihad, and how is the Egyptian MB’s
conceptualization of jihad separate from Al-Qaeda and other extremist, fundamentalist
organizations? (h) if the Egyptian MB gains political legitimation, with its present emphasis
on Islam and Shari’a, how can it ensure not turning Egypt into a theocracy 39 instead of a
democracy? and (i) if the Egyptian MB, as stated in its rhetoric, opposes foreign interference
in its workings, what is the nature of alliance it seeks from Western agents, or role it
envisions for the latter to play vis-à-vis Egypt?
These dialectics and ambiguities call into question the apparent ingenuity of many of
the Egyptian MB’s beliefs and positionings as manifest in its rhetoric in Ikhwanweb. And
this in turn brings this discussion back to the question of the Egyptian MB’s tactical versus
39

A form of government in which the state is ruled by clergy, or by officials who are regarded as
divinely guided (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 1990). And most simplistically put, as Keong
(2005) states, “the fundamental problem with every theocracy is that it is innately unfair. Not just
unfair to those who do not follow the state religion, but also unfair to those who do not follow the
state religion as it is understood and interpreted by the humans who run the state” (para. 4).
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its strategic goals, that is, its short-term maneuvers for immediate gain versus its long-term
goals. To elaborate with an instance, one of the debates about the Egyptian MB that arises
consequent to these dialectics and ambiguities is whether or not its participation in
democratic processes and support for human rights is simply a tactic to gain short-term
political advantage, or is it part of the Egyptian MB’s long-term vision of its role in society;
does it participate in democratic processes to make inroads into the political structure to
thereafter turn the Egyptian society into a theocratic one, or is its long-term vision of society
a democratic one?
To comment on this quandary and to identify the kernel of the Egyptian MB’s
worldview, the implications of the following must be taken into consideration: the position of
the Egyptian MB as a counterpublic; the use of its English-language website—Ikhwanweb—
as a communicative platform whose intended and openly avowed audience is the West; and
the hugely confounding and controversial debate surrounding the place Islam should occupy
vis-à-vis politics, and the potential democratic institutions hold in Muslim societies. These
provide the overall context apropos which the Egyptian Brotherhood’s worldview should be
interpreted, and its tactical moves and strategic goals can be envisioned.
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, the literature on counterpublic
communication has focused extensively on the goal and purpose of it. Much has been
written, and some of the predominant purposes of counterpublic communication have been
distilled to be the expression of opposition, the attainment of consensus, and the expression
of difference as a resource for public deliberation. Analysis of the Egyptian MB’s rhetoric
shows that there is yet another consequential goal and purpose to counterpublic
communication—the expression of dialectical contradictions by counterpublics to evade

192
commitment and complete disclosure vis-à-vis wider publics, so as to keep the
counterpublic’s true intent and positionings ambiguous and obscure.
To elaborate, it must be kept in mind that counterpublics’ relationship with wider
publics is often marred by distrust consequent to experiences of suppression and
marginalization experienced by the former. In the case of the Egyptian MB, it neither trusts
the Hosni Mubarak regime for the latter’s dictatorial maneuvers and hostility towards the
Egyptian MB, nor does it completely rely on Western agents due to their support of
authoritarian regimes. As Lewicki and Tomlinson (2003) state:
Distrust is the confident expectation that another individual’s motives, intentions, and
behaviors are sinister and harmful to one’s own interests….this often entails a sense
of fear and anticipation of discomfort or danger. Distrust naturally prompts us to take
steps that reduce our vulnerability in an attempt to protect our interests. (para. 1)
In anticipation of danger, to ensure survival in an atmosphere of hostility and distrust, to
reduce its vulnerability, and to protect its own interests, the Egyptian MB chooses to remain
ambiguous, contradictory, and non-committal in many of its stances. This aspect, thus, brings
to light one of the key elements characterizing the Egyptian MB ideology—an inherent
absence of trust.
Also, related to the issue of trust is the implication of online communication by
counterpublics. Literature abounds on how repressive governments can control flow of
information and curb freedom of expression. Although the Internet is considered to have
emancipatory potential and fewer constraints than traditional mass media, content on the
Internet can be readily available to a counterpublic’s intended audience and an oppressive
regime alike. In such a scenario, rhetoric of dialectical contradictions evades total disclosure
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of any stance or belief as aforementioned; in the absence of forthright stances and
commitments it becomes difficult for repressive regimes to persecute counterpublics. This
particular concern associated with the Egyptian MB’s cyber communication points to the
relevance of caution, another key element of its ideology in Ikhwanweb.
A further issue of significant import is the implication of the West as the intended
audience of Ikhwanweb. This naturally connotes that the Egyptian MB’s rhetoric and
communication strategies in Ikhwanweb are motivated by what it intends to achieve vis-à-vis
its audience. The rhetoric displays that the Egyptian MB criticizes certain Western agents’
act of supporting authoritarian regimes and questions whether they truly intend to promote
democratic institutions in Egypt. At the same time, the rhetoric emphasizes the importance of
not viewing the West as a monolith, the need to promote understanding between Western
agents and the Egyptian MB, and the rhetoric manifests support for human rights, a strong
civil society, and democratic ideals—values that are predominantly associated with Western
societies. Thus, I contend that the Egyptian MB rhetoric demonstrates the need to be valued
by Western agents, which constitutes another key element of its ideology. Value entails the
Egyptian MB’s need to be respected irrespective of voicing differences and discontent, and
value demands Western agents to be honest and forthright and make efforts to counter
prejudices and reduce misconceptions.
Finally, on the discourse of Islam and democracy, the dialectical contradictions
surrounding the Egyptian Brotherhood’s rhetoric on the role Islam must play vis-à-vis secular
democratic ideals and institutions are characteristic of the inherent incertitude facing Islamic
organizations keen for political legitimation. In addition, violence and intolerance perpetrated
by Islamic extremist organizations, and the resultant reductionist perceptions and prejudicial
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stances towards Islam further complicate the task of moderate Islamists. In its wake to find
the balance between its Islamic ethos and adapting to democratic ideals, the Egyptian MB’s
rhetoric clearly portrays a sense of confusion and flux that accompanies any move towards
transition. In other words, the Egyptian MB rhetoric portrays the fundamental tension it is
experiencing in its attempt to transition into an Islamic organization that has democratic
aspirations.
In sum, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s worldview manifests four key elements:
(a) distrust towards the Egyptian regime and certain Western agents; (b) the need to be
valued by Western agents; (c) the importance of exercising caution in its cyber
communication; and finally (d) the tension and flux resulting from its endeavor to transition
into an organization that has contextualized democratic ideals in an Islamic idiom. This
worldview is concomitant to the Egyptian MB’s role as an Islamic counterpublic that uses
cyber communication for political legitimation and works within an authoritarian framework
supported by Western agents. Thus, it is only apt that the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood as reflected in its English-language cyber rhetoric is termed Counterpublic
Cyber Islamism. Furthermore, this worldview reinforces the Egyptian MB’s long-term
democratic vision of society, as opposed to short-term maneuvers with the sole objective of
gaining political preeminence and power devoid of democratic intentions. At this point it
becomes expedient to highlight the predominant rhetorical strategies providing support for
the dialectical contradictions forming the basis of the Egyptian MB worldview.
The Rhetorical Moves
Throughout the Egyptian MB rhetoric, three predominant rhetorical moves are
discerned: (a) the show of support; (b) the portrayal of opposition; and (c) the display of
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contradiction. Within each of these three broader rhetorical patterns, certain prominent
rhetorical tactics/devices feature, such as, consubstantiation, resource sharing, negative otherpresentation, testimony, epithet, and ambiguity. Not all of these tactics are used within each
of the broader rhetorical moves; thus, the prominent tactics within each move are illustrated.
The rhetoric of support. In the English-language rhetoric of the Egyptian
Brotherhood, support is exhibited through consubstantiation, resource sharing, testimony,
and epithet. Without being specific to any one of the three sections analyzed, the show of
support, in different degrees and intensities, is manifest across all three sections; for Hamas
in MB versus Al-Qaeda and MB and the West, for Western agents to a certain degree in MB
and the West, and for students, the Egyptian people, and Copts in Parliament. I elaborate on
the four aforementioned rhetorical tactics that entail the overarching rhetoric of support.
First, the Egyptian MB shows support for Hamas by focusing on the substances that
unite them; in other words, consubstantiation. Specifically, several areas of shared substance
include the following: unity over the cause of the Palestinian people, over the oppositional
attitude towards Al-Qaeda, and over the common idea that violence is context specific.
Examples of this consubstantiation are the following: “Abu Marzouk [a senior Hamas leader]
confirmed that Hamas…seeking liberation for the Palestinian people” and the Egyptian MB’s
use of the qualifier “legitimate” to describe Palestinian peoples’ resistance in “legitimate
resistance carried out by the Palestinian people;” “Hamas ideology is miles away from the
ideology of Al-Qaeda” and “our [MB] ideology is not the same as Al-Qaeda’s;” and “our
[Hamas] weapons are only directed towards the occupation” and “Morsi [sic] [a senior MB
leader] pointed out that the violent incidents allegedly committed by the MB, are separate
and individual incidents.”
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The Egyptian MB also shows consubstantiality with certain Western agents by
uniting through an oppositional attitude towards terrorism, seen in “the West does not
support terrorism” and “Muslim Brotherhood supports Hamas although it is a terrorist
organization.” In addition, consubstantiation with Egyptian students is featured in the unity
over use of sit-ins as instrument of protest; exemplars in the rhetoric are “a sit-in they
[students] staged in protest at the situations that the universities are witnessing” and “MB
MPs held a sit-in in the Egyptian parliament.”
The strategy of resource sharing basically entails the Egyptian MB’s show of support
for an entity by allowing it to share the resources the former possesses; a key instance is the
sharing of Ikhwanweb as a forum for expression. Among other instances, throughout the
Egyptian MB rhetoric the presence of Hamas associates as active agents using Ikhwanweb,
as a forum for expression of their ideas, goals, and practices is conspicuous. An example is
“Hamdan, a Hamas leader and representative in Lebanon said to Ikhwanweb that AlZawahiri’s statements and criticism to Hamas movement will never have any impact,”
wherein Hamas’s opposition with Al-Zawahiri, and by extension, Al-Qaeda is expressed by a
Hamas leader through Ikhwanweb.
On the issue of testimony, or evidence in support of a fact or assertion, the Egyptian
MB rhetoric uses prominent individuals to testify for the Egyptian MB claims and assertions.
Examples of testimonials of support are “Hamdan [a senior Hamas leader] confirmed that
Hamas rejects Al-Qaeda” and “Morsi [sic] [a senior MB leader] pointed out that peaceful
change does not happen overnight.” Herein, senior leaders of Hamas and the Muslim
Brotherhood are testifying, and in the process adding credibility and strength to the claims of
opposition towards Al-Qaeda and support for peaceful change.

197
Finally, epithets are adjectives or descriptive phrases expressing a quality
characteristic of a person, a thing, or a phenomenon. In the Egyptian Brotherhood rhetoric
numerous epithets are used for qualifying individuals, groups, actions, beliefs, insinuating
support for them. Some instances can be: “MB representatives are credible,” “righteous
Shari’a,” and “moderate Islamic movement.” In the use of the epithets “credible,”
“righteous,” and “moderate,” a positive stance towards MB representatives, Shari’a, and
Islamic movement, respectively, is decried.
The rhetoric of opposition. Opposition, viewed as resistance, contrast, or dissent, is
primarily exhibited through negative other-presentation, testimonials, and epithets. This
rhetorical move is featured across all three sections analyzed for this study; in the portrayal
of stance towards Israel and the Zionists in MB versus Al-Qaeda, stance towards Western
agents’ support for authoritarian regimes in MB and the West, and the stance towards the
Egyptian regime in Parliament.
Focusing on specific rhetorical tactics, Van Dijk’s (1998) “ideological square” (p.
267) (elaborated in Chapter 4) includes negative other-presentation as an instance of rhetors
making selections to portray an out-group entity in a negative manner. It must be reiterated
that negative other-presentation is significant to the larger contextual strategy of positive selfpresentation. Instances of negative other-presentation are numerous in the Egyptian MB
rhetoric—associating Al-Qaeda and Al-Zawahiri with negative actions and intent, portraying
Western agents as supporters of authoritarian regimes, qualifying the Egyptian regime as
dictatorial, and Zionists as sly, are exemplars. A few examples of negative other-presentation
in the rhetoric are: “Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak conveniently use the Brotherhood as
an excuse to prevent serious reform,” “Egyptian regime turned the political competition into
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a security manhunt,” “infighting that serves only the Zionist enemy,” and “[the Zionist
enemy] seeks to lead slyly and maliciously the Palestinian people.” Thus also, by implication
the Egyptian MB is self-presenting as an organization that: dissociates itself from Al-Qaeda
and Al-Zawahiri and from negative actions and intent; opposes authoritarian, dictatorial
regimes and Western agents’ alliance with the same; and does not condone malicious acts
such as the kind practiced by Zionists.
Testimonials and epithets, defined earlier, are used by the Egyptian MB to show
opposition towards ideas, entities, and actions. Some examples for testimonies are, “Dr.
Mohamed Habib, First Deputy Leader of the MB, added that there are no prospects of any
dialogue with US” and “Al-Sameraie [a senior member of the Iraqi political system] pointed
out that Al-Qaeda network in Iraq has a foreign agenda.” In the first example, Habib testifies
to the Egyptian MB’s stance towards dialogue with the US; and in the second, Al-Samaraie
testifies to the negative intent of Al-Qaeda, that of having a foreign agenda. Both are
instances of prominent individuals testifying for the Egyptian MB to strengthen the latter’s
claims of opposition—towards dialogue with the US, and Al-Qaeda’s holding a “foreign
agenda.”
Instances of use of epithets for qualifying individuals, groups, actions, and beliefs,
insinuating opposition, are numerous in the Egyptian MB rhetoric; “repelling violence,” “the
Zionist enemy,” and “Zionists…lead slyly and maliciously” are some examples. In the use of
the epithets “repelling,” “enemy,” and “slyly and maliciously” a negative stance towards
violence, and Zionists, respectively, is manifest.
The rhetoric of contradiction. The key rhetorical tool used to manifest contradiction
is ambiguity, specifically, theoretical ambiguity. In turn, four predominant rhetorical devices

199
entail theoretical ambiguity—action over substance, generalization, implication, and
antithesis. Jasper and Young (2007) define theoretical ambiguity as “fuzzy theoretical and
causal arguments, which rely on audiences’ unstated assumptions and understandings to fill
them in” (p. 273). Using this as foundation, I define theoretical ambiguity manifest in the
Egyptian MB rhetoric as fuzzy theoretical expressions of alliances, values, and goals through
the use of action over substance, generalizations, implications, and antitheses, which rely on
the audiences’ subjective interpretation of these unstated assumptions and understandings to
fill them (the audience) in.
To elaborate on the rhetorical devices, for action over substance the Egyptian MB
explicitly emphasizes positive or negative, in other words, nuanced actions—support, reject,
allow, confirm, condemn—to manifest its stance towards an idea or entity such as violence,
jihad, the Al-Qaeda worldview, Islam, and democracy. Yet, the substantive explanations for
what violence entails, what specifically separates the Al-Qaeda worldview from the Egyptian
MB worldview, how Islam and democracy can (or cannot) co-exist, etc., remain vague and
flimsy, thus manifesting ambiguity. In the following four statements—“what kind of jihad
has the Al-Qaeda network claimed to have done?” “jihad movement will emerge again but in
a peaceful method,” “jihad will not be used as a counterforce against the Muslim
Brotherhood,” and “any way other than the method of jihad will only lead to loss and
failure”—several actions are associated with jihad, and each of these statements presents
jihad in either a positive or negative way. Nevertheless, none of these statements manifest a
comprehensive and clear description of how the Egyptian MB defines jihad, that is, the
substance of jihad as perceived and practised by the Egyptian MB.
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Ambiguity is also manifest in numerous generalizations, or presence of less-specific
criteria, in the Egyptian MB rhetoric. One predominant instance is the use of generalized
agents, such as “the West,” “Islamic groups/movements,” “We” (people in general),
“Muslims,” “fringe extremist elements,” and “national and political powers.” The use of
generalizations precludes comprehension of diverse viewpoints and stances, as well as
context-specific understandings; this adds to the ambiguity characteristic of much of the
Egyptian MB rhetoric. Two further instances of ambiguity caused as a result of
generalizations are: “Islamists will not impose their beliefs”—is this true of all Islamists?;
and “Muslims do not accept to deeply discuss the Qur’an”—is this true of all Muslims?
Implication, or stating something non-explicitly, is yet another rhetorical tactic that
leads to ambiguity and multiple interpretations. For example, the Egyptian MB’s implication
of an Islamist identity and never a direct mention of it, and its implication of what violence
entails for the Egyptian MB rather than a concrete description and avowal, lead to ambiguous
interpretations of the Egyptian MB’s stance towards Islam, and violence, respectively.
The final rhetorical device is antithesis, or “juxtaposition of contradictory ideas in
balanced phrases” (Nordquist, 2011, para. 1). A classic instance of the use of antithesis in the
Egyptian MB rhetoric is in the statement “Muslim Brotherhood supports Hamas although it
is a terrorist organization.” The use of the action verb “supports” shows clear agreement for
Hamas; at the same time “although” in “although it is a terrorist organization” insinuates
distancing from Hamas on the issue of terrorism. This antithetical presentation of stances
creates ambiguity and complicates understanding of the nature of support the Egyptian MB
has towards Hamas.
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Summary and Answers to RQs 1 & 2
RQ1: What is the ideology manifest in the English-language rhetoric of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood in www.ikhwanweb.com?
Four major dialectical tensions, namely, openness and closedness, autonomy and
connectedness, equality and inequality, and possession and deficiency inherent in the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s English-language rhetoric in Ikhwanweb bring forth four
fundamental dimensions that form its worldview. These are: (a) the absence of trust towards
the Egyptian regime and certain Western agents; (b) the need to be valued by Western
agents; (c) the importance of exercising caution in its online communications; and finally (d)
the flux resulting from its efforts to transition into an organization that has successfully
balanced its Islamic ideals with its democratic aspirations. This worldview is termed
Counterpublic Cyber Islamism, and is shaped and influenced by: (a) the Egyptian MB’s role
as an Islamic counterpublic functioning within an authoritarian environment patronized by
certain Western agents; and (b) the Egyptian MB’s use of its English-language website as a
counterpublic sphere to attain political legitimation.
RQ2: What rhetorical strategies provide support for this ideology?
Three rhetorical paradigms, the show of support, the portrayal of opposition, and the
display of contradiction, and specific rhetorical tactics within these paradigms such as
consubstantiation, resource sharing, negative other-presentation, testimony, epithet, and
theoretical ambiguity feature predominantly in the Egyptian MB rhetoric. Support is
exhibited through consubstantiation, resource sharing, testimony, and epithet, and in different
degrees and intensities is manifest across all three sections. Opposition is primarily exhibited
through negative other-presentation, and testimonials. This rhetorical move is also featured
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across all three sections analyzed for this study. The key rhetorical tool used to manifest
contradiction is theoretical ambiguity. Theoretical ambiguity, in turn, entails four rhetorical
devices—action over substance, generalization, implication, and antithesis.
Thus, in this chapter I answered RQs 1 and 2. In the forthcoming and final chapter of
this study, I include a discussion on the implications of the Counterpublic Cyber Islamist
worldview and rhetorical strategies supporting it on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s
online counterpublic dynamics. I also comment on the ramifications that Counterpublic
Cyber Islamism might hold for Western thinking and praxis towards Islam and politics, the
potential the Internet might (or might not) have for counterpublics in the context of the
Middle East, and the role of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the global civil sphere. All
these discussions are included within the scaffolding of the consistencies with and extensions
to existing literature, and the theoretical and practical contributions of the findings of this
study. I conclude this project by outlining the challenges that marked it, and by making some
heuristic suggestions and future recommendations for research.
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Chapter VII: The Way Things Stand
This study began by presenting the predicament of the Muslim Brotherhood—the
attack it faces by agents of secular and democratic change such as Western agents who often
view it as a radical, extremist movement, and at the same time condemnation from the end of
agents of militant, radical jihad, for participating in elections and supporting democratic
principles. In addition to this is the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s quandary with the
Egyptian regime; namely, the Hosni Mubarak regime that suppresses it, defiles it, and
challenges it. Counterpublic Cyber Islamism is a reflection and resultant of these external
pushes and pulls the Muslim Brotherhood as a counterpublic to the wider publics—Western
agents, militant fundamentalist organizations, and the Mubarak regime—has been
experiencing in its struggle to succeed and sustain as a movement with both an Islamic and a
democratic ethos.
In this chapter, as I further a discussion on the implications of Counterpublic Cyber
Islamism I perform some tasks that bring this study to a meaningful completion. First, I
discuss the research questions and how the findings of my analysis of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood’s English-language rhetoric in Ikhwanweb find their niche in the academic
literature. Second, I discuss the theoretical and research implications, as well as the practical
implications of the findings. I end by presenting the limitations of this study, and the
possibilities it opens up for future research.
Findings and Contributions to Literature
A rhetorical analysis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s contributions in
Ikhwanweb, as featured in the three sections—Muslim Brotherhood versus Al-Qaeda,
Muslim Brotherhood and the West, and Parliament—brought forth a worldview
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characterized by dialectical contradictions; an ideology that, in the Egyptian Brotherhood’s
positioning of its identity, its allies and foes, its notion on how a society should work, the
resources it sees available to it, and most importantly, in its conceptualization of the
relationship between Islam and democracy, manifests endemic dialectical tensions. The four
core tensions identified are the following: (a) openness and closedness, that is, the desire to
be open and share information versus the desire to be private; (b) autonomy and
connectedness, or the need to separate to maintain uniqueness versus the desire to have ties
and connections with others; (c) equality and inequality, or the desire to be considered as
equals versus the desire to develop levels of superiority; and (d) possession and deficiency,
that is, the need to portray what we have versus the desire to manifest deficiency, or what we
do not have.
These dialectical tensions point to four core elements that constitute the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood’s Counterpublic Cyber Islamist worldview. These are: (a) distrust
towards the Hosni Mubarak regime and Western agents who aid and support authoritarian
governments; (b) the need to be valued—to be respected, to be considered equals, to be
understood without prejudices, to be acknowledged despite differences—by Western agents;
(c) the significance of caution in its online communications; and finally (d) the flux resulting
from its efforts at transitioning into an organization that has an Islamic ethos but nurtures
democratic aspirations. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s worldview thus interpreted in
this dissertation is a unique perspective on the dynamics resulting from the confluence of
online Islamism and counterpublicity.
The dialectical contradictions are exhibited through three rhetorical paradigms, the
show of support, the portrayal of opposition, and the display of contradiction. To be specific,
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the show of support is manifest through the rhetorical tactics of consubstantiation, resource
sharing, testimonials, and epithet. Consubstantiation is the rhetorical tactic of uniting two
entities by focusing on the substance/s that connect them; resource sharing is the tactic
wherein rhetors show support for an individual or group by allowing the latter to use its
resources; testimony is evidence in support of a fact or assertion; and epithets are adjectives
or descriptive phrases expressing a quality characteristic of a person, thing, or phenomenon.
The show of opposition is manifest through negative other-presentation, testimonials,
and epithet; with testimony and epithets defined earlier, negative other-presentation entails an
instance of rhetors making selections to portray an out-group entity in a negative manner and
by implication portraying itself in a positive manner. Finally, the display of contradiction is
expressed through theoretical ambiguity, or vague theoretical expressions of alliances,
values, and goals by rhetors that rely on the audiences’ subjective interpretation of these
unstated assumptions to fill them (the audience) in. Theoretical ambiguity in turn includes
action over substance, generalization, implication, and antithesis. Action over substance is
the rhetorical tactic of presenting explicitly nuanced actions, but fuzzy substantive and
context-based explanations to qualify the actions; generalizations include the use of less
specific criteria to qualify an entity or phenomenon; implication is the rhetorical tactic of not
stating something explicitly; and antithesis is the “juxtaposition of contradictory ideas in
balanced phrases” (Nordquist, 2011, para. 1).
With these findings unearthed and interpreted from the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood’s rhetoric, it becomes expedient to consider their place within the existing
literature on counterpublicity, and research that focuses on the role rhetoric and new media
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play within the scaffolding of counterpublic communication. In that endeavor, I present the
consistencies with existing literature, followed by the contributions that extend it.
The congruities. There are some significant issues around which the findings of this
study find congruence with the existing literature on counterpublicity, counterpublic rhetoric,
and Internet and counterpublicity. To begin with, the literature on counterpublics states that
most definitions of counterpublic share three key features—oppositionality, constitution of a
discursive arena, and the dialectic of retreat and engagement with other publics. The findings
of my study show that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood functions like a true counterpublic
on all three counts.
According to Brouwer (2006), oppositionality is characterized by a stance of
“resistance, rejection, or dissent” (p. 197), and the communication of exclusion following
marginalization by dominant, wider publics. The Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric depicts
opposition towards all three groups it functions as a counterpublic to—militant
fundamentalist organizations (predominantly Al-Qaeda in this study), Western agents, and
the Egyptian regime. It also voices exclusion, for instance, the exclusion it experiences as a
result of the Egyptian regime’s suppressive acts and demonizing efforts against it; working
within the framework of a dictatorial regime that banned it and propagates the Brotherhood’s
image as an extremist organization associated with violence, clearly diminishes the Egyptian
Brotherhood’s prospects during elections as well as its potential for a positive relationship
with Western agents. The Egyptian Brotherhood exhibits this exclusion in the way it’s
rhetoric portrays the Egyptian regime and the vilifying maneuvers the regime undertakes that
have cost the Egyptian MB a good image and an unprejudiced understanding of its goals and
actions by the world.
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Continuing on the matter of marginality and exclusions, from the point of view of the
Internet, according to Castells (1996) one of the characteristics that makes the Internet unique
is interactivity. Castells (1996) states that in “a society organized around mass media, the
existence of messages that are outside the media is restricted to interpersonal networks, thus
disappearing from the collective mind” (p. 336). The Internet can be considered as an
electronic analogue of interpersonal networks, which allows interactivity and thus comes
with the possibility to bring otherwise marginalized topics before the collective mind
(Underwood, 2010). Also, the Internet is unique in that it provides open access. From the
point of view of the Egyptian Brotherhood, an organization functioning in a dictatorial and
authoritarian environment where mass media is mostly controlled, co-opted, or influenced by
the Egyptian regime, Ikhwanweb, although not an interactive platform per se, provides the
Egyptian Brotherhood an alternative forum. This alternative forum guarantees open access
and a comparatively greater possibility for introducing marginal and counterdiscourses in the
collective mind, than mass media can.
As regards the second feature of counterpublics, the constitution of a discursive arena
entails the creation of imagined communities (Anderson, 1991) through asynchronous
communication by those communicating oppositional stances, over and above meeting
together in physical spaces (Brouwer, 2006). A significant example of the creation of
community through asynchronous communication is observable in the discourse and
dynamics around Hamas manifest in Ikhwanweb. Through rhetorical devices, such as
consubstantiation, resource sharing, and testimonials, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
shows support for Hamas. Through these rhetorical tactics it also creates a sense of an
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imagined community with Hamas wherein both the Egyptian Brotherhood and Hamas
express their oppositional stances towards Al-Qaeda and Israel.
Finally, counterpublics entail a dialectic of inward and outward address as a response
to the experience of exclusion (Brouwer, 2006; Felski, 1989; Fraser, 1992a). Specifically,
Fraser (1992a) points at the publicist orientation that counterpublics often assume which
reveals this dual character; she observes that they function both as spaces of withdrawal for
regroupment, as well as training grounds for agitational activities that are directed towards
wider publics. For both Fraser (1992a) and Felski (1989), the emancipatory potential of
counterpublics emerges in this dialectical movement of withdrawal and reengagement with
wider publics. In addition, the dialectic of inward and outward address “which foregrounds
the status of relations between dominant and subordinate as one of mutual influence and the
status of rhetorical structures and practices as contingent” (Brouwer, 2006, pp. 199-200),
reveals that counterpublics communicate with the like-minded with an understanding that
communication will be directed toward or constitute other wider publics.
Following in the vein of the above claim, in the context of this study the dialectic of
inward and outward address can be identified in the following dynamics. The Egyptian
Brotherhood’s inward communication gets manifest in the creation of an imagined
community wherein the Egyptian Brotherhood shares common oppositionality with Hamas,
it shows support towards the Egyptian people, Copts, and Egyptian students, who also
function within an authoritarian environment and fight for human rights, reforms, and
equality, and in the Egyptian MB’s show of support for the Palestinian people’s legitimate
resistance against Israeli occupation and their fight for democracy. As for its outward
address, the nature of Ikhwanweb—an English-language website—guarantees that the
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Egyptian MB’s inward communications and positionings naturally get directed towards and
constitute the English-speaking Western world, the Egyptian regime, and Al-Qaeda.
To elaborate, the emancipatory element in this dialectic, enhanced by the use of a
website in English, rests in the ability of the Egyptian Brotherhood to use its inward
communication for an outward positioning wherein: it presents itself with self-determination
for the Western world; it acts as an opposition force against the Egyptian regime; and it
separates itself from militant fundamentalists. To add to this, analysis of the Egyptian MB
rhetoric unearths a worldview characterized by dialectical contradictions thus reinforcing the
presence of dialectical dynamics in counterpublics’ relationship with wider publics.
The issue of identity is yet another important concept existent in the counterpublic
literature. Fraser (1992) suggests that subordinated social groups often “constitute alternative
public . . . in order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional
interpretations of their identities…” (p.123). The Egyptian Brotherhood’s rhetoric manifests
no clear avowal of an Islamist identity, although this is one of the most commonly used terms
in Western policy and academic circles to qualify the Egyptian Brotherhood; and this term
often entails a negative connotation. This shows that the Egyptian Brotherhood uses
Ikhwanweb to formulate an interpretation of its identity that is not predominant, and
circulates counterdiscourses about the same. In addition, on the question of identity, Poster
(2001) argues “Internet discourse constitutes the subject as the subject fashions himself or
herself …” (p. 211). In other words, communication online requires linguistic acts of selfpositioning (Poster, 1995). Thus, as aforementioned, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood uses
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its cyber rhetoric for self-positioning as it makes the choice to steer clear from the term
Islamist.
In addition, inequalities as explicit topics for debate is a necessary feature of
counterpublicity (Asen & Brouwer, 2001; Fraser, 1992a); the contribution of inequalities is
to articulate difference as a resource for public deliberation and discourse in the public
sphere. As defined earlier in the study, difference, following Young (1997), is viewed as a
resource necessary for discussion-based politics, the aim and objective of which is cooperation, reaching understanding, and doing justice. In the rhetoric of the Egyptian
Brotherhood, several instances stand out as articulation of differences—the Egyptian
Brotherhood presents its support for elections, thus articulating difference with Al-Qaeda; the
Egyptian Brotherhood opposes Western agents’ friendly stance with authoritarian regimes
and questions their true intent behind reform and democracy promotion in Egypt; lastly, it
expresses opposition towards the harassment the Hosni Mubarak regime metes out to voices
against the Egyptian government. The expression of these differences becomes resources for
public deliberation and discourse in the public sphere.
Solely from the standpoint of rhetoric, the rhetorical study of counterpublic spheres
does not always focus on consensus, but the goal is often to understand “how counterpublics
identify themselves” and “challenge the conventions of dominant discourse” (Doxtader,
2001, p. 66). The Egyptian MB’s rhetoric clearly portrays that its goal is not to gain
consensus—rather, the Egyptian MB uses its rhetoric to position and identify itself in its own
terms, challenge the dominant discourse circulated by the Egyptian regime and several
Western agents that portrays the Brotherhood in negative terms, and express differences that
become resources for public deliberation.
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Lastly, on the matter of Islam and the Internet, according to Eickelman and Anderson
(1999) the Internet has created a public sphere where an increasing number of participants
can take part in the discourse on Islam, giving rise to a cyber plurality that leads to
fragmentation and recombination of a myriad of ideas, understandings, and experiences
about Islamic thought and practice. Through its rhetoric in Ikhwanweb, the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood contributes to the ongoing discourse on the potential and problems of
establishing and maintaining a political system that is based on democratic ideals, and at the
same time has an Islamic ethos, in other words, the Islam versus democracy discourse.
With this I conclude my discussion on the consistencies my findings share with the
existing literature, namely, in the ways in which the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood acts like
an apt counterpublic, and how it uses Ikhwanweb and its cyber rhetoric for self-positioning,
to express differences that become resources for public deliberation and discourse in the
public sphere, and to participate and contribute to the discourse on Islam and democracy. The
following section details the additions to the existing literature this study makes.
Extensions to the existing literature. There are some significant directions in which
this study extends the existing literature. First, the dialectic of inward and outward address,
an important feature of counterpublicity, has been elaborated above; this study contributes to
the counterpublic literature by extending the dynamics of counterpublic dialectics from
solely an inward and outward mode of address (Brouwer, 2006) to the foundation and basis
of an overall worldview that entails several core tensions manifesting in a counterpublic’s
identity positionings, relational positionings, idea of society and political views, and view of
resources available or unavailable to it. In other words, the dialectical tensions are not just
regularities endemic to most relationships which manifest in speech acts, but rather, the flux
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reflects the profoundly complex social, political, and global contingencies the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood is subjected to, and thus needs to adapt itself to for survival.
Second, in keeping with the fact that the basis of dialectical contradictions identified
in the literature reviewed for this study is in interpersonal relational dynamics, the core
contradictions consistent with previous research on relational dialectics were not adequate to
conceptualize the endemic tensions manifest in the Egyptian MB’s counterpublic rhetoric.
Out of the four core contradictions identified in the Egyptian MB rhetoric, only the first
three—openness and closedness, autonomy and connectedness, equality and inequality—are
consistent with previous research on relational dialectics (Baxter, 1988; Cheney et al., 2011).
The fourth core tension, possession and deficiency, is unique to the Egyptian MB rhetoric.
This suggests that the nature of counterpublic relationships, being different from
interpersonal relationships, introduces new and unique tensions and extends our
understanding of relational dynamics beyond interpersonal particularities.
Finally, literature on counterpublic communication has focused extensively on the
predominant purposes of counterpublic communication, which have been the expression of
opposition (Felski, 1989), the attainment of consensus (Asen & Brouwer, 2001), and the
expression of difference as a resource for public deliberation (Fraser, 1992). This study adds
another purpose and goal to counterpublic communication—the expression of dialectical
contradictions by counterpublics to evade commitment and complete disclosure vis-à-vis
wider publics. The inability to trust wider publics as a result of the history of suppression and
marginalization and the need to be cautious in using online modes of communication to
safeguard itself from hostile repercussions, make communication of counterpublics—that
function within authoritarian frameworks and use online communication to voice their
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concerns and criticisms—ambiguous. This ensures their sustenance and success. In the
following section I discuss the theoretical and research implications, and the practical
implications of the findings of this study.
Implications of Findings
It is important to discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this study; to
situate it within the larger academic discourse, as well as find its significance for practice and
policy. In this section I begin by elaborating on the research implications of the findings—on
counterpublic studies, on the study of rhetoric, and Internet communication. Thereafter, I lay
out the practical implications, in other words, how the findings of this study find significance
for practice and policy.
Research implications for counterpublic studies. Addressing the issue of
counterpublicity, in this study the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was positioned as a
counterpublic to three wider publics—militant fundamentalist organizations, the West, and
the Hosni Mubarak regime—and exploration of its counterpublic dynamics with each of
these wider publics was one of the objectives of this analysis. The Egyptian Brotherhood’s
rhetorical positionings and stances towards each of these wider publics emphasized some
inclinations and patterns; these inclinations and patterns hold significance.
On the relationship with militant fundamentalist organizations, the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood’s rhetoric shows opposition towards Al-Qaeda, shows support for democratic
ideals and human rights, and rejects extremism. In the process it reinforces its criticism
against Al-Qaeda, and positions itself as a movement that is stepping away from the path of
violent jihad and imbibing moderate, peaceful means to gain political legitimation, as well as
showing its support for democratic ideals. At the same time, Hamas, which is viewed as a
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militant organization by Western agents and professed to be a terrorist organization by the
Muslim Brotherhood in its rhetoric, is also shown strong support. Thus, the counterpublic
dynamic noticed herein reveals that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood does not base its
support or opposition solely on differences in action and ideology, but also on shared
histories and strategic goals.
In other words, although both Hamas and Al-Qaeda are considered radical and
militant in their action and ideology, the Egyptian MB chooses to show support for one and
not the other. It must be considered that Hamas is supposedly the Muslim Brotherhood’s arm
in Palestine, and despite being militant, it participates in elections and is a significant
component of Palestinian politics, none of which can be attributed to Al-Qaeda. Furthermore,
because of the nature of its political ethos, Hamas perhaps holds more credibility for Western
agents than Al-Qaeda, which post-9/11 has been explicitly marked as the antagonist.
The implication this observation has for research is that, when the dynamics of the
relationship between counterpublics and wider publics is studied, the problem of exclusion,
marginalization, and oppression should not be the only factors scholars should consider.
Depending on context the importance of history, political motives, and international and
global repercussions become indispensable to understanding the nuances and the diverse and
complex dynamics that characterize counterpublics’ relationship with wider publics.
As regards Western agents, the Egyptian Brotherhood’s rhetoric shows support and
the desire to cooperate with Western agents in some instances, whereas in some other
contexts the MB rhetoric portrays discontent, dissociation, and advisory maneuvers. This
constitutes one of the major dialectical tensions discussed—equality and inequality—and
also forms the foundation for the two key elements—trust and value—of Counterpublic
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Cyber Islamism. This implies the need for counterpublics to not base their communication
only on stances of agreement and consensus, but also of difference and opposition with the
rationale that success for counterpublics can also be rooted in the show of assertion and
exercise of agency.
The counterpublic dynamics exhibited in relationship to the Egyptian regime also
make an important contribution. As an Islamic organization functioning outside the Egyptian
Parliament, the Egyptian MB is seen to have compromised agency. However, as members of
the Egyptian Parliament, the Egyptian MB representatives are seen to be active and
influential. The implication of this on counterpublic studies is that counterpublics might find
avenues and fissures within a system dominated by wider publics through which they can
exercise agency. Thus, for scholars studying counterpublicity, it becomes important to
identify these fissures and avenues and study counterpublic dynamics therein, rather than
always looking at counterpublics as monolithic groups placed against wider publics. In other
words, as monoliths counterpublics might appear as groups lacking agency, which can
become a faulty premise to start evaluating counterpublicity; it is in finding the moments and
places where counterpublics vacillate between holding agency and having none, that a richer
and nuanced understanding of counterpublic’s relationship with wider publics can be
attained.
Research implications for rhetorical studies. For the implications of this study on
rhetoric, three predominant rhetorical moves, that of support, opposition, and contradiction
come forth, each of which are manifest through rhetorical devices such as consubstantiation,
negative other-presentation, theoretical ambiguity, etc. The overall worldview that is brought
forth by the rhetoric is one that has its basis in dialectical contradictions. Some significant
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questions arise vis-à-vis these findings: are these dialectical tensions a consequence of the
inherent psychological pushes and pulls that characterize relationships?; or in the context of
counterpublics, specifically a counterpublic like the Egyptian MB that functions within
complex social, political, historical, and global circumstances, portrayal of these dialectical
tensions is strategic?; or is it a combination of both?; can the study of rhetoric respond to this
dilemma?; finally, does a rhetorical study that looks at actions to interpret the symbolic
dramas, which in turn help interpret the ideology and worldview of a counterpublic, truly
capture the complexities of a counterpublic’s relational dynamics with wider publics?
I claim that a study of this nature can identify the essence of a counterpublic’s
worldview; thus, this dissertation has been successful in unearthing the core elements that
constitute the worldview of Counterpublic Cyber Islamism exhibited by the Egyptian
Brotherhood. This is a worldview that in counterpublic relationships and corresponding
communicative dynamics manifests distrust, caution, the need to be valued, and a state of
transition. In identifying these elemental components of the Egyptian Brotherhood’s
worldview, assumptions could also be made as regards its strategic intentions.
In addition, three more claims can be made. First, this analysis brought forth the use
and importance of rhetorical tactics such as consubstantiation, negative other-presentation,
theoretical ambiguity, resource sharing, testimonials, and epithets to portray dialectical
contradictions in the Egyptian Brotherhood’s counterpublic negotiations with three wider
publics, in its English-language website. This is a contribution to rhetorical theory as it aids
in understanding yet another practice of communication by counterpublics—presenting
dialectical contradictions through rhetorical devices in an online forum of expression.
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Second, this study also focuses on the rhetorical strategies used by a unique
counterpublic—the Egyptian MB—which functions within a complex and distinctive set of
circumstances. This becomes an instance of norm generation that can serve as a productive
guideline for rhetoricians studying the dynamics of counterpublics who function within
similar contextual frameworks as the Egyptian MB. Finally, the findings of this study have
implications for society at large and moves beyond just the rhetorical event. That is, the
implications of dialectical contradictions unearthed through rhetorical analysis are of
significant import to the way the Western world may view and approach the Egyptian MB,
its place in the Egyptian political scene, and its real-world relationships with wider publics.
Thus, based on Foss (2004) and Gronbeck (1975), this study fulfills all the primary goals of
rhetorical criticism; namely, appreciation of rhetorical structures and processes, generation of
norms or productive guidelines, and advocacy.
Research implications for studies on Internet and counterpublicity. In addition to
the dynamics of identity positioning, its emancipatory potential, and a forum for expression
of difference and exclusion discussed earlier, few more significant implications of the use of
Ikhwanweb need to be elaborated. First, Ikhwanweb has been used as a counterpublic sphere
in this study, and the intended audience of this website is the West. This makes it obvious
that the dynamics in Ikhwanweb are intended towards Western agents, but, as mentioned
earlier, audiences beyond those intended also access this English-language website. Hence,
although the Egyptian Brotherhood as a counterpublic performs its actions in Ikhwanweb for
the Western audience, its actions have implications for other publics. Second, a website such
as Ikhwanweb is not an interactive forum per se; thus it has its limitations on that front.
However, due to the features of open access and being less constricted than traditional mass
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media, specifically in the context of authoritarian environments, a website does provide a
comparatively freer forum for counterpublic expression and positionings.
Finally, apart from the oft-stated and most obvious tasks of expressing opposition and
exclusion, manifesting support, and voicing difference that Ikhwanweb enables, some
additional functions of Ikhwanweb vis-à-vis the Egyptian MB’s counterpublic expressions
need to be stated. To begin with, it acts as a forum for presenting information that might not
always be nuanced. Also, the elemental feature of hypertext (elaborated in Chapter 2), and
the ability to navigate between webpages, allows a counterpublic to present a huge amount of
information and a diversity of viewpoints with ease. Most importantly, the online forum
allows counterpublics to prioritize issues and place them in a way that brings forth the
counterpublic’s agenda. In other words, it aids in the agenda-setting function of the
counterpublic—agenda-setting theory states that media have a large influence on audiences
by their (the media) choice of what issues to consider major and what minor, and how much
space to give them (Cohen, 1995). Two exemplars related to this study are: (a) the Egyptian
Brotherhood’s assigning certain issues and acts major position, and others minor; and (b)
among the three sections of the website analyzed, placing more Egyptian MB contributions
in some sections and less in others. All these additional functions and dynamics transpire
through Ikhwanweb. Thus, for scholars studying the Internet as a forum for counterpublic
expression, the counterpublic dynamics should be studied along the aforementioned lines as
well. This completes the discussion around theoretical implications, and is followed by the
practical implications of the findings of this study.
Practical implications for Western agents’ monolithic treatment of the MB. This
study began on the premise that the Muslim Brotherhood’s image for many in the Western
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world is that of a radical, extremist organization, unsupportive of democratic ideas and
principles, an organization that holds an all-encompassing vision of Islam and advocates the
primacy of Shari’a, the Islamic law, over the Rule of Law, and one that is against the West. In
addition, the Brotherhood’s ideology, objectives, and actions have been associated with
ambiguity and inconsistencies. Leiken and Brooke (2007) describe the Brotherhood as “a
collection of national Islamist groups with differing outlooks,” (p. 108), and to address the
ambiguity surrounding the Muslim Brotherhood I claimed that each national faction needs to
be studied separately so that a contextual understanding of the MB’s worldview and actions
can be gained. This could minimize misunderstandings, clarify the ambiguities, and curtail a
monolithic treatment of the group by Western agents. In that endeavor, I studied the Egyptian
faction of the MB.
This study has made some stances clear. Rhetorical implications have been that the
Egyptian Brotherhood is against extremism and terrorism, and it supports peace and
moderation. Instances of support for democratic principles, such as participation in elections,
are featured. An all-encompassing vision of Islam with emphasis on righteousness and the
importance of Shari’a is seen, yet at the same time, support for modernization and religious
tolerance are expressed. Finally, its stance towards Western agents is put in context as the
Egyptian Brotherhood’s grievances towards the former are asserted; sometimes gestures of
cooperation and at others gestures of criticism and caution towards Western agents are
portrayed.
Most importantly, the Counterpublic Cyber Islamist worldview depicting distrust,
caution, the need to be valued, and a state of transition is brought to light. Typifying this
worldview is an inherent tension and struggle: a struggle motivated by the Egyptian
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Brotherhood’s efforts to make the values of Islam and democracy work harmoniously
together; a struggle emanating from the effort to separate itself from Islamic militant
organizations that choose the path of extremism to create a world dominated by Islam; and
finally, the struggle against the Hosni Mubarak regime that uses the discourse of extremism
to taint the image of the Egyptian MB. In the face of these complex dynamics, the Egyptian
Brotherhood’s efforts at coping, surviving, and succeeding entail communicating some clear
positionings, some ambiguities, and the hugely noteworthy suggestion that Western agents
must make an effort to come closer to the Egyptian MB to get a contextual understanding of
its goals and actions, rather than viewing the MB as a monolith.
Practical implications for the Egyptian MB’s role in civil society. The findings of
this study show that the Egyptian MB functions as a true counterpublic; albeit this is a
rhetorical portrayal of its counterpublic potential through Ikhwanweb, its forum for
counterpublic expression. Through its rhetoric, by showing support for human rights, popular
choice, religious tolerance, democratic ideals, and peace, it expresses support for values
central to a civil society. By using Ikhwanweb as its forum for counterpublic expression, the
Egyptian MB voices experiences of exclusion and marginalization, communicates difference,
negotiates, critiques, opposes, and shows association; in all these respects, the Egyptian MB
exhibits actions innate to civil society actors and aligns itself with features inherent to a
functioning and robust civil society. Thus, through its rhetoric, the Egyptian MB presents
itself as an active and positive civil society force. This has important implications; by using
Ikhwanweb, its English-language website, to manifest and carry out its civil society and
counterpublic dynamics, the Egyptian MB presents itself as a promising and potential civil
society actor to the Western world, worthy of cooperation with Western agents, worthy of
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sustaining a significant position within the Egyptian civil sphere, and worthy of participating
in and contributing to the global civil sphere.
Practical implications for Islamism. This study makes a unique contribution to the
ongoing debate on the issue of compatibility between Islam and democracy; in other words,
the place of Islam not only as a religion but also a political program, especially one with
modern democratic principles. Based on the findings of this analysis I suggest that the debate
on Islam and democracy within the discourse of Islamism, and the feasibility or lack thereof
of Islam and modern institutions of democracy—participatory elections, popular choice, nonviolent constitutional means, peaceful political reform—to be compatible, should turn to
post-Islamism.
To elaborate, Bayat (2007) states that the Islam and democracy discourse has perhaps
gotten stalled in the cycle of “The Perverse Charm of an Irrelevant Question” (contents
page). He elaborates:
As a point of departure I interrogate the infamous question of “whether Islam is
compatible with democracy” by demonstrating that the realization of democratic
ideals in Muslim societies has less to do with the “essence” of Islam than with the
intellectual conviction and political capacity of Muslims. For it is individuals, groups,
and movements who give meaning to “sacred” injunctions; the disposition of a faith,
whether tolerant or repressive, democratic or authoritarian, is determined primarily by
the attributes of the faithful. The question of democratic polity is then one of political
struggle rather than religious scripture… (Preface).
He suggests that the right question is not whether Islam is compatible with democracy or not,
but rather under what circumstances and in which ways Muslims can make them harmonious.
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In that vein he transitions beyond Islamism to bring in the idea of post-Islamism. Bayat
claims that:
Post-Islamism represents both a condition and a project. It refers to political and
social conditions where, following a phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy,
and sources of legitimacy of Islamism are exhausted, even among its once-ardent
supporters….Islamism becomes compelled, both by its own internal contradictions
and by societal pressure, to reinvent itself, but it does so at the cost of a qualitative
shift….As a project, post-Islamism represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and
rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty. It is an attempt to turn the underlying
principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in
place of singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scripture, and the
future instead of the past. It strives to marry Islam with individual choice and
freedom, with democracy and modernity….[it] is expressed in acknowledging secular
exigencies, in freedom from rigidity, in breaking down the monopoly of religious
truth. (pp. 10-11)
Thus, Bayat (2007) proposes a form of coming together of Islamic values and values
of modernity, which is neither anti-Islamic, nor un-Islamic, nor secular. Instead, the focus is
on the ability of Islam to correspond to democratic ideals, which is primarily dependent on
whether those who abide by the aforementioned perspectives and stances are able to establish
their political hegemony in society. What one descries in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s
rhetoric is a moment of transition, an effort at rethinking and reforming its existent Islamist
worldview.
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The new Counterpublic Cyber Islamist worldview captures and constitutes this
transition, and represents the Egyptian Brotherhood’s struggle to come to an understanding
of the Islamist reformulation. For Western agents what this means is that the Egyptian
Brotherhood must be seen through a new lens; one that is not prejudiced, one that does not
prejudge, and one that tries to contextualize and understand.
In this section I presented the theoretical and practical implications of this study.
Specifically, the research implications for counterpublic studies, rhetorical studies, and
studies on Internet and counterpublicity, and the practical implications for Western agents’
monolithic treatment of the MB, Egyptian MB’s role in civil society, and Islamism. I now
turn to the challenges this project encountered.
Challenges During the Journey
Every project is marked by challenges; in this section I will briefly outline some of
the challenges this project faced. In the period of approximately three years it took this
project to reach its completion, the Muslim Brotherhood’s website underwent several
modifications. A few months into the project’s inception Ikhwanweb underwent a dramatic
transformation on both design and substance fronts; consequently, some modifications
needed to be made to this project’s approach and conceptual framework.
Thereafter, Ikhwanweb goes through regular minor modifications, mostly in the
positioning of its articles. For instance, at times entire sections from the website are deleted,
and contents belonging to the section are placed under other headings, which can be reached
only through the function of article search. That is, these changes are not declared or
conspicuous, and only one familiar with the website can identify these and navigate his/her
way through Ikhwanweb to find what is lost. Furthermore, after the January 2011 Revolution
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in Egypt, the sections MB and the West and Parliament have been deleted, although the
contents exist hidden within other webpages of the site. After choosing my articles for
analysis from the three sections, I saved printed copies of all articles to work around this
inconsistency.
Yet another challenge was the changing nature of politics in Egypt, and especially,
the January 2011 Revolution, which led to the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak, brought
the Muslim Brotherhood in the center stage of the political arena, and majorly affected the
discourse within Egypt and internationally around politics, religion, and civil society in the
region. This challenged the productive contingency of this dissertation vis-à-vis
contemporary political and social change in Egypt and the region, and some time had to be
devoted to raise the significance of this work.
Also, by placing the Egyptian Brotherhood as a counterpublic to three wider publics,
I undertook a mammoth task. With a huge amount of data to analyze and interpret, several
complex contexts informing this project, the changing nature of the website and the political
scenario within Egypt and the region, and numerous rhetorical dynamics of counterpublicity
to take into consideration, at times this study became extremely challenging, overwhelming,
and unmanageable.
Finally, I have studied a website—Ikhwanweb—to explore, interpret, and understand
counterpublic dynamics. However, websites, specifically the one in question, is not
interactive; it does not allow a glimpse into the counterpublic dynamics that are manifest in
fora such as social networking sites where the options of reciprocity and interactivity are
high, and which contain potentially rich dynamics of counterpublicity. Nevertheless, this
study focuses on the use of a website, which is an important forum for counterpublic
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expression in repressive environments; specifically, how the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
uses its English-language website for counterpublic expression in an authoritarian
environment—therein lies its significance. With the challenges and limitations stated, it
becomes important to close this study by recommending some directions for future research
on this terrain and topic.
Future Directions
I complete this study by presenting four recommendations for future research. First,
in order to gain a multi-perspective understanding of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s
counterpublic dynamics, varied approaches need to be taken. For instance, in this dissertation
I have analyzed rhetoric present in three specific sections of Ikhwanweb, and chosen
contributions made by the Egyptian MB as my artifact. However, the Egyptian MB states in
Ikhwanweb that other views are also present in the website. I believe that despite being
outside views the Egyptian Brotherhood’s editorial and administrative policies have an
impact on which other comments can be included in Ikhwanweb. Analysis of these views
and voices can help explore the multivocality present in Ikhwanweb, which can bring forth
interesting observations and insights.
Earlier in this chapter I introduced the concept of agenda setting and its implications
to this study. Although that did not form the predominant focus of analysis, future research
may benefit from looking into the agenda setting aspect of counterpublic communication,
especially on online fora. This can potentially unearth some significant insights into the use
of new media as a tool for agenda setting, and the consequences of such use, by
counterpublics.
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Yet another direction that future scholars can take is to study the Brotherhood’s use of
Facebook, Twitter, or other social networking or microblogging sites, in order to capture the
counterpublic dynamics and negotiations present therein. Since these technologies have been
dominant in providing the impetus for, as well as sustaining, the 2011 Egyptian Revolution,
it might be extremely important and contingent to understand how these new media and
technologies are used for counterpublic negotiations.
Finally, the recent Egyptian Revolution has changed the political dynamics within the
country dramatically. Consequently, the role and importance of the Egyptian Brotherhood
has also changed. Now the Egyptian Brotherhood has perhaps taken on the role of the wider
public in relation to religious minorities like Coptic Christians in Egypt and secular parties
within the Egyptian political system. If the tables are turned, and the Egyptian Brotherhood
becomes the wider public, how does its rhetorical dynamics and worldview (or do they)
change, is an important point to ponder. What happens when counterpublics become the
wider public? These are critical questions to consider.
Conclusion
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is a distinct counterpublic that holds a worldview
unique to itself; thus, its counterpublic dynamics and its rhetorical acts are also idiosyncratic.
Yet, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is also representative of several moderate Islamic
organizations in the Middle East that are struggling to find a niche within the democratic
discourse, as well as stay true to their Islamic sensibilities. These organizations are most
often counterpublics enmeshed in complex relationships with such wider publics as the West,
their respective secular, authoritarian governments, as well as extremist organizations
responsible for demonizing Islam. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Counterpublic Cyber
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Islamic worldview, though specific to it, nevertheless brings to light the quintessential
dilemma that typify these moderate groups: how can organizations with inherent Islamic
convictions be the harbinger of democratic realities in the Middle East?; how can they
contextualize the core ideals of democracy in terms relevant to predominantly Muslim
societies?; are their democratic aspirations and actions genuine, or are these short-term
tactical maneuvers simply ways to find political predominance to establish Islamic
theocracies?
Based on my analysis of its rhetoric in Ikhwanweb, I assert that the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood has genuine democratic intentions. Inherent in its Counterpublic Cyber Islamic
worldview is a need for reform; the dialectical tensions, the mistrust, the desire to be valued,
the need to be cautious, and the manifestation of flux, are all pointers to its struggle—to
transition into an entity within the Egyptian society that can counter authoritarianism,
promote human rights and peace, and support a form of government that maintains an
Islamic spirit but follows democratic practices. It becomes important to view this struggle
through a lens of understanding and trust, instead of suspicion.
Furthermore, the Egyptian Brotherhood uses Ikhwanweb as a counterpublic sphere
and the English-language rhetoric therein to voice support as well as opposition, circulate
counterdiscourses, express difference, and perform various rhetorical acts of self and otherpositioning, with the ulterior aim to reach out to the Western world. Its objective is to apprise
the Western world that Islamic organizations are not inherently extremist entities. The aim
also is to expose and condemn authoritarian regimes, which despite being secular neither
support democracy nor foster robust civil societies. In fact, the post-Mubarak Egypt of today
requires Western agents to pay more attention to the rhetoric of the Egyptian Muslim
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Brotherhood. This becomes imperative because Western agents can be potential allies,
supporting and assisting this Islamic organization to play its optimum role within Egypt, so
that all Egyptians can reach their manifest destiny—live as free citizens in a democratic
Egypt.
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